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ABSTRACT
WILLIAM KINDRED WINECOFF: A Complex Political Economy of the Global
Banking System.
(Under the direction of Thomas Oatley)
The global financial crisis which began in 2007 is the most severe economic event since
the 1930s. The profound political and economic consequences of the crisis have clarified
the need to better understand the financial system at both micro and macro levels. This
dissertation advances research on both fronts. First, it utilizes network prominence mea-
sures to look at the pre- and post-crisis organization of the global banking system, finding
that American prestige has increased as a result of the crisis. Second, it employs com-
plex network theory and inferential statistical models to explain why the global banking
system is organized as it is, finding that endogenous processes interact with monadic and
dyadic political economy variables to produce a global structure. Third, it examines bank
behaviors at the firm level, demonstrates that representative agent models are insufficient
for explaining the patterns observed, proposes an alternative approach drawing from eco-
logical finance theory, tests the model using Bayesian regression, and finds support for the
new approach. In sum, this dissertation demonstrates the need for further quantitative po-
litical economy work at both the micro and macro levels of the global financial system and
provides several possible pathways forward.
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1 FINANCIAL POWER AND THE GLOBAL CRISIS
1.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis which began in 2007 was widely expected to weaken U.S.
hegemony. Nearly every possible configuration of the future of world politics has been
proposed as likely to emerge from the crisis: apolarity, region-based multipolarity, a hege-
monic shift to China, institutional multilateralism, a fragmentation of multilateral institu-
tions, the end of the nation-state as the relevant unit of analysis, the end of capitalism, the
end of democracy, the creation of Bretton Woods III, a reversion to Bretton Woods I, and
more. These conversations convey the sense that there should be some significant change
resulting from the largest financial crisis since the previous period of hegemonic transition.
These accounts shared a premise if not a conclusion: the Anglo-American model of finance
capitalism has been discredited. The crisis has been compared to the end of the Cold War
(Cohen 2009b) and has been called a “transformative moment” (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009,
208); there was a palpable sense that an epochal shift was underway. How could it not be?
Despite such speculation there has been surprisingly little empirical analysis of the ways
in which the global financial system has changed since the crisis. This is of vital impor-
tance to post-crisis conversation on the distribution of power in the global economy, but to
this point most analyses have focused on the effects of the crisis on attributes of individual
countries (e.g. inequality or debt in the United States, growth in China), regional integra-
tion efforts (e.g. strains within the European Union), institutional reform (voting shares in
the IMF, shift in economic governance from the G7 to the G20), or regulatory reforms at
the national and international levels. Each of these political economy processes has been
powerfully impacted by the spread of the crisis through global markets in ways which are
conditioned by linkages in the global economy; none of them is fully understandable with-
out reference to the complex interdependencies in the world economy from which power is
constructed. The fact that post-crisis speculation has out-paced empirical analysis indicates
that the pre-crisis observation of Cohen (2000) may be accurate:
Theory calls for a reasonably parsimonious and well specified set of propo-
sitions about behavior - statements that are both logically true and, at least
in principle, empirically falsifiable. In that sense no true theory of monetary
power may be said, as yet, to exist.
The same is true of financial power more generally. The geopolitical importance of
financial power is well-demonstrated. Financial power is inextricably linked with hege-
monic projects (Sobel 2012), restricts the ability of states to wage war in some instances
(Kirschner 2007), and in others provides opportunities for war-making without resolving
domestic political disagreements over how to pay for them (Oatley 2013). Yet financial
power is more often recognized than measured. Contrary to previous conceptualizations
of financial power imported from bargaining theory (Drezner 2007), I argue that financial
power arises from prominence within market structures which perform in non-monotonic
ways. Unlike earlier intuitive conceptualizations of structural power (Strange 1987), I pro-
vide measures of prominence which are employed to show that the global banking system
was affected by the crisis in several ways. First, overall cross-national connectivity initially
declined as the crisis began and spread. In this way, comparisons to the 1930s crisis and
global depression were apt. Unlike the 1930s, however, this deterioration in connectivity
was temporary rather than persistent: since 2009 the system has been reinforced rather than
fragmenting further. Second, unlike the 1930s, the position of the most prominent country
– the United Kingdom then, the United States now – at the core of this system has increased
as a result of the crisis by some measures, and remained constant by others. The United
Kingdom has remained secondarily prominent since 2009, while continental Europe has
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generally declined and the so-called BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
– have remained quite peripheral. No other countries have increased in prominence as a
result of the crisis. Some others, including tax havens, have fallen in importance.
This outcome was generally not anticipated either before the crisis or after it. But quite
early on, it was possible to notice that in some key ways this time was different. As a recent
review of the literature noted:
In most emerging-market countries over the previous two decades, the bursting
of domestic financial bubbles was accompanied by capital flight, which only
exacerbated these countries financial crises by generating exchange rate depre-
ciation and higher interest rates. But foreign funding of the United States –
both public and private – continued during the crisis, even as the United States
lowered interest rates dramatically. Indeed, the dollar even strengthened as the
crisis became more severe after mid-2008. ... IPE scholars have not yet pro-
duced detailed explanations for the foreign support provided during the crisis.
... But it seems very likely that one of the most important explanations was
the structural position of the United States in global financial markets. De-
spite the enormity of the U.S. financial troubles at the time, the U.S. Treasury
bill remained the investment of choice for financial institutions and investors
scrambling for liquidity and security in the midst of the panic (Helleiner 2011,
81).
It is not just emerging economies which faced capital flight during this crisis. A number
of OECD countries did as well, among them Iceland, Ireland, Greece, and Spain. Germany
and France were net exporters of banking finance before the crisis, and the United Kingdom
switched from being a net recipient to a net sender. But despite suffering the worst internal
financial crisis since the 1930s, flight from the United States was moderate and temporary.
Moreover the phenomenon was not limited to Treasury bills. Thus, faced with a similar
3
situation – a domestic banking crisis – some countries experienced capital outflows while
others experienced capital inflows. As Helleiner notes, an approach which focuses on the
internal attributes of states has difficulty explaining this outcome. Nevertheless, it has ma-
jor implications for the future performance of the global banking system, and in particular
the ways in which power is distributed within it. Prior theory in international political
economy, which has primarily focused on the internal attributes of states as being the pri-
mary determinants of capital flows, have difficulty accounting for these divergent outcomes
(Cohen 2009b; Oatley 2011).
This realization is reflected in the policymaking community. The shift in focus among
regulators from “too big to fail” (TBTF) financial institutions to “systemically important
financial institutions” (SIFI) is revealing: TBTF considers internal characteristics, while
SIFI places the emphasis on positions within structures. While the two may correlate they
are conceptually distinct. This change in thinking took hold quite suddenly during and
after the crisis. The report to the G7 of the Financial Stability Forum on April 7, 2008
contained no mention of “systemically important” institutions, and indicated that risk in the
global financial system was concentrated in the largest firms that operated cross-nationally
(Financial Stability Forum 2008).1 Seven months later, following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, the first meeting of the Group of 20 (2008) tasked their finance ministers with
“defining the scope of systemically important institutions and determining their appropriate
regulation and oversight”.2 Since then, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and
national regulators have worked to define SIFI by firms’ positions within the structure of the
global financial system in addition to traditional criteria such as size (Bank for International
Settlements 2011; Price and Walter 2011).
1The section of interest in the Financial Stability Forum report is VI.10, p. 52.
2Point 10.
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SIFI are more important than other firms, even other large firms, because their promi-
nent position within financial markets gives them influence which is both broad and deep.
There is an increasing awareness among policymakers that these positions confer politi-
cal power. Shortly after leaving her post as Director of Policy Planning for the U.S. State
Department, Anne-Marie Slaughter made explicit the argument that the U.S.’s role in the
world is determined by its position within a network structure:
For the next decade, the United States should pursue of a grand strategy of
network centrality. The most important shift for America is not the rise of
China and the realignment of power in the international system, but rather the
ubiquity and density of global networks. Existing grand strategies – such as
primacy, containment, offshore balancing, isolationism, selective engagement
and order building – assume a world of states acting essentially as unitary
actors with defined military, economic, and diplomatic strategies. ... However,
even if [states] are the principal actors in the international system, they now
act side by side with many types of social actors who are able to come together
and act independently on the world stage. The resulting [network] system is
messy, complex, and frustrating. Yet wishing for a simpler world will not make
it so. (Slaughter 2012, 45)
Among these “types of social actors” are financial institutions. Slaughter is arguing
that the U.S. should exploit as strategy the position of the U.S. at the core of the global
economy, as this confers distinct geopolitical advantages beyond the U.S.’s internal mate-
rial capabilities. A corollary is that each country’s position within this structure conditions
outcomes and opportunities for that country. As the recent crisis demonstrated, the organi-
zation of the entire system is a meaningful variable which powerfully impacts interactions
and interdependencies among countries.
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This mode of thinking is not entirely new to studies of power within the global econ-
omy. Applications of network theory in international relations go back at least to Hart
(1974). Knoke and Burt (1983) and Knoke (1990) defined power in terms of prominence
within networks, although the networks they analyzed were not complex. The complex
interdependence tradition often used network logics if not network empirics, and following
Susan Strange the British school of IPE frequently considered power to be at least partially
determined by structural position (Strange 1982, 1987, 1998). But conceptualizations of
power which employ network theory and quantitative methodologies are far from the norm
in contemporary international political economy.
Nor has the awareness of the importance of structure percolated far into contemporary
theories of interdependence, which are often presented in terms of diffusion which operate
at the dyad-level. Diffusion is only one dynamic process of interdependence, and it does
not involve the overall structure of relationships as being a meaningful condition. Similarly,
very little work has considered structural dynamics as something that can be theorized
systematically and measured empirically (Cohen 2000). This is of particular concern in the
study of power in global banking (Cohen 2009b; Keohane 2009). A conceptualization of
structural power that is operationalized in terms of complex networks offers avenues for
the development of such a theory and the tools for an empirical examination of it.
I focus on two general types of structural power – prestige and centrality – which are
in some ways analogous to “sensitivity” and “vulnerability” in theories of complex inter-
dependence (Keohane and Nye Jr. 1973). I offer several measures of each which contain
distinct properties. While I apply this framework to the global banking system, I suggest
that it may be useful in analyses of power in systems of security, production and exchange,
and information and knowledge. I use the recent global financial crisis to consider how a
complex network approach can help us understand developments within this system which
were not expected ex ante in a theoretically coherent and empirically sound manner. These
6
results suggest that the hegemonic position of the United States has not disappeared as a
result of the crisis, at least in banking, contrary to the expectations of many, because of pro-
cesses which have previously been identified by network scientists but have not yet been
appreciated by political economists.
So a complex network conceptualization of power is not merely orthogonal with prior
conceptualizations of the global system. There are several advantages which come with the
network approach. Among them are a wide range of statistical measures with known prop-
erties in complex systems. Another is a scientific expectation of future performance of the
system which draws from a large literature studying social processes in other disciplines.
That is, a complex network conceptualization of the global banking system not only allows
us to measure key features of the power distribution in that system empirically, but to infer
the likely patterns of future relationships from the distribution of prior relationships. Thus,
complex network theory and methods offer important additions to existing explanations of
power dynamics, which are generally constructed post hoc.
This paper presents a theory of power as stemming from prominence within interde-
pendent markets; defines particular forms of this power with substantive value for scholars
and policymakers; develops a taxonomy by which states may be considered as core or pe-
ripheral, bridges or prestigious, insiders or outsiders; and provides measures of each. It
applies this conceptualization to the global banking system pre- and post-crisis, and shows
how the crisis affected the global banking system, emphasizing the ways in which change
(or no change) could have been anticipated by this approach but not prior approaches. As
such, I show how a power-based approach which emphasizes prominence within networks
fulfills the theoretical demands of Cohen (2000) in a way which lends itself to quantitative
analysis.
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1.2 Global Banking as a Complex Network
The global banking system is comprised of a set of contractual relationships which
exists across national boundaries. Taken together, these relationships can be conceptualized
as a network in which individual units (i.e. nodes) are connected via financial obligations
(i.e. ties) to other units. The units, in turn, can be conceptualized as individual investors or
firms, or as aggregated units such as national banking sectors. The connection of the system
of nodes and the relationships between them constitute a single entity whose outcomes are
considered at the level of the network rather than the node or dyad. Thus, in a network
context, the unit of analysis is the system itself rather than any particular component which
exists within it such as a national economy or firm.3
Networks are often described in terms of the distribution of ties linking nodes.4 These
distributions can take many different organizational forms, which are referred to as topolo-
gies. Generally, there are two ideal types of networks: those in which the topology is
trivial – ties between nodes are formed according to a random process whereby new ties
are formed with equal probability – and those in which network topology is non-trivial –
ties between nodes are formed partially in response to the endogenous characteristics of
the network itself. The former are random, the latter are “complex”. Complex networks
are often characterized by a heavy tail in the distribution of link between nodes, assortative
mixing between nodes, the formation of communities within the network, and (often) a
clearly hierarchical structure. Almost all real-world networks are complex. As we will see,
so is the global banking system.
The topology of the network matters. Networks behave differently under different prob-
ability distributions of tie-formation: if the topology is trivial, nodes will attract links with
3In this context “system” is not meant to bring to mind billiard balls and functionally undifferentiated
bargaining units concerned with relative and/or absolute gains. It is meant to connote a structure of interde-
pendence which encompasses the global economy: a complex adaptive system with a non-trivial topology
(Oatley, Winecoff, Danzman, and Pennock 2013).
4“Ties” may also be referred to as “links” or, depending on the context, as “edges” or “arcs”.
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equiprobability; if the topology is non-trivial, some nodes will attract links with a higher
probability than others. This probability may be related to some inherent trait possessed by
some nodes, or it may relate to properties of the network structure. In finance, consider two
decision rules for portfolio allocation. In the first, investors determine which firms to invest
with by following the advice of economist Burton Malkiel in his famous book A Random
Walk Down Wall Street: with efficient markets, the performance of all firms will be the
same in expectation. Given that, a portfolio allocation rule which collects some monkeys,
blindfolds them, has them throw darts at a board listing financial institutions, and allocates
money according to where the darts land is as good as any other ex ante (and possibly better
than most) (Malkiel 1973). As many monkeys throw many darts many times, the distribu-
tion of financial ties will converge to the Gaussian normal distribution: few firms will have
very large or very small numbers of clients, and the mean and median number of ties will
be equivalent.
Under a different portfolio allocation decision rule, firms are treated as units whose ex-
pected investment return is partially a function of internal fitness and partially a function
of the connections that firm has to other actors (Baraba´si and Albert 1999; Bianconi and
Baraba´si 2001). The attractiveness of Goldman Sachs as a counterparty may have some-
thing to do with its particular skill at investing, but it also involves the fact that Goldman
Sachs has strong relationships with many other actors in the financial, business, and gov-
ernment sectors: it is prominent in the financial system. So Goldman Sachs attracts new
business because it previously attracted business, and as this dynamic reinforces itself over
time the distribution of ties between nodes in the financial system will be skewed and have
a heavy tail: some (like Goldman Sachs) will attract a large number of ties while most at-
tract very few; the mean will be much larger than the median (Newman 2005). As new ties
are formed the network will not only become more densely connected but will also cluster
around a small number nodes.
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Whether the distribution of ties is distributed in a way which more closely resembles
a normal or skewed probability distribution is important on its own, but it also has impli-
cations for the development, evolution, and stability of the network. In random networks
information, viruses, financial crises, or other “shocks” will impact every node with roughly
equal probability as they diffuse through the system. In a complex network this is not the
case: the probability of contagion – or any other process involving interdependence – varies
by whether a node is in the core or periphery.5 As such, an understanding of the empirical
reality of the global banking system is a prerequisite for building theory, locating puzzles,
and understanding the system.
1.3 Power As Prominence: Centrality and Prestige
Networks are generally described in terms of the amount and distribution of connectiv-
ity. These two criteria allow us to consider structural features of the total network as well
as the relative importance of particular nodes within that structure. Each of these features
has substantive importance for the behavior of the network. In this section I describe the
the network of global banking relationships from before and after the crisis, focusing first
on the network at an aggregate level before shifting to an analysis of the distribution of ties
between nodes. The underlying data come from the Bank for International Settlements’
consolidated banking statistics on an immediate borrower basis.6 The network is “egocen-
tric”, meaning that full information is available for only a subset of nodes. In this case, the
5For more discussion on this point see Oatley et al. (2013).
6In an online appendix I also report the results for the same banking statistics on an ultimate risk basis,
which distinguishes between the host country of a financial institution and its home country. The difference
between the two is most noticeable when considering the role of off-shore financial havens: in the immediate
borrower statistics, cross-national holdings of an American bank in a subsidiary in the Cayman Islands would
be classified as a tie from the United States to the Cayman Islands; in the ultimate risk basis it would not
be, as the terminal liability remains in the United States. As a result, the immediate borrower data tend to
overstate the importance of tax havens and understate the importance of “true” financial centers. The overall
distribution of the network is similar in both data sets, but for the sake of conservatism I employ the immediate
borrower data in the text and report the ultimate risk data in the appendix. Additionally, the appendix reports a
full time series of all measures for both data types, from 1999-2012 using the data on an immediate borrower
basis and from 2005-2012 on an ultimate risk basis.
10
Figure 1.1: A depiction of the global banking network in the fourth quarter of 2007, before
the global financial crisis. The spherical layout exists in three dimensions, with nodes
spaced equidistantly around the surface of the sphere.
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Figure 1.2: A depiction of the global banking network in the third quarter of 2012. The
spherical layout exists in three dimensions, with nodes spaced equidistantly around the
surface of the sphere. The most significant changes from the crisis include the weakening
of European prominence, and the switch of the U.K. from net receiver to net sender of bank
assets.
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data-collecting process involved surveying “egos” (roughly two dozen leading economies)
regarding their connections to “alters” (every other economy in the world), but the recip-
rocal information was not collected. There are methods for correcting the potential bias
which could result from this, but for now it is simply worth pointing out that any problems
with the egocentric nature of these data will tend to under-emphasize the importance of
financial centers, especially those which attract many in-links from diverse sources.
Figure 1.1 presents a snapshot of the global banking network before the global financial
crisis, while Figure 1.2 reports the same network in the most recent period for which data
are available. The nodes are national financial systems, which form ties when banks in one
jurisdiction have claims on banks in another jurisdiction.7 The ties are directed – assets
owned by country i that are held in country j generates one weighted tie while links from
country j to country i generates a separate weighted tie – while the width of each tie is
proportional to the amount (in U.S. dollars) of the ties connecting the two nodes. The
nodes are arranged uniformly (in alphabetical order) on the surface of a sphere; thus, this
layout portrays the network in three dimensions.8 The size of nodes are the summation of
all of the ties connecting to that node. The color of node indicates whether the node has
more in-links than out-links (red) or the opposite (black). The size of the edges indicate the
strength of the relationship between two nodes.
From a glance at this visualization we can see the importance of the United States
(and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom) in the global banking system was not much
diminished by the crisis. Those two countries have far more cross-national banking ties
7This network therefore depicts stocks of assets, not flows.
8Force-directed layout algorithms, such as that proposed by Fruchterman and Reingold, are often not
visually appealing for directed networks with weighted edges and a large number of nodes. A circle layout,
in which nodes are arrange equidistantly in a two-dimensional space, also makes visualizations of networks
with a large number of nodes difficult, as nodes tend to be “stacked” on top of each other. The sphere layout
used here helps correct both problems by allowing us to see “through” the network. For the same reason,
however, it may be difficult to spot nodes and connections that are not at the front of the sphere. In the online
appendix I present several alternate layouts, including a two-dimensional circle as well as force-directed
visualizations in which the network has been dichotomized according to various thresholds.
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than any others, and this is not proportional to simple differences in size of the national
economy. Most countries are so peripheral that they are not even visible. Moreover, the
United States has been a net host for foreign bank holdings during the entire period under
observation; all of the other important nodes are net senders.9 In short, the United States is
the world’s banker: a tremendous proportion of overall network activity can be described as
the rest of the network being organized around depositing assets into U.S. banks.10 In some
ways, as described below, the status of the U.S. as the global banker has been enhanced by
the crisis.
Although these are merely snapshots, they already reveal the extent to which the crisis
presented less of a transformation than many expected: there was little fundamental reor-
ganization of the network. From this, we might conclude as Oatley et al. (2013) did that
the U.S. is likely to remain in possession of the bulk of structural power in global banking.
But we can go much further by calculating statistics which describe key features of the
network, and linking them to conceptions of power within systems. In particular, we can
isolate different forms of power which arise from structural positions within the network.
These, in turn, follow from the distribution of ties within the network.
Often, we are concerned with the distribution of ties in a network because they con-
stitute outcomes in many static analyses, but also because they function as inputs guiding
future tie formation in dynamic networks. The distribution of ties across nodes determines
nodes’ prominence. A node is prominent if it is conspicuous relative to other nodes. Specif-
ically, I consider the two types of node prominence proposed by Knoke and Burt (1983):
9Note that “under observation” here means 1999-2012. The U.K. was a net receiver until the third quarter
of 2008, when it became a net sender in response to the global financial crisis. Italy was the most important
node (other than the U.S.) that was a net receiver of bank assets until the height of eurozone crisis in the
third quarter of 2010. Ireland and the Cayman Islands (abbreviated ‘KY’ in the graph) were the next most
significant recipients prior to the crisis, but both receded after it. In the ultimate risk data the importance of
both Ireland and the Cayman Islands is reduced.
10Prior to the crisis Gourinchas and Rey (2007) characterized the U.S. as the world’s venture capitalist, as
it borrowed short, lent long, and generated excess returns on its foreign investments.
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Out-Links
In-Links
Low High
High Central
Sender
Core
Low Peripheral Prestigious
Receiver
Table 1.1: A taxonomy of country type, delineated by the distribution of ties in the global
banking system.
centrality and prestige.11 In brief, central nodes send many ties while prestigious nodes
attract many ties. In this way the direction and intensity of ties connecting nodes is impor-
tant for theory and inference. If we distinguish between ties a node sends and ties a node
receives, we may find large asymmetries. The level of prestige increases as the number of
ties a node receives increases. In this way, all prestigious nodes have high prominence on
at least one dimension but not all nodes with high prominence are prestigious. The same is
true for centrality. We can distinguish between types of nodes according to their position
within the structure of the network, as in Table 1.1: those which attract many in-links and
send many out-links constitute the core of the network. Those which attract many in-links
but send few out-links are prestigious receivers; their mirrored image are central senders.
Those who receive few in-links and send few out-links are peripheral nodes.
11This framework was explicitly extended to political networks in Knoke (1990), which indicated that node
prominence is related to, and is in fact one conceptualization of, power in the international political economy
and other political systems. See pp. 10ff.
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Note that different uses of terminology exist in the literature.12 Some refer to in-links
as “prominence” (or “prestige”) and out-links as “influence” (Hanneman and Riddle 2005).
In many social systems such a separation may make sense. But in financial systems, dif-
ferent forms of influence come from an ability to attract a large number of in-links and
from extending a large number of out-links. Because banks act as intermediaries between
savers and borrowers, they must first receive finance before they can lend it out. Thus, a
bank’s out-link influence is dependent upon its capacity at persuading savers to entrust
their funds to the bank: its in-link influence. This persuasion capacity will vary with
the bank’s prior performance in successfully transforming in-links into out-links, from
saver− > bank− > borrower and, eventually, back again. Therefore, I distinguish
between types of prominence: the broad influence of prestigious nodes and the narrow
influence of central nodes.
Both prestigious and central nodes are prominent in networks. Prominent nodes have
the quality of being “in the thick of things” (Freeman 1978, 219). That is, most activ-
ity within the network involves them in some way. Prominent positions give the nodes
that occupy them power over the broader network such as a capacity to initiate (or curtail)
certain types of activities. In informational networks, prominent nodes disproportionately
influence the spread of information from one part of the network to other parts. In viral
networks, prominent nodes are capable of communicating disease to more victims than
peripheral nodes. Destroying the prominent nodes in terrorist networks can fragment the
12“Centrality” is a general term, often applied to high rankings on various measures of prominence as
in the quote from Anne-Marie Slaughter reproduced above. Most of these were developed in analyses of
undirected networks, where a tie connecting i and j is represented by i−−j rather than i− > j or i < −j.
In undirected networks centrality and prominence refer to the same concept. Thus, the literature often does
not distinguish between prominence and centrality, and the latter term is more common in these cases. A
Google Scholar search for “network centrality” (including quotes) returned 8,870 results on March 2, 2013.
Omitting the quotations increased that number to 153,000 results. I use a narrower definition here both for
reasons of precision – the global banking system is comprised of directed ties – and also to emphasize that
central nodes are less critical than prestigious nodes for some functions in the global banking system.
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entire organization, causing it to cease functioning. The collapse of a “systemically impor-
tant financial institution” (SIFI), and only the collapse of a SIFI, can threaten the collapse
of the entire financial system.13
The concept of prominence is relatively easily to understand. It simply implies that
some nodes are more important than others according to some criterion, and that the im-
portance of these nodes is defined in some manner by its connections with the rest of the
network. Because of the importance of prominence, its properties have been extensively
studied. In real-world networks, prominent nodes are those which exist at the core of the
network structure, such as the hub of a wheel. Most nodes are connected to it and to rel-
atively few other nodes. Scholars in international relations have recently defined power in
terms of network prominence (Nexon 2009; Carpenter 2011), sometimes using alternative
language to describe the same intuition.14
But while the general intuition of prominence is easy to grasp, precise operational-
izations of the concept beg the question: what trait should “prominence”, as a concept,
prioritize? Prominence may be measured by degree, which counts up the number of other
nodes to which one node is tied. It may operationalized as strength, the weight on each
of those ties. Since not all ties are equivalent, perhaps we should consider what types
of connections nodes have in addition to the amount of connections, thus conceptualizing
prominence in terms of Eigenvector scores: ties to other high-tie nodes are weighted more
heavily than ties to low-tie nodes. Prominence could also refer to the number of paths –
linear or geodesic – in which a node is situated between two other nodes, which has im-
plications for transmission through networks that the former measures lack, since nodes
with high betweenness prominence will serve as bridges connecting various clusters in the
13A summary discussion of types of prominence can be found in (Borgatti 2005), although he focuses on
unweighted and undirected networks and thus uses the term “centrality” rather than “prominence”.
14For example, Strange (1987) refers to the “structural power” that states attain by being at the center of
the global system, but never explicitly uses network terminology. Oatley et al. (2013) describe prestige in the
global banking system but refer to it as “centrality”, following previous literature.
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network.
1.4 Degree-Based Measures of Prominence
In network studies, “degree” refers to the number of ties connecting one node to other
nodes. A node with high degree prominence is thus in contact with many other nodes.
As a result, high-degree nodes have the ability to influence the entire network in some
way. There are a variety of degree-based prominence measures. In its simplest form,
a node’s degree is the number of other nodes to which it is connected. In a weighted
network where ties can take on values other than zero or one, the cumulative weight of
all of a node’s connections – its cumulative degree – is known as its “strength”. In a
directed network in-links may be distinguished from out-links, and the total in-strength may
function as a measure of prestige while total out-strength measures centrality. Moreover,
the distribution of degree centrality tends to be durable: nodes which are prominent at time
t tend to remain prominent at time t+1 (Burt, Marsden, and Rossi 1985). This tendency
becomes increasingly important when the size of the network changes over time. As new
connections are formed between nodes, the probability that they will involve high-centrality
nodes is higher than the probability that they will involve low-centrality nodes.15
The size of the global banking network is largely invariant across time in one sense: the
number of national banking systems (nodes) generally does not change from one period to
the next. As a result, we should expect degree prominence to remain relatively fixed. But
new relationships are frequently formed (or dissolved) between banks in different jurisdic-
tions, so the density of the network may vary significantly from one period to another. This
is especially true when the network is “shocked” by a crisis. As a result, the relative promi-
nence of nodes as measured by strength may change quite a lot over time. If we expect
nodes with an initial strength advantage to increase in relative importance as the network
15There are various mechanisms by which this might occur, including preferential attachment, triadic clo-
sure, reciprocity, reinforcement, and more. For reasons of space parsing which mechanisms are operating in
the global banking system is beyond the scope of this analysis, but can be done using inferential statistical
models in the exponential random graph and stochastic actor-oriented network model families.
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develops, we should also understand that this dynamic may not be a monotonic function
of a linear process: some relatively high-strength nodes may lose ties when shocked, while
others gain.
Figure 1.3: The weighted in-degree (in-strength) distribution before (black) and after (red)
the financial crisis. Overall network connectivity suffered, but the United States, and to a
lesser extent the United Kingdom, remain the most prestigious nodes.
Figure 1.3 shows one measure of prominence in the global banking network, where
countries are arranged in alphabetical order and plotted according to their in-strength.16
Pre-crisis observations are depicted in black, while post-crisis observations are in red.
This snapshot shows a clear delineation between prestigious nodes, particularly the United
States, and all others. Most countries have very low in-strength: their banking systems do
not attract much foreign bank capital. A handful – including major European economies
and Japan – attract a significant number of strong ties, but far fewer than the U.S. The crisis
brought the U.S. back to the pack somewhat, and the U.K. somewhat more, but the gap is
16A time series animation is included in the online appendix. It shows that the prestige of the U.S. increased
over time before the crisis, after which it declined for several quarters before beginning to regain lost ground.
If recent trends continue, in other words, the U.S. will continue to separate from the rest of the nodes in the
system.
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still enormous.17 The gains by the BRICS – “BR”, “CN”/“HK”, “IN”, “RU”, “SA” – are
slight or non-existent. Keep in mind that many of the out-links of countries which might
“fly to safety” in the United States as the crisis spread to other locales are not reported
in these data; therefore, the gap between the U.S. and the rest is likely understated to a
significant extent.
How does this confer power? Cohen (2000) refers to “internal power” which comes
from prominence in the international financial system. If the United States is able to attract
foreign bank finance even during the worst crisis period since the Great Depression rather
than experiencing capital flight, then it possesses what Cohen refer to as the power of
“autonomy”. It is not constrained by foreign finance to the same extent as any other country.
It enjoys policy flexibility that others do not. And, indeed, we have observed this flexibility.
The U.S. has been able to engage in the most significant monetary expansion in modern
history without suffering a decline in the dollar’s value. It has been able to run trillion-plus
dollar deficits annually as it recovers from the crisis without a spike in the interest rate it
pays on its bonds. It has therefore been able to avoid the sort of harsh austerity which
have been imposed on other polities during crisis periods. And, perhaps more importantly
for this analysis, it has allowed its domestic banking sector to recover quickly from the
crisis, and become more active in the global banking system in other ways.18 Other major
economies – even the U.K., Germany, and France – have not had this flexibility despite
the fact that the crisis did not originate in those jurisdictions, nor were its effects most
pronounced there. This analysis shows one source of this internal power-as-autonomy: the
high level of American prestige in global banking.
The converse is also true. The spread of the U.S. crisis throughout the system had
17This could provide evidence either of capital flight or of wealth being destroyed by the crisis, thus
shrinking the value of the claims foreigners had on U.S. banks. Given other observable features of the global
financial system the most plausible explanation is the latter, but the former cannot be ruled out by these
measures.
18I expound on this below.
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devastating effects on many others. Thus, using the language of complex interdependence,
the high in-degree and in-strength of the United States implies a high level of sensitivity and
vulnerability of other countries in the face of a crisis in the U.S.19 In this context, sensitivity
would refer to the set of specific relationships between the U.S. and other countries, while
vulnerability would refer to the cumulative effect of all relationships.20
The crisis clearly eroded some of the absolute advantage the U.S. had over other states,
at least by this measure. But it did not erode the position of the U.S. at the core of the
system. Contrary to expectations, no country moved into a position from which it could
challenge American banking supremacy as a result of the crisis. As the network has begun
re-building itself it has done so by reinforcing American prominence.21 Thus, the hierar-
chical structure of the global banking system was not altered as a result of the crisis. In
fact, the most likely pre-crisis challenger to Anglo-American dominance – the European
Union – suffered (and at this writing continues to suffer) greatly from the crisis. The net
result appears to be a more unequal distribution of internal power – prestige – in the global
banking system than before the crisis.
But a simple plotting of in-strength does not tell us whether nodes attract a tremendous
amount of strength from one or two nodes, or whether it attracts quite a lot of bank finance
from many nodes. In the case of the United States’ position, this is important. If the U.S.
receives most of its finance from one country – perhaps Japan, due to developments in the
balance of payments – then it will have far greater influence over Japan than it has over all
19In Keohane and Nye’s framework, sensitivity refers to the ability of a state to avoid repercussions em-
anating from outside. Vulnerability refers to the inability of states to reverse patterns of outside influence
except at extremely high cost. In this case, the cost would likely be segregation from the network.
20Cohen (2000) thus refers to sensitivity as a relational concept and vulnerability as a structural concept.
While perhaps useful in some cases, this assumes that that the sensitivity of i to j is independent of those
countries’ relationships with k. This is now always, or perhaps even often, the case. I elaborate below.
21I again refer readers to the separate appendix which contains the full time series, in which this dynamic
is even more noticeable.
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Figure 1.4: The weighted in-degree (in-strength) distribution before (black) and after (red)
the financial crisis, at different α. The distribution appears to be exponential: an increase
in-degree does not correspond to a large increase in in-strength, except at the height of the
distribution.
other nodes.22 Conversely, if the U.S. receives a lot of strong in-links from many nodes, it
has broad influence over much of the system. In other words, the question is whether there
is a positive relationship between in-degree and in-strength: does the former rise with the
22China would perhaps be a better analogue than Japan, but China’s out-links are not reported in the BIS
data set. This is a reminder that the prestige of the U.S. (and probably some other countries) in the global
banking system is understated in all of these measures, probably to a significant extent.
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latter? If not, then prestige may be deep but narrow.
One way of parsing this is to plot both in-degree and in-strength on a two-dimensional
plane as in Figure 1.4.23 Here, we adjust the value of ties by a tuning parameter α as
proposed by Opsahl, Agneessens, and Skvoretz (2010), which allows us to adjust the level
of importance given to node strength relative to node degree. In other words, α allows
us to distinguish between two nodes, one of which attracts ties from 10 different nodes
each with a weight of 1, and another which attracts a tie from 1 node with a weight of
10. When α = 0, the measure is equivalent to the number of binary ties, which is a
node’s degree. When α = 1, the measure equals the sum of weighted ties irrespective
of the number of unique ties, which is a node’s strength. When 0 > α > 1, nodes are
rewarded for being connected to many other nodes; when 1 > α > 2, nodes are rewarded
for being strongly connected to other nodes. In Figure 1.4, the horizontal axis arranges
national banking sectors when α = 0.1 while the vertical axis places the same banking
sectors when alpha = 1.5. As we can see, there is a correlation between the two: the
same nodes tend to be prestigious regardless of which α is used, and an increase in one
measure generally coincides with an increase in the other. But the relationship appears
to be exponential. The U.S. is slightly more prominent than Germany and France when
strength is heavily discounted, but much more prestigious when it is rewarded.24 This
provides some preliminary evidence that ties may be formed by some sort of a preferential
attachment mechanism, “rich get richer” effect, and/or triadic closure. Structural processes
may guide tie formation in addition to national characteristics.
In-strength is not the only measure of prominence which is important. The out-link
23Again, see the separate appendix for a time series of these statistics.
24When alpha < 1, this statistic is very likely to be heavily biased against the United States, as in-degree is
restricted by the data collection process. The U.S. has a global presence in financial markets, while countries
like Germany and France have a predominately regional presence. This is demonstrated in the analysis of
a broader set of financial relationships examined by Oatley et al. (2013), which shows that the U.S. attracts
significant in-links from roughly 70% of the countries in the system; no other country attracts more than 35%
(the U.K.) and the distribution has an exponential decay.
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centrality of nodes provides them with another form of influence within the network. As
traditionally defined, senders of cross-national bank finance are powerful because they con-
trol the international supply of credit. Figure 1.5 shows that the centrality of the U.S., U.K.,
and Japan actually increased as a result of the crisis, while that of most European countries
fell significantly.25 Pre-crisis, the U.S. had a much higher prestige than centrality: it at-
tracted many more in-links than it sent out-links. Other countries, particularly European
countries, were larger net senders of bank finance. Post-crisis, many of those countries have
declined in out-link centrality, while the U.S. has risen markedly in addition to remaining
the most prestigious.
Figure 1.5: The weighted out-degree (out-strength) distribution before (black) and after
(red) the financial crisis. Overall network connectivity suffered, but the United States in-
creased in centrality. European prominence mostly declined.
The rapid post-crisis increase in the United States’ out-link centrality could be inter-
preted in several ways. First is as a fulfillment of responsibility to provide countercycli-
cal lending to the rest of the system when a crisis hits (Kindleberger 1973). This can be
25Note that out-link data is only collected for twenty-six countries in the BIS data set.
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translated into private self-interest with the same result: as the crisis spread from the U.S.
outward, and cross-national banking ties deteriorated (particularly in Europe), U.S. banks
were able to invest internationally because they recovered from the crisis first – due to the
substantial interventions made by American policymakers at the Treasury and Federal Re-
serve, and the lack of capital flight – and were willing to do so because such opportunities
were attractive. Indeed, it appears that most countries which could increase foreign lending
post-crisis did so: the U.K., Japan, South Korea, and Australia all increased their foreign
exposure. But none so much as the U.S., which nearly doubled the amount of claims on
foreign banks after the crisis.
This confers a distinct type of power from internal autonomy, what Cohen (2000) refers
to as “external power”, which involves mechanisms of control. In response to the crisis the
U.S. moved into position as a preeminent source of cross-national bank finance. Its ability
to extend (or not extend) this finance provides it with opportunities for control throughout
the system. It suggests that outcomes in other jurisdictions are dependent upon outcomes
in the United States to a significant extent. This not only gives the U.S. leverage in in-
ternational negotiations over global banking regulations (Oatley and Winecoff 2012), but
increases the dependence of the rest of the system on American finance, both as a safe
haven destination and as a source of finance capital.
The overall portrait of a degree-based measure of power is visible in figure 1.6. The
global banking network shows a sharp delineation between nodes with high prestige, those
which are prominently central but are not prestigious, and those which are not prominent
in any sense. Figure 1.6 plots countries’ out-strength (y-axis) against its in-strength, with
α = 1 for both.26 We again see that only one country is truly prestigious both before and
26Several things immediately stand out from the time series reported in the separate appendix. First, the
size of the network – the total number of cross-border financial relationships – has increased markedly in a
relatively short period of time. Second, the distribution of these links has not been equal across all nodes, nor
has the allocation of ties followed a strictly linear process. Third, all countries with high prestige possess high
centrality as well, although the converse is not true. Several countries display some elements of prominence,
but only one or two are prestigious.
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after the crisis: the United States. Thus, referring to the taxonomy in table 1.1, the U.S. is
the only definitively core country, while the U.K. is a borderline case. Germany and France
were central senders before the crisis and remain so post-crisis, but their prominence has
diminished. Japan’s centrality has risen, while its prestige remains unchanged.
Figure 1.6: The weighted in-degree (in-strength) plotted against weighted out-degree (in-
strength) distribution before (black) and after (red) the financial crisis. Overall network
connectivity suffered, but the U.S., U.K., and Japan increased in centrality while most con-
tinental European declined.
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The fact that in-strength prominence is distributed so much more unequally than out-
strength prominence is both striking and important. It suggests that even if the system
becomes more interconnected in coming years – meaning that more countries have more
cross-national banking relationships – a disproportionate amount of that activity will in-
volve the United States. Such an outcome would not be expected by extant political econ-
omy theories based on balancing, portfolio diversification, or hegemonic decline, but would
be expected by a complex network approach which anticipates hierarchical networks to
contain positive feedback mechanisms – such as preferential attachment – that exacerbate
inequalities over time.27 Thus, the rest of the world will be more sensitive to outcomes in
the United States than the United States will be to outcomes elsewhere. If positive feedback
mechanisms do operate in this system, and a full analysis of that question will have to be
the subject of another paper, reversing these dynamics would come at a very high cost: the
dissolution of the network. The only historical referrent we have of this happening during
an era of globalized capitalism is the 1930s, the nadir of modern civilization. Thus, those
who wish to move away from a financial system organized around American prestige do so
at great risk, since the rest of the world is vulnerable to American prominence.28
While the results which are observed (summarized in Table 1.2) may not be espe-
cially surprising, the results which we do not observe might be. None of the high-growth
emerging markets which have been speculated as possible additions to (or replacements
of) the U.S. and E.U. at the core of the global economy made in-roads in prestige, despite
the largest crisis to hit the industrialized core since the 1930s. None of the BRICS gained
noticeably in network importance on any degree-based measure during the period. This
provides some descriptive evidence, at least, that the architecture of the global financial
system is not undergoing a major reorganization. This is significant. It calls into question
27There is a large literature on this, but see as examples Baraba´si and Albert (1999) and Oatley et al. (2013).
28There are few examples from history, maybe none, in which the transition from one financial core to
another was gradual and stable. It is easy to bring to mind transitions which were rapid and chaotic.
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Out-Links
In-Links
Low High
High DE, JP
FR, CH
US,
UK
Low All
Others
None
Table 1.2: Placement of national banking systems according to the taxonomy in Table 1,
from various degree-based network statistics reported above. The U.S., and arguably the
U.K., are the only core nodes. All others are peripheral, excepting Japan and several
European countries which are central but not prestigious.
speculation that the center of gravity in the global financial system is shifting from West
to East or from North to South. To the extent that there has been a reorganization at all, it
has been to reduce the rise of continental European powers and reinforce the prominence
of the U.S. and U.K.29
At this point a note of caution is in order. Because of the ego-centric quality of the data
collection, some countries may have increased in centrality (but likely not prestige) without
being appropriately measured. China, for example, may have become more important as
a source of cross-national bank finance even if it remains peripheral as a destination for
29Even before the crisis the role of off-shore or lax-regulation financial havens as hosts of banking assets
was noticeable but relatively muted. Following the financial crisis, the importance of some of them – partic-
ularly Ireland and Iceland – reduced further. This indicates that the global financial system is not dominated
by a “race to the bottom” at least in banking. Financial assets are based in banking systems based primarily
on criteria other than regulatory strictness or disclosure requirements, although tax avoidance does appear to
drive some banking sector behavior at the margin.
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it.30 Indeed, in absolute terms there is little doubt that it has; in relative terms it may not
have. These data cannot tell us, despite being the best available. But the identical fact
also understates the prominence nodes which are present, and in particular downplays the
prestige of the United States: for China to be a large sender, others must be large receivers.
Many emerging markets – especially those with high national savings, from China and
other newly-industrialized exporters to countries which recycle petrodollars through New
York and London – hold large amounts of claims on the United States and United Kingdom.
These are not reported in the BIS data. Given the endogenous growth mechanisms which
likely exist in the global banking network, the absolute gap between the U.S. and the rest
has likely grown since the crisis.
In summary, descriptions of the global banking network based on the number or strength
of ties connecting nodes show that the U.S. is the most prestigious national financial sector
– it attracts the most ties – and is one of the most central. Some of this surely reflects the
U.S.’s status as a “safe haven” for international investment, and its deep internal market,
which did not significantly change despite the subprime financial crisis. We might suspect
that endogenous processes played a significant role in this development, since the inter-
nal attributes of the U.S. – such as financial health, macroeconomic growth prospects, and
political stability – were incontrovertibly weakened by the crisis. Other major economies
– particularly Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom – are highly central, but are less
prestigious. The spread of the subprime crisis throughout the global financial system had
a major impact on the network but not necessarily in obvious ways. Some previous trends
of prominence growth were halted or went into reverse. Continental European centrality
decreased, while that of Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. increased. No nodes moved into a
more prestigious position as a result of the crisis.
30This argument cannot be applied to emerging markets more generally: Brazil, Chile, India, Mexico,
Panama, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey are all egos in at least one of the two BIS surveys. None are
prominent nodes under any measure in either.
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1.5 Eigenvector and Betweenness Prominence
Node prominence can be measured in ways other than simple summation of degree
and strength. Other types of network performance are important besides adding up ties
connecting nodes to each other. Two of these are betweenness and Eigenvector promi-
nence.31 Degree-based measures of prominence treat all ties as if they were of the same
importance. Proposed by Bonacich (1972, 1987), Eigenvector prominence complicates this
approach and distinguishes between ties with others according to their prominence. Ties
which connect to a core node are thus weighted more heavily than ties which connect to
a peripheral node. Because it takes the connectivity of other nodes into account, Eigen-
vector prominence is a weighted sum of direct and indirect connections, and provides a
measure of a node’s prominence within the entire structure of connections comprising the
network: nodes with high Eigenvector prominence are not just the most connected nodes
in the network, they are the most well-connected nodes in the network. The Eigenvector
score combines in-links and out-links, providing an overall measure of a node’s influence.
Betweenness prominence is a measure of the paths which indirectly connect nodes
via a third party, taken as a function of the total number of paths in the network. For
example, if i and k are connected to each other only by mutual connection to j, then j
provides a “bridge” for the other two. Nodes with high betweenness prominence are critical
conveyers of “information” throughout a network by connecting disparate clusters to each
other. In financial systems, high-betweenness nodes may be conduits of crisis by providing
the pathway for instability to spread from one country to others. As such, the overall
connectivity of the network is enhanced by nodes with high betweenness scores, but the
same feature also entails vulnerabilitys.
31Most network literature does not distinguish between centrality and prestige for these measures, because
they consider both in-links and out-links. I use prominence for purposes of analytical consistency, but both
measures incorporate elements of prestige and centrality.
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Betweenness
Eigenvector
Low High
High Bridge Core
Low Outsider Insider
Table 1.3: A taxonomy of node importance according to their betweenness and Eigenvector
prominence.
Thus, these measures capture different structural relationships than degree-based mea-
sures. The scores of nodes do not just depend on their direct connections to others, but
on indirect connections as well. As such, they complicate conceptions of sensitivity and
vulnerability. When bridges connect clusters in the global banking network, nodes in one
cluster may become sensitive to nodes in other clusters even if they are not directly con-
nected. Through these connections, many or most states may be vulnerable to those with
high Eigenvector prominence even if they are not directly tied to them.
Looking at the two in conjunction can provide information regarding the importance of
nodes within a network along multiple dimensions as Table 1.3 portrays (Conway 2012).
Nodes with high Eigenvector but low betweenness prominence are network “insiders”:
they occupy a core position in the network but have few (direct) connections outside their
immediate cluster. Nodes with high betweenness prominence but low Eigenvector promi-
nence function as significant bridges linking together major components of the network,
but may not themselves exist at the core of the structure. Nodes with low scores on both
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measures are outsiders: they exist in the periphery and do not create pathways connecting
clusters. Nodes with high betweenness and Eigenvector prominence constitute the core of
the network and provide bridges to most other clusters.
Figure 1.7: Betweenness prominence (vertical axis) plotted against Eigenvector promi-
nence (horizontal axis) both before (black) and after (red) the global financial crisis. The
United States is the only definitive core node. The United Kingdom may be considered as a
core node or an insider. Several European countries function as bridges, but most countries
are outsiders.
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Figure 1.7 plots countries according to their Eigenvector (horizontal axis) and between-
ness (vertical axis) prominence before and after the financial crisis.32 The U.S. stays in the
most prominent position according to Eigenvector scores; in fact, there are no important
countries to which the U.S. is not connected. No other national banking system comes close
to the U.S.’s importance on this dimension, and the financial crisis did not erode it. This in-
dicates that not only is the U.S. the most connected node, it is also the most well-connected
node, and suggests that there are no major national banking sector which is not influenced,
in some way, by the United States. The converse is not true of any other country.33
Before the crisis, some European nodes were important pathways for other nodes to
connect to the broader system – and thus are prominent by the betweenness measure –
but are not themselves at the core of the system, as is made clear by low Eigenvector
scores. In most cases the crisis led to an erosion in the betweenness prominence of Europe.
This follows intuition. The European economic integration project has revolved around
several large economies within the eurozone, particularly Germany and France, which con-
nect financial centers outside of the eurozone with smaller economies inside the eurozone.
Through these connections the rest of Europe is linked to the rest of the world. Thus,
prominent European countries have great regional importance, but their global importance
is less significant. The spread of the crisis to the eurozone led to a reversal of capital flows
from the Eurocore to the Europeriphery, thus disconnecting parts of the network. As a re-
sult the regional importance of Germany and Italy declined as a result of the spread of the
subprime crisis to the eurozone. Perhaps surprisingly France and Spain actually increased
slightly. Japan is connected to well-connected countries – increasingly so post-crisis – but
32As before, a full time series is available in the appendix. Again, the increasing importance of some nodes
over the period under observation is remarkable: the prominence of several nodes increases to a large extent
from 1999-2007, then the system reorganizes as a response to the global financial crisis.
33A few others (Japan, Germany, and France) slightly increased in Eigenvector importance following the
crisis. This may be due to increasing their connections to the U.S. and U.K., and decreasing connections to
the European and Asian periphery.
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does not serve as an important bridge. This perhaps reflects the fact that Asian regional
integration has lagged behind European regionalism, particularly in finance.
The most significant development in terms of magnitude was the increase in the im-
portance of the U.S. as a bridge and the drop in importance of the U.K. Prior to the crisis
the U.S. was the second most important bridge, and the difference between it and Franco-
Germany was small. After the crisis the U.S. was by far the most important bridge in
addition to being the most well-connected node. Indeed, the rising importance of the U.S.
by these measures shows the extent to which the U.S. held the entire structure together in
the face of the shock: had the U.S. failed as a bridge, the entire network may have frag-
mented into isolated clusters with few connections between them. Such was the experience
in the 1930s, and many expected a similar outcome during this crisis. Instead, the U.S.
was able to stay connected to all the most important countries while building bridges be-
tween them.34 According to this measure the prominence of the United States increased
significantly as a result of the crisis.
This is reflected in table 1.4, which summarizes the graphical depiction in figure 1.7.
Most nodes are unimportant by either measure, but a handful are important betweenness
nodes (bridges) and two are globally important on both accounts (core nodes): the United
States and United Kingdom (and in particular the former). Both also became more impor-
tant by both measures over the time series, despite the fact that the financial crisis emanated
from their national financial systems. This reinforces the result from degree prominence,
but in a more nuanced way. Moreover, as a result of the crisis the U.S. became the most
important bridge maintaining connections between disparate parts of the network. Without
the U.S. occupying this position, the recent financial crisis may have led to the disappear-
ance of a truly global banking network, as the network fragmented into regional or local
34This may have been an intentional policy goal. The U.S. Federal Reserve extended liquidity to foreign
firms and governments during the crisis, thus taking Kindleberger’s advice to the hegemon to extend coun-
tercyclical finance to others in the system during crises. For one study of this phenomenon see Broz (2012).
For a journalistic account see Irwin (2013).
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Betweenness
Eigenvector
Low High
High DR
FR
US,
UK
Low All
Others
JP?
Table 1.4: Placement of national financial systems according to the taxonomy in Table 3,
from the betweenness and Eigenvector centrality score above. The U.S., and arguably the
U.K., are the only core nodes. Several European countries act as bridges. All others are
outsiders, with the possible exception of Japan.
clusters in an analogous way to the 1930s.
All of these results tell a similar story in slightly different ways: the U.S. remains the
most important banking system, and there are no strong contenders for displacing it. In
fact, the relative gap between the U.S. and the rest has grown since the subprime crisis, and
as the global financial system has begun to recover it has re-organized itself with the U.S.
occupying a reinforced position at the core. This cannot be easily explained by reference
to the internal attributes of the United States which were not favorable during this period.
Instead, we should consider how the structural properties of the banking network may have
facilitated patterns of endogenous growth.
1.6 Conclusion
Theories of international politics have often conceived of power as arising from the
structure of relationships in the global system, but measures of power have been limited
to monadic or dyadic characteristics of states. This paper argues that the structure can
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be operationalized in terms of statistics describing prominence in complex networks, and
provides an application to the global banking system. Besides offering precision, such an
operationalization offers novel conclusions regarding the performance of the system in the
wake of the most severe financial crisis since the 1930s: despite being the epicenter of the
crisis, the United States has increased in prestige according to some measures and remained
at the core in others. European financial centers have declined by most measures, while the
rest of the countries have remained peripheral. Notably, this includes emerging markets
like the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa – which have not increased in
prominence in global banking according to these metrics.
The complex network conceptualization of power can be applied to substantive areas
other than banking. Strange (1987) conceived of structural power as existing in four areas:
finance, production and exchange, security, and knowledge generation. Future analyses
may be able to demonstrate whether American preeminence in banking has extended to
other areas of the global financial system as well as these other areas. Such an approach
might provide a different picture than metrics now in common usage such as the Composite
Index of National Capabilities (CINC) scores, which counter-intuitively suggests that the
Soviet Union was more powerful than the United States during the 1980s and that Chinese
power eclipsed American power in the late-1990s.
Moreover, a complex network approach provides expectations regarding future perfor-
mance of the system. While such dynamics have barely been mentioned here, inferential
models of networks allow researchers to formally test whether mechanisms such as pref-
erential attachment, triadic closure, or other structural processes exist in networks. Such
models are increasingly common in political science, but have yet to be utilized to an-
alyze the distribution of power in the system. These models allow for the inclusion of
country-level and dyad-level covariates which also impact development and change within
the global system, thus allowing researchers to test the relative impact of different kinds of
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processes in network formation. For this reason, applications of complex network science
– especially in its dynamic form – may complement and enrich other conceptualizations of
power, and may unify disparate strands of the literature.
This analysis has barely scratched the surface. Many other measures of network promi-
nence exist and can be applied to studies of the global political economy and security sys-
tem. Among others, such possibilities include analyzing when crises are likely to arise and
spread, the conditions under which states move from the periphery to the core, the mani-
festations of structural power in bargaining over global governance structures and security
situations, and many other topics. By providing an empirically precise and theoretically
rich environment in which to study the global political system as a system, a complex
network approach can improve our understanding of many phenomena of interest.
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2 GLOBAL BANKING AS A COMPLEX POLITICAL ECONOMY
2.1 Introduction
To this point international political economy (IPE) discussion of “the most virulent
global financial crisis ever” (Greenspan 2010, 3) has contained almost no analysis of global
finance, instead focusing on the pre-crisis innovations of micro-level units and the post-
crisis response behaviors of governments. What IPE conversation has occurred has mostly
been speculative (Helleiner 2010; Drezner and McNamara 2013; Oatley et al. 2013) or
sociological (Cohen 2009b; Keohane 2009; Helleiner 2011; Oatley 2011). The only well-
established theoretical framework in the empirical literature which seeks to explain dy-
namics at the global level is a “race to the bottom” driven by global competition, which
is often presumed rather than empirically demonstrated. This despite the fact that “race to
the bottom” theories have been called into serious question or in other ways complicated
in many other issue-areas of the global political economy.1 Nevertheless, such theories
remain predominant in the literature (Meseguer and Gilardi 2009).
Such a post-crisis lack of interest in the politics of global finance is at odds with prior
theory, which maintains that predominance in world financial markets is advantageous be-
cause it confers a broad base of power (Strange 1998; Cohen 2000, 2006) which may be
employed to provide advantage for domestic firms through the coercion or neglect of their
foreign rivals (Oatley and Nabors 1998; Simmons 2001). Conceptualizations of power
1Also in finance. More than a decade ago (Simmons 2001, 590) noted that “[t]heories of ‘races to the
bottom’ are of little help” in explaining patterns in global capital markets. The recent crisis, which was cen-
tered around AAA-rated financial instruments and supposedly low-risk debt of OECD sovereigns, provides
support for the Simmons thesis as it indicates that many financial actors believed they were acting safely
rather racing to the bottom.
in financial systems have been imported either from neo-Marxist structuralism (Strange
1982) or from bargaining models of international relations (Drezner 2007). Both agree that
a state’s ability to attract interest from foreign financial firms is a indicator of power, but
the former places primary importance on the qualitative nature of the global structure of
financial relationships while the latter emphasizes quantitative attributes such as the im-
portance of the size of internal markets in bargaining conducted between major powers.
Thus, in existing literature there is a tension between the complex and the parsimonious,
the accurate and the precise.2 Perhaps it is this tension which has led to the relative lack of
post-crisis attention from IPE scholars.
This paper provides a bridge which may connect the two while providing extensions
to both. I argue that power in global banking can be conceptualized as emerging from
a complex adaptive system comprised of national units and the linkages between them,
theorized in terms of the linkages as well as the units, and quantitatively analyzed using
recent inferential network methodologies. This approach creates opportunities for theoret-
ical arguments which situate national political economies within a global context in unique
ways, and for empirical analyses which uncover patterns in the global banking system that
would be obscured using common methodologies. As such, this paper seeks to unify vari-
ous strands of the IPE of finance literature while providing extensions to them. Rather than
treating the global financial system as an “abstract force ‘out there”’ (Helleiner 2011, 78),
it problematizes the system by situating national political economies within a global mar-
ket (Cohen 2009b; Palan 2009) which is modeled statistically. The central argument is that
global banking is a complex system which emerges through the interaction of processes
which occur at multiple strata.3
2These divisions roughly correspond with the divisions between the “American” and “British” schools of
international political economy (Cohen 2008, 2009b; Helleiner 2011).
3In this context, “strata” does not correspond with the traditional levels of analysis proposed by Waltz
(1959), but by the intensity of interconnectedness.
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I focus on global banking. Following Oatley et al. (2013), I conceptualize the global
banking system as a weighted and directed dynamic network. I do this because observed
bank relationships comprise an interdependent market which more closely resembles a
network than a series of independent and identically distributed monads or dyads, so a
network specification is most appropriate for analysis of this kind of system. I employ in-
ferential network methodologies to uncover the determinants of the global banking system,
which is the outcome variable.4 Determinants of this system include country-level po-
litical institutions, macroeconomic fundamentals, national policies, dyadic relationships,
and endogenous structural processes. The relative effect of these variables is analyzed us-
ing recently-developed extensions of exponential random graph models (ERGM), which I
compare to linear regression models in order to highlight the utility of my approach. The
findings suggest that the ability to attract cross-national financial relationships, which con-
fers power in the world economy, is not a pure function of monadic or dyadic attributes
of states. I show that in some ways the importance of internal market size, key elements
of political systems, and shared characteristics (such as regional proximity, similar levels
of development, or common political systems) have been overstated by previous studies.
The importance of dynamic structural processes such as preferential attachment and triadic
closure has been understated or only vaguely identified.
2.2 A complex political economy theory of financial power
Power in the global financial system arises from supply and demand forces in financial
markets. The attractiveness of a national financial system impacts the extent to which these
forces interact. If country j wishes to have access to country i’s markets then i has demand
power over j; if i wishes to attract capital from j then j has supply power over i. This
understanding of financial power underpins the literature on bargaining over global regu-
lation (Simmons 2001; Drezner 2007) as well as the accumulation of wealth in the global
4That is, I move beyond previous descriptive analyses of the global financial system, or analyses which
employ inferential models but do not include country-level political or economic variables.
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economy (Strange 1987) perhaps by the collection of rents from foreign financiers (Oatley
and Nabors 1998). It creates an “exorbitant privilege” which comes from controlling global
liquidity (Eichengreen 2011), and impacts the interest rate sovereigns pay on debt (Schultz
and Weingast 2003; Saiegh 2005). Financial power bestows influence over international fi-
nancial institutions (Woods 2003) which can be used to further geopolitical interests abroad
(Thacker 1999; Oatley and Yackee 2004; Stone 2004, 2008; Kirschner 2007; Pop-Eleches
2008). Indeed, financial power has been inextricably linked with every hegemonic project
in the capitalist era (Helleiner 1994; Sobel 2012; Oatley 2013).
Cohen (2006) usefully collects these aspects of financial power into two general types:
the existence of autonomy from foreign pressures and the ability to influence others in the
world economy. In one sense these are two sides of the same coin (so to speak) – auton-
omy is the ability to avoid being influenced in undesirable ways by others – but they have
distinct properties as well. Crises often bring these aspects into sharp focus. The power
of the United States to influence states in need of finance is evidenced by the conditionali-
ties attached to International Monetary Fund loans (Oatley and Yackee 2004; Pop-Eleches
2008; Stone 2008). Following the Asian crises in the 1990s, the desire for autonomy led
many states to stockpile a “war chest” of U.S. dollar liquidity so as to not come under the
sway of the IMF again (Bernanke 2005). These reserves may have granted some degree of
autonomy but evidence that it has bestowed influence, particularly over the U.S., is scant
(Drezner 2009). Indeed, increasing dollar-denominated assets made these countries even
more dependent on American financial health (Eichengreen 2006; Oatley et al. 2013).
Articulating the precise ways by which control over global finance confers advantage is
difficult. Cohen (2000) noted of the international monetary system that no general theory
of the sources and uses of power exists.5 In the intervening years several attempts were
5Cohen uses the term “monetary power” to refer to “finance or currencies” generally. As I am presently
concerned with bank finance rather than currencies, I refer to financial power even as I adopt some of Cohen’s
langauge.
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made to define, and occasionally measure, financial power. One method is to consider
the ways in which states are dependent upon others or independent of them in the global
banking system.6 There are three possible locii of power in the global banking system:
the internal characteristics of national political economies (monadic), the interaction be-
tween characteristics of two political economies (dyadic), and the organizational structure
of global finance (systemic). All of these may operate simultaneously and each of them
impacts autonomy and influence in ways which produce observable outcomes at different
strata of the global banking system.
Monadic sources of power are a linear function: as some internal characteristic of a
state increases, its power increases proportionately. Dyadic power is multiplicative, as
it involves the interaction between domestic attributes which are shared (or not shared)
with other countries. Systemic power is exponential and arises from the entire structure
of global bank relationships. Monadic and dyadic sources of power may be exogenous to
the global banking system, meaning that they influence the creation of cross-national bank
relationships, and they may be endogenous to it. Systemic sources of power are endogenous
to the system. They are not a function of unit attributes, but of dynamic processes which
are beyond the control of any actor but nevertheless condition the behavior of actors.
Each of these are useful at particular strata of the global financial system. Because
its effect is linear, monadic sources of power will typically have the greatest amount of
influence at the lowest stratum: the presence or absence of banking relationships involving
a locality. Dyadic sources power operate at a higher stratum through multiplicity, and may
extend to sets of dyads – such as regional partnerships – with common goals or attributes.
Systemic sources of power are not limited to regional clusters but extend through the entire
global banking market, and is therefore the highest stratum of power in global banking. The
6Banking is only one component of the global financial system, but it may be the most important. Bank
assets recently topped $100 trillion, or 150% of global GDP, nearly half of all global financial market activity
(The International Monetary Fund 2012). In any case, the framework I develop here is intended to have
broader application.
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Source Intensity Influence Autonomy Stratum
Monadic Linear Compellence Deterrence Low
Dyadic Multiplicative Gravity Assortativity Medium
Systemic Exponential Shared Partners Preferential Attachment High
Table 2.1: Locus, type, manifestation, and level of power in the global banking system.
sources, intensities, particularities, and strata of power in this system are summarized in
table 2.1.7 Each of them has important theoretical implications which should be observable
empirically. I expound on each in turn.
2.3 Monadic sources of power in global banking
In global banking, the internal characteristics of states may confer instrumental power
in ways similar to other types of relational power (Dahl 1957). In particular, the ability to
restrict outsiders’ access to a large internal market may compel the foreign state to accede
to some demand, such as adherence to a common regulatory standard like the Basel capital
accords (Oatley and Nabors 1998). These capabilities may also shield them from the inno-
vations of others (Simmons 2001). In either case, a consideration of internal characteristics
will cause us to focus on the great powers, as determined by criteria such as the size of the
domestic financial and economic markets (Drezner 2007). This sort of power will be most
visible during explicit negotiations with other states (influence) or, perhaps, by the absence
of such discussions (autonomy).
States which control access to significant markets thus possess capacity to compel oth-
ers toward some behavior which it prefers and deter others from compelling them, but
this power is most useful at lower strata. To the extent that it isn’t binary, control over
an attractive market is an additive function: the stronger the fundamentals – size, growth
7While each of these elements may contain subelements it is not possible to encompass all possibilities
in a single analysis. As such, I focus on the broad categories contained in table 2.1 in the rest of this section,
reserving further complications for future work.
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rate, political system – the more attractive a market is, and the more power a state has.
Drezner (2007) refers to this as a linear process which determines control over the content
and adherence to global financial standards.8 What matters is the relative gap between two
countries compared to the cost of adjustment relative to the status quo ante: if the difference
in market size between i and j is large enough, and the costs of adjustment small enough,
then j will conform to i’s preferred regulatory standard. In this case, i has influence over
j. If that condition is not met, then j has autonomy.
It is not difficult to find examples of the pursuit and exertion of this sort of power in
global finance. Recent bargaining over control of international institutions is a manifesta-
tion of influence. In particular, the increase of internal attributes of emerging markets, such
as size of the domestic market, would be expected to lead to an increase in monadic power.
Accordingly, there has recently been a shift in global financial governance from the G7 to
the G20, a realignment of voting shares in the IMF, and a more inclusive membership in
the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision which negotiates international capital stan-
dards. Each of these provides evidence that the monadic power of major emerging markets
has increased.
But the effect of this shift has been less pronounced than we might expect from a sole
focus on internal attributes. The relocation of international ad hoc governance from the
G7 to the G20 has been less meaningful than many predicted (Drezner 2012). Despite
controlling a larger internal market, China has roughly half the voting shares of Japan in the
IMF, and only the U.S. and E.U. retain effective veto power in that institution. Bargaining
over the recent revisions to the Basel capital accords were dominated by the U.S. and major
European powers just as previous negotiations had been (Oatley and Winecoff 2012). In
short, because it arises from a monadic source, the increase in emerging market power
8Page 55, footnote 90. While Drezner mentions that “gravity” factors such as regional proximity might
also play a role, he suggests that in his analysis it does not affect the results. In any case, I discuss spatial
models below.
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has primarily functioned at low strata: gaining a seat at the table is significant and may
grant some measure of autonomy, but it does not automatically confer agenda-setting or
other types of revisionist power. Perhaps because of their inability to exert significant
influence in global finance, emerging markets have focused on increasing their deterrence
capabilities. These efforts have proceeded along two tracks: first, the accumulation of
financial assets which insulate these economies from foreign influence (Bernanke 2005;
Drezner 2009); second, the establishment of alternative financial institutions over which
they will have predominant influence. The former has proceeded further than the latter, as
these countries’ deterrence capabilities have out-paced their compellence capabilities.
2.4 Dyadic sources of power in global banking
As the above discussion suggests, there may be sources of power in the global banking
system which are impossible to uncover by reference to linear processes stemming from
monadic attributes. This would not be surprising. Spatial models of diffusion, contagion,
and spillover effects are increasingly common in studies of the global political economy.9
While early applications of spatial models – such as gravity models of trade – focused on
internal characteristics such as size, recent advances in spatial modeling incorporate many
types of dyadic interdependence (Neumayer and Plu¨mper 2010). In such models, the unit of
analysis is the joint relationship between i and j. To this point such accounts have included
spatial processes primarily as control variables: a relationship between i and j is condi-
tioned by the presence or absence of a shared attribute. These effects are thus interactive
and multiplicative: an internal attribute of i and/or j combines with a common characteris-
tic to determine the nature of a relationship. Such variables may include location, level of
development, or type of political system.
These sorts of interactive effects can also be characterized in terms of influence and
autonomy. The most common application is a gravity model, wherein the probability (or
9Although they are uncommon in studies of global banking.
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extent) of a relationship between two countries is a function of the mass of each economy
mediated by the “distance” between them. Distance may refer not only to geographical
proximity but also to other similarities.10 Thus, the effect of an internal attribute (market
size) on an outcome of interest (existence or strength of a relationship) is conditional upon
the presence of a mitigating factor (membership in an institution). Large economies which
belong to international institutions will be very attractive to many other countries, which
gives them power in international negotiations. For example, Neumayer and Plu¨mper
(2010) show that the attractiveness of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) is in part a func-
tion of the number of BITs which a potential partner has with a country’s competitors.
A country with many BITs has influence in negotiations over the terms of a new BIT. A
spatial perspective would expect these types of relationships to extend beyond the case of
BITs.
Autonomy in dyadic interdependence models can arise through an assortative mixing
process, whereby firms or governments prefer to establish relationships with those like
them on some dimension. These might include equivalent levels of economic or finan-
cial development, regional proximity, similar political institutions, or some other shared
attribute. A country with many similar partners along these dimensions is less dependent
on any one of them, which provides autonomy. Assortative mixing is important for over-
coming adverse selection problems in a host of relations including finance (Ghatak 1999).
While prior studies of the politics of global banking have not emphasized shared charac-
teristics, such variables seem to have a profound effect on global politics in other areas.
The effect of joint-democracy, for example, is presumed to have a major impact on mili-
tary peace (Maoz and Russett 1993), trade (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2000), and
foreign direct investment (Guerin and Manzocchi 2006). Cross-national production and
10For a recent review of gravity models in economics, see Anderson (2011). The use of these models in
international political economy is extensive; for one discussion of their strengths and weaknesses see Ward,
Ahlquist, and Rozenas (2013).
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exchange are also associated with similar levels of economic development (Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg 2012), which are in turn associated with peace (Gartzke 2007).
In these ways, the effect of internal characteristics are multiplied through relationships
with other states in a non-linear fashion. The attractiveness of a domestic banking system
is enhanced by its ability to develop a set of dyadic relationships. This, in turn, bestows
power on governments of these markets over and above their internal attributes: relatively
small economies, such as Switzerland or Luxembourg, may be able to “punch above their
weight” in international financial negotiations by virtue of their attractiveness to their peers.
This power functions at an intermediate stratum: it is “higher” than a monadic attribute, as
it exists at the level of the dyad, but does not describe a systemic phenomenon. It describes
the relationship between subsets – pairs – of national economies, rather than the entire
world economy. Nevertheless, these relationships are quite important in world politics as
the expansive literature on diffusion, contagion, and spillovers emphatically demonstrates.
While political economy studies which include dyadic interdependence have made im-
pressive gains over prior research, there are several limitations to spatial models that have
recently been discussed in the literature. These are related but distinct: two are primarily
methodological but have theoretical implications, while the other is primarily theoretical
but has methodological implications. The primary methodological concern is that, like
other regression-based approaches, spatial models assume that dyadic relationships are ob-
served independently from each other and are identically distributed (Ward, Ahlquist, and
Rozenas 2013). This has two implications. First, it assumes that dyad i−−j is unrelated to
dyads i−−k and j−−k and that these, in turn, are not affected by any other dyads. In the
present analysis, this would involve an assumption that a banking relationship between the
United States and Ireland is not conditioned by banking relationships between the United
States and the United Kingdom and the United Kingdom and Ireland or any of the other
47
banking relationships in the world economy.11 Not only is this methodological assumption
quite strong, it is in opposition to most general theories of international political economy.12
Therefore, many dyadic analyses either contort theory to fit the assumptions of the model
and/or data structure – e.g., by positing a simple dyadic relationship rather than something
more complex – or they involve statistical analyses which contradict theory in potentially
meaningful ways.
A secondary methodological implication is that the data are multiplied in dyadic analy-
ses (Cranmer, Desmarais, and Menninga 2012). For example, in the statistical analysis con-
ducted below there are 217 banking jurisdictions. A dyadic specification of cross-national
banking relationships could contain up to 47,089 undirected observations or 94,178 di-
rected observations per time period, each of which are treated as independent from the
others.13 Because I examine eleven time periods, the number of observations could be as
high as 1,035,958. This inflation of observations can artificially reduce standard errors, thus
creating problems of inference and in particular increase the likelihood of committing type
I error. The severity of this problem in any particular case is unknowable and untestable,
but it is likely to be non-trivial in many cases (Oatley 2011; Cranmer, Desmarais, and
Menninga 2012). Spatial analyses have unquestionably improved upon prior studies which
assumed no dependence within dyads, but challenges remain.
11Noting this problem, Neumayer and Plu¨mper (2010) attempt to overcome it by specifying a variety of
spatial dependencies in increasingly-complex weighted matrices. Nevertheless, the unit of analysis remains
the dyad and the only dependencies which can be modeled in this context are intra-dyad, so the problem is at
best lessened rather than eliminated.
12“General theory” is not meant to imply “grand theory”, although it is inclusive of it, but also mid-range
theory which posits a system of competition (or other complex interdependency) in the world economy such
as a “race to the bottom”. I know of no general theory in IPE which does not involve such a claim.
13In the Neumayer and Plu¨mper (2010) study of bilateral investment treaties, the creation of 555 BITs is
analyzed using 38,395 observations of 2,411 dyads.
48
2.5 Systemic sources of power in global banking
The last limitation of spatial analyses is theoretical. Neumayer and Plu¨mper (2010) note
that spatial analyses cannot account for endogeneity. In some studies this may be concern-
ing simply for methodological reasons, and various statistical “fixes” may be proposed,
but in theories of banking this is a matter of theoretical importance. Many endogenous
processes are considered to be important in financial markets. Among them are confi-
dence, herding, reputation, information processing, “animal spirits”, and other cognitive-
behavioral factors which may operate at the level of the individual or firm to condition
the broader competitive environment. The competitive environment may also involve en-
dogenous processes. Consider a prominent financial institution, a fictional First National
Bank of the United States, which generates significant business despite not offering higher
interest on deposits or lower interest on loans. How does it do it? Because of its brand:
it has previously attracted a lot of business, which makes it more likely to attract business
in the future. Its ex ante prominence gives it a competitive advantage quite separate from
its attributes. The fact that the First National Bank was able to gain customers initially
may have been related to its internal characteristics, but absent extreme mismanagement
positive feedback mechanisms can guarantee that it gets more business over time.14
At the stratum of the system, endogenous structural processes may grant power to some
national banking systems over others. This power arises from the set of relationships in a
system, which can be theorized and analyzed as a network: a social structure which is de-
fined by the entire set of entities and the relationships contained between them, rather than a
collection of dyadic subsets treated independently from each other. Thus, “systemic” refers
to the entire ecology of banking relationships which exist globally. It does not mean “in-
ternational” in the sense that traditional levels-of-analysis studies following Waltz (1959)
14This is known as “fitness with preferential attachment” (FPA) and is discussed thoroughly in Oatley et al.
(2013). FPA suggests that ex ante quality can provide an initial advantage which is exacerbated over time
through preferential attachment mechanisms such as those described below.
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often use the term, nor is it merely “transnational” in the sense that Keohane and Nye Jr.
(1977) describe.15 As such, in this context a network is closer to the conceptualization of
systems commonly used in neo-Marxist critical theories (Wallerstein 1974; Strange 1982),
but draws primarily from contemporary network science (Baraba´si 2012).
Conceptualizations of power within networks are not new to political science. Hart
(1974) extended the relational depiction of power from Dahl (1957) into a graph theo-
retical construct.16 Knoke and Burt (1983) defined prominence within network structures
as being meaningful for influencing the network, while Knoke (1990) explicitly opera-
tionalized power in networks as resulting from prominence. More recently, Hafner-Burton,
Kahler, and Montgomery (2009) and Carpenter (2011) have looked at various kinds of sim-
ple networks in international politics, noting that position within a structure might confer
particular types of influence in particular situations. Cohen (2009a) recommended network
analysis as a way of locating power in monetary systems.
Earlier applications of network science to international politics have generally not em-
phasized the complexity that exists in most real-world networks (Baraba´si and Albert 1999;
Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman 2009), including political and economic networks (Cranmer
and Desmarais 2011b; Cranmer, Desmarais, and Kirkland 2012; Cranmer, Desmarais, and
Menninga 2012; Oatley et al. 2013; Ward, Ahlquist, and Rozenas 2013). Complex net-
works are defined by non-trivial topologies, meaning that they contain structural processes
which are endogenous to the network and are causally important drivers of future network
developments. These processes powerfully impact the performance of the network but do
not derive from characteristics of any of the individual units or dyads within it. Neverthe-
less, they are features of the system and they affect units within the system in heterogenous
ways. Some units will be beneficiaries of these processes while others suffer. Two types of
15Although the entire set of complex interdependencies described by Keohane and Nye comes much closer
to the idea.
16A graph is a particular type of representation of a network.
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structural processes are most significant for the present analysis, as they correspond to our
concern with influence and autonomy in global banking: one type describes the hierarchical
ranking of countries’ prominence within the system, while the other concerns relationships
beyond pairs of countries.17
Many complex networks exhibit preferential attachment, which is a stochastic process
by which new relationships in a network are distributed as an increasing function of the
existing distribution of relationships. That is, under a preferential attachment rule, bank-
ing systems which attract much finance from foreign banks will tend to attract more at
an exponential rate. In its purest form the distribution of relationships will conform to a
power-law distribution (Baraba´si and Albert 1999).18 The banking system which attracts
all of these links is advantaged relative to its peers. It receives finance beyond what its
internal or shared attributes would suggest. And because this banking system attracts a
disproportionate amount of the world’s capital, it possesses autonomy: it is not dependent
on any particular part of the network because it draws from the whole. The converse is
not true. Most of the other parts of the network are dependent upon the prominent banking
system, increasingly so over time (Oatley et al. 2013).
Banking sectors which are not the most prominent as measured by an ability to at-
tract the most (or the strongest) relationships may still be influential by linking together
other parts of the network. For example, a country j which provides a path connecting
otherwise-isolated i and k gains power by functioning as a bridge. To the extent that the
global economy becomes increasingly regionalized these bridges become increasingly im-
portant as the sinew which holds together the overall structure. In networks, bridges which
17Systemic assortativity can exist in networks as dyadic assortativity exists does in spatial analyses, but
other effects are unique to networks and cannot be uncovered in a regression where the unit of analysis is the
monad or dyad.
18Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman (2009) note that true power laws are somewhat-rarer than is often claimed,
but conclude that whether distributions conform to a power law is generally less important for network per-
formance than that the distribution is heavily skewed.
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connect clusters are sometimes more influential even than the most strongly-connected
units (Granovetter 1973). They provide outlets and access to information which would oth-
erwise be unavailable to the mass of the network. Moreover, once i and k are indirectly
linked by joint association with j, they are more likely to become directly linked to each
other through a process known as “triadic closure”: friends of friends are more likely to
become friends than a randomly-selected pair.
These triadic relationships may be especially important in the development of the global
banking system. Consider the relationship between the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Hong Kong. The latter two developed strong financial relationships during the course
of the 20th century as the result of British imperialism, but the significance of this relation-
ship went beyond the direct tie. Because the U.K. maintained a simultaneous relationship
with the U.S., Hong Kong had indirect access to New York, and New York had indirect ac-
cess to China. Over time Hong Kong and the U.S. established a direct relationship, but had
the U.K. not provided an initial path between the two that likely would not have happened
as rapidly, or perhaps not at all. More generally, the fact that j is conducting business with
k sends a signal regarding k’s quality which i might not otherwise be able to ascertain. If i
trusts j, which is likely if they maintain a relationship, then i will be more likely to initiate
a relationship with k than it otherwise would. In practice, we frequently observe such dy-
namics in financial markets: if a sufficiently prominent j develops a new relationship with
k, then i senses an opportunity. And not just i. h and l may also become attracted to k if
they are first connected to j (or i). Each of these reflects a triad being closed.
Of course, bridges may also be well-connected generally. In the above example the
U.K.’s power in global banking does not exclusively obtain from its provision of a path
between the U.S. and Hong Kong; the U.K. has many other ties as well. Particularly in
global banking, it may be the case that some countries are prominent both in terms of the
amount of strong direct connections they attract and the number of indirect connections
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they provide for other countries to be linked together. In a hegemonic system, such as
that intuitively described by Strange (1987), one country may provide the most pathways
and attract the strongest links. Such a country would have a great deal of autonomy and
influence; actions taken by that country would have far-reaching implications, and it would
be protected from exposure to idiosyncratic events elsewhere because of its broad base
of strong connections. Oatley et al. (2013) suggests that the United States serves in that
capacity today.
From the perspective of financial stability, these structural processes are highly salient.
When preferential attachment is occurring rapidly, or when many triads are being closed
over a short period of time, the systemic outcome may resemble “hot money” flows, “capi-
tal bonanzas”, and other developments in financial markets which have frequently been ob-
served. Previously these behaviors have been explained, or explained away, by references
to psychology which suggest that they are in some way irrational. Keynes (1936) famously
called them “animal spirits”. Alan Greenspan referred to one such process as “irrational
exuberance”. The aggregation of individual actions lead to speculative bubbles (“manias”,
to Kindleberger and Aliber (2005)) which eventually culminate in crisis (Minsky 1986).
A reference to endogenous structural processes provides a framework within which these
psychological accounts may be embedded. Rather than being irrational, rapid changes in
the organization of the global financial system can be modeled as endogenous processes:
investors place assets where other investors are placing assets because the attractiveness of
these locations are partially determined by their ability to attract assets.
As these processes operate over a sustained period of time, risk in global banking be-
comes increasingly concentrated. As risk becomes concentrated, so does power: the ability
to affect the entire system, rather than just a partner (or potential partner) in a dyad. Because
prominent countries (or firms) are strongly connected, the performance of the entire sys-
tem depends on them. This confers significant advantages over competitors. It is easier for
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prominent nodes in networks to attract new relationships and strengthen existing ones, thus
granting autonomy from the influence of any particular nodes. At the same time, bridges
which connect other nodes to each other have influence over the nodes being connected.
These types of structural processes, which are known as “dyadic dependence” in the net-
works literature, cannot be analyzed empirically when the unit of analysis is monadic or
dyadic.
2.6 Hypotheses
The preceding discussion suggests that monadic, dyadic, and systemic factors should
influence the formation of ties in global banking. The question of which factors are im-
portant at each strata remains. Monadic factors include internal attributes of states, such
as macroeconomic fundamentals and political institutions. Dyadic factors involve shared
characteristics between two national banking systems. Systemic factors involve dynamic
processes which shape the evolution of the network over time. Specific expectations are
summarized in table 2.2.
Prior theory as well as the theoretical discussion above would expect the size of a coun-
try’s national economy and banking system to positively impact its ability to attract foreign
bank finance. Indeed, in some prior analyses these have been the predominant source of fi-
nancial power (Simmons 2001; Drezner 2007). Foreign banks wish to have access to large
markets, liquid markets, and growing economies. Large banking sectors will be better able
to supply funds internationally as well. Economic variables may not have a strictly mono-
tonic effect however, for reasons related to network structure. If an economy receives a
large amount of foreign funds into its banking sector because of its size, then its financial
markets will become deeper and more liquid. This, in turn, may attract additional invest-
ment. As a national economy becomes a hub for global banking, its ability to continue
to develop new relationships will grow as a partial function of its previous relationships.
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Thus, the initial positive impact of GDP and growth on tie formation may become decou-
pled, with the rate of new financial relationships increasing faster than economic growth.
Such a country may continue to successfully form new connections even if growth slows
or stops, while another country may develop a similarly-sized economy but receive many
fewer assets from foreign banks, as it has fewer existing links from which to draw. Thus,
the effect of the size – or growth rate – of a national economy on its ability to generate inter-
est from outside banks may be conditioned by its body of connections to others. In general,
we might expect a country’s macroeconomy to have a greater impact on tie formation at
low levels (i.e. when links are new, and thus relatively weak) than at higher levels (i.e.
when ties are quite strong), at least if structural processes influence network performance.
Other macroeconomic factors could matter. A country’s national accounts are related
to the foreign financial relationships it maintains. If capital is flowing into a country, it
must also import more than it exports. But countries with large current account deficits
may also be less attractive investment partners for banks. Competition will be stronger
and default risk will be higher, so opportunities for a high risk-adjusted return may be
limited. If a country experiences a financial crisis it should experience capital flight, which
is a weakening of the cross-national linkages, although whether this is less likely when
ties are strong or weak is not clear. Strong ties may be able to withstand a crisis, even a
major one such as the subprime crisis after which the U.S. experienced capital inflows as
a result of “flight to safety”, while weak ones do not, as evidenced by capital flight from
East Asian countries in the late-1990s. On the other hand, crisis prevalence is more likely
if a contagion effect exists. If this is the case then we may observe a positive relationship
between crisis and the existence of ties as crises spread across the tie distribution.
Political variables may also have an impact on network development. Much political
economy literature is concerned with the properties of regime type as it pertains to inter-
national economic relationships. While any sort of comprehensive survey is beyond the
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scope of this paper, democracy has not only been given credit for international peace – at
least among some sets of dyads – but trade openness (Milner and Kubota 2005),19 foreign
direct investment (Jensen 2008), and a host of other outcomes which are generally consid-
ered to be normatively desirable. While the precise mechanisms are not always clear, there
is a overall sense that democratic regimes are inclusive, and inclusive politics reduces the
political risk of expropriation while providing a stable environment for investment (North
and Weingast 1989; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). As such, a baseline political econ-
omy model would expect democracy to be associated with the existence of cross-national
banking relationships as it is with other international economic outcomes.
In a complex network conceptualization, however, we may be skeptical. Prominence in
the global banking system has remained with the U.S. and U.K. for decades if not longer
(Oatley et al. 2013). These countries are democratic, it is true, but so are many others.
Successive waves of democratization have not eroded the prominence of the U.S. and
U.K., not can regime type explain why the U.S. and U.K. are so much more prominent
in global banking than consolidated democracies like Australia or Spain, much less non-
OECD democracies. It may be the case that an inclusive political system is a prerequisite
for the establishment of many and strong international banking linkages, but it cannot be
a guarantee of it. Thus, a complex network theory would de-emphasize the importance of
regime type as a determinant of patterns in global banking, particularly at higher strata in
the network.
The same may be true of policies related to regulation. Regulation at both the national
and global levels is given quite a lot of attention in the international and comparative po-
litical economy literature on banking. As noted above, the general conclusion is that lax
regulation should facilitate a “race to the bottom” in lending standards, so international
19Though see Oatley (2011).
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banking should flock to those jurisdictions.20 There are at least three reasons to be skepti-
cal of these claims. First, “race to the bottom” behavior is sporadic or at least inconsistent
in other parts of the global economy, as noted above. Second, if the literature on financial
power previously mentioned is correct, that power is as often used to strengthen regula-
tions rather than weaken them as stronger regulations create barriers to entry which protect
incumbents (Oatley and Nabors 1998). Finally, the distribution of financial power is re-
markably durable across countries and time; particularities in regulatory structures are not.
When we observe change in an independent variable but no change in a dependent variable,
we should suspect there is not a strong relationship between the two.
I include two regulatory variables to be sure. While not comprehensive, they get at
two key elements which might condition the attractiveness of a domestic banking sector
to foreign firms.21 First, I consider how open a country is to foreign finance. Previous
literature on the capital account has noted it that it may be used as a tool for financial pro-
tectionism, designed to induce prudence from domestic financial institutions (Rosenbluth
and Schaap 2003). A network theory would suggest that capital account liberalization is
a necessary condition for integration into the global banking network. A country cannot
attract in-links without an open capital account. A contemporary example of this is China,
which has integrated into global production and trade networks markedly over the past two
decades, but is unimportant in the global banking system. The other variable I consider is
the location of regulatory authority. Other literature has suggested that banks benefit from
preferential monetary policies when regulated by central banks (Winecoff 2014). If this is
the case, then domestic firms may be privileged when central banks regulate, thus entrance
20Often tax havens are also categorized this way, although the two should be distinct: moving business to
a low-tax jurisdiction (e.g. the Cayman Islands) is qualitatively different from moving to a low-regulation
jurisdiction (e.g. East Asia, at least in the 1980-90s (Kapstein 1989; Oatley and Nabors 1998; Walter 2008b)),
even if in practice the two may correlate.
21Comprehensive international data on regulatory policies do not exist, but another chapter of this disser-
tation suggests that their effect on firm behavior is somewhat idiosyncratic.
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by foreign firms may be dissuaded.
Assortative mixing may also impact bank relationships which extend across dyads. Re-
gional economies such as the European Union, NAFTA, ASEAN, and others will incen-
tivize the development of financial relationships which facilitate trade and investment, so
we should expect homophily according to geographical proximity. Most connections will
take place between countries in relative high income groups as well. Once controlling for
these factors, however, homophily will not necessarily extend to common political systems.
It is a long running theme in political economy that global capital is concerned with return.
So long as investments are not at risk of expropriation, regime type affinity should be, at
most, a secondary concern.
Structural processes should also play a large role in the banking network. There are
two basic types of structural processes in which we are interested: those which pertain to
direct and indirect links between national banking sectors. The collection of direct links
in the network forms a degree distribution. Those countries which are tied to many other
countries have a higher degree – are more prominent – than those which are not tied to
many others. Future tie formation will be a function, in part, of past tie formation: countries
which have many cross-national banking ties will tend to attract new ones. This is known
as preferential attachment. Indirect links involve connections through shared partners: if
both the U.S. and U.K. are tied to Germany, then the U.S. and U.K. are linked indirectly
through Germany whether or not they are linked directly. When countries have a shared
partner they will be more likely to become directly tied to each other.
2.7 Data and Models
The dependent variable is constructed from the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) consolidated banking statistics on an immediate borrower basis, which are avail-
able from 1999-2012.22 These data are egocentric: the BIS collects information on the
22For more information about these data see http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r qt0509f.pdf. While BIS data
is available through 2012, most of the country-level covariate data are not. Therefore, I restrict the analysis
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Variable Direction Stratum
GDP + Low
GDP growth + Low
Current Account - Low
Banking Crisis - Low
Banking Sector Size + Low
Regulatory Central Bank - Low
Capital Account Openness + Low
Joint Democracy + Medium
Shared Region + Medium
Same Income Level + Medium
Preferential Attachment + High
Shared Partners + High
Table 2.2: Hypotheses concerning the relationship between monadic, dyadic, and systemic
variables on the formation of the global banking network.
amount of cross-national claims that a subset of countries have on all countries, but the
reciprocal information is collected for only a subset of countries. As an example, the BIS
data includes the dollar amount of claims that all American banks have on all South African
banks, but not the amount that South African banks have on American banks. This raises
the question of whether all the data should be analyzed, or whether we should restrict the
analysis to include only ties which are (or could be) reciprocal. In such situations Gile and
Handcock (2006) recommend using all the data, and I follow their advice.
Country-level macroeconomic and locational data – income class, regional classifica-
tion, nominal GDP, GDP growth, current account balance (% GDP) – comes from the
World Bank World Development Indicators database, while financial data come from the
Bureau van Dijk BankScope database. The BankScope database contains detailed infor-
mation at the firm level of thousands of financial institutions around the world. To create
the variable for size of the banking sector, I summed the amount of assets controlled by
commercial banks and bank holding corporations for each country-year in the sample.
to the years 1999-2009.
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I also include the Polity2 measure of regime type from the POLITY IV dataset, the cap-
ital account openness variable described by Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2008), the banking
crisis measure compiled by Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010, 2012), and a dichotomous
measure of whether a national banking system is regulated by a central bank or another
institution. This variable was constructed from the Bank Supervision surveys conducted in
1999-2000, 2003, 2005-2006, and 2011 by the World Bank (Barth, Caprio Jr., and Levine
2013). Where there was no change in the location of regulatory authority from one survey
to the next, I expanded the data to cover all years. When there was, I supplemented the data
with information from national authorities to uncover the timing of the institutional shift.
The theoretical framework developed above anticipates power in global banking to be
located at the monad, dyad, and system and to occur at multiple strata. Therefore, an em-
pirical model seeking to analyze the plausibility of the theory must be able to incorporate
monadic, dyadic, and systemic effects. Until recently no inferential statistical models were
capable of doing so. Perhaps for this reason, most prior analyses of the political economy
of global banking have been historical, interpretivist, or otherwise qualitative (Helleiner
1994; Kapstein 1994; Germain 1997; Oatley and Nabors 1998; Simmons 2001; Drezner
2007; Helleiner 2011). There have been few quantitative inferential analyses of the polit-
ical economy of global banking; those which do exist have used regression models which
assume independence of observations and thus exclude structural processes (Broz 2012).
Previous network analyses have been descriptive (Oatley et al. 2013).
Since their development by Wasserman and Pattison (1996), exponential random graph
models (ERGMs, also called p* models) have provided a way of evaluating the importance
of structural processes alongside monadic and dyadic characteristics by evaluating the ef-
fect of a set of covariates and network tendencies on the probability that ties will form
between nodes. ERGMs treat networks as a single observation, rather than a collection
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of many independent dyadic observations.23 Because the assumptions underlying ERGMs
match the theoretical arguments made above, I use them to explore the determinants of
global banking relationships. To illustrate the usefulness of ERGMs in this context, I com-
pare their results to a standard linear regression as described below.
Cranmer and Desmarais (2011b) provide a full derivation and discussion of ERGMs.
Briefly, ERGMs evaluate the likelihood of observing a network of ties Y = [Y (i, j)] be-
tween all nodes i and j in the network, given an observation of ties y and node attributes
X . More formally, ERGMs are denoted by:
Prθ(Y = y|X) = exp(θ
Tg(y,X))
κ(θ)
(2.1)
where Y is a random network connecting n nodes, θ is a vector of maximum likelihood
parameters, g(y,X) is a vector of network statistics on y, and κ(θ) is a normalizing function
which ensures that the above equation is a legitimate probability distribution:
κ(θ) =
∑
all possible y
exp{θtg(y,X)} (2.2)
In other words, ERGMs attempt to find the probability, given our model, that we would
observe the network that we have observed over the possible networks we could have ob-
served. In many ways ERGMs are similar to logistic regressions, with the difference that
ERGMs allow for the inclusion of structural terms that are disallowed in logits by the as-
sumption of independence of observations. ERGM coefficients are interpreted as affecting
the likelihood of tie formation relative to a null model: a positive parameter indicates that
higher values of a variable are associated with a higher likelihood of tie formation, con-
trolling for the effect of the other variables in the model as well as network dependencies.
23This is not trivial. Because the network is the unit of analysis, there is no need to assume that components
of the network – nodes and ties – are independent and identically-distributed observations of the outcome of
interest. Such an assumption is required in a regression framework. It also reduces inferential problems
associated with inflated sample sizes in many dyadic analyses as discussed above.
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In this way, the interpretation of coefficients estimated by ERGMs is similar to the inter-
pretation of logistic regressions, but with dependence built into the functional form of the
model.
Many of the components of these equations have analogues in commonly-used regres-
sions. Y is the outcome we are interested in explaining. X is group of covariates with Y ,
similar to regressors. θ is parameter relating X to Y , estimated by maximum likelihood.
If dyads (i, j) are independent from each other, the model reduces to a logit model of the
probability of a relationship forming between i and j:
logit(Yij = 1) = θ
T δ[g(y,X)]ij (2.3)
where δij is the change in probability if yij changes from 0 to 1 (or vice versa). This
would happen if the dependence terms in a network model have no impact on outcomes,
which is the assumption underlying regression-based methods. However, if this assumption
is not valid the difference between a logistic regression and an ERGM may be quite stark
(Oatley 2011; Cranmer and Desmarais 2011b; Ward, Ahlquist, and Rozenas 2013).
There are several problems which commonly occur in ERGMs. First is the problem of
degeneracy: the specification of a model so poor-fitting, so unlikely to have generated the
network under observation, that the ERGM cannot be estimated. The probability of de-
generacy increases when variables are included which do not improve the fit of the model,
and when complex higher-order structural processes are present. In other words, degen-
eracy is a punishment for “kitchen-sink” modeling strategies and for the specification of
atheoretical models,24 but is also related to the complexity of the network itself: a more
complex network will be more difficult to model. Each additional parameter added to an
24A corollary is that including many different “control” variables, which have no explanatory power, are
even less useful in ERGMs than they are in linear regressions (Achen 2005; Schrodt 2010).
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ERGM increases the chance that the model will be degenerate, so the estimation proce-
dures of ERGMs force the modeler towards a specification which is a reasonable fit to the
data. This is often more of an inductive process than model specification in a regression
context.25
A second problem is computational. ERGMs can be estimated in two ways, each of
which involves complications: via maximum pseudolikelihood (MPLE) or by Markov
chain Monte Carlo simulations of the maximum likelihood (MCMC-MLE).26 MPLE pa-
rameter estimates are unbiased, but comparative studies have shown a tendency toward
a suppression of variance and inconsistent estimation of confidence intervals (van Duijn,
Gile, and Handcock 2009). Therefore, from the perspective of inference, MPLE estima-
tion will tend to overstate the statistical significance of estimated parameters, although this
tendency diminishes with larger samples (Liu, Yu, and Edwards 2010). MCMC-MLE esti-
mations are much more computationally complex (especially for large networks) and may
not converge on the target distribution even after a large number of simulations.
The global banking network is large and quite complex. MCMC-MLE estimation of
cross-sectional ERGMs did not converge after running on 96 gigabytes of RAM for a week
even when the model contained few terms. Moreover, there may be intertemporal depen-
dence, such as serial correlation, which drive network formation. Estimation of these mod-
els would be even more difficult using MCMC-MLE simulations. Therefore, I employ the
temporal ERGM (TERGM) developed by Desmarais and Cranmer (2012), which estimates
via MPLE and then corrects inconsistency in the standard errors through a bootstrapping
resampling algorithm. I compare the TERGM results to a logit model with fixed effects
25As model degeneracy informs us when we have specified a sufficiently ill-fitting model, it is a lesser
problem from the perspective of inference than omitted variable bias, for which there is no warning. I return
to this point later.
26The MCMC-MLE approach simulates the joint likelihood of the ties, while MPLE replaces the joint
likelihood with the product of the conditional probability of the ties given the other ties. See the detailed
discussion of these two approaches in Cranmer and Desmarais (2011b), pp. 74ff.
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for time period to highlight the inferential benefit from using a network model motivated
by theory.27 Using this approach, the TERGM coefficient estimates remain unbiased, and
problems of inference which sometimes appear in MPLE calculations are mitigated.
There is another potential problem associated with ERGMs. First, ERGMs are inca-
pable of estimating weighted networks, in which relationships can take on values other
than zero or one.28 Obviously, in the global banking system the strength of a relationship
may be as important as its presence or absence. Moreover, in the theoretical framework
presented here the stratum at which a relationship exists is quite important: the U.S. and
U.K. have a relationship that is not qualitatively similar to the relationship between the U.S.
and Estonia. These problems can be overcome, or at least moderated, by “thresholding” the
network: considering whether a relationship exists at different strengths, and then coding a
network at that level.
The process of threshold selection is fundamentally arbitrary, meaning that there is
no statistical rule for choosing thresholds, but can also lead to substantively interesting
data analysis. The theoretical section discusses effects which occur at different strata, and
thresholding can isolate these strata. The global banking system is highly concentrated:
most countries have few connections, while a few have many. In all years the modal tie
weight is zero even after restricting the out-degree of nodes which cannot send ties by data
construction, and the median is a very small fraction of the mean. In some years the median
and mode are both zero. For this reason, the presence or absence of a tie of connecting
national banking systems of any strength is a good operationalization of the lowest stratum.
As the median is so close to the presence/absence dichotomy, the 75th percentile is better
as an intermediate stratum. In all years the mean is much higher than the 75th percentile,
27All models were estimated using the statistical software R. I thank Skyler Cranmer and Zhengqi Pan for
sharing TERGM code. Other models use the ergm and arm packages.
28That is, they have been mathematically derived but are not yet implemented in software.
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Figure 2.1: Snapshots of the global banking system in 1999 and 2009, at the three thresh-
olds modeled below: any connection between countries, connections at the 75th percentile
of in-degree strength or higher, and connections at the mean in-degree strength or higher.
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indicating that the degree distribution is quite hierarchical.29 As such, I use the mean as
the highest stratum. The network thins noticeably at each threshold but there remains a
substantial amount of activity in each, as shown in figure 2.1. When the threshold is simply
the presence or absence of a relationship there is a clear core-periphery structure. This
basic structure remains as the network is thinned, but becomes less pronounced.
Thresholding is a limitation but it also provides opportunities for examining which vari-
ables are important in driving which kinds of relationships. In particular, we are interested
in which variables affect prominence at which strata. As monadic effects are additive, we
expect them to operate most intensely at the lowest stratum, where the network is consid-
ered as the presence or absence of a banking relationship. Dyadic effects are multiplicative,
and should occur at the intermediate stratum. Systemic higher-order effects are exponen-
tial, and should be the driving force in network formation at the highest stratum. In this way,
the statistical necessity of thresholding may be used as a tool for exploring the plausibility
of the theory. Without thresholding we would typically estimate average effects across the
entire network; such averaging could lead us to miss where in the network which variables
are important. With thresholding we can isolate the impact of effects at distinct strata.
2.8 Results
Table 2.3 shows the results from logistic regression and temporal exponential random
graph models at three thresholds: presence or absence of any tie between national banking
systems, the existence of a relationship at the 75th percentile of tie strength or above, and
existence of a relationship at the mean tie strength or above. The comparison between the
logit and TERGM models indicates the importance of an approach which can accommodate
monadic, dyadic, and systemic variables simultaneously, as statistically significant effects
exist at all intensities for the structural processes which are included in the model. Looking
at relationships between exogenous covariates and endogenous processes at different strata
29This is explored in greater depth in Oatley et al. (2013).
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No Threshold Threshold = 75th Percentile Threshold = Mean
Logit TERGM Logit TERGM Logit TERGM
Edges -110.89∗∗∗ -2.29∗∗∗ -67.95∗∗∗ -1.30∗∗∗ -149.67∗∗∗ -1.52∗∗∗
(8.63) (0.20) (9.84) (0.10) (15.00) (0.16)
GDP 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP Growth -0.01∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Current Account (% GDP) 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Banking Crisis 0.23∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.04 0.14∗ 0.13
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09)
Banking Sector Size 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Regime Type 0.04∗∗∗ 0.00 0.08∗∗∗ 0.01 0.15∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Regulatory Central Bank -0.03 -0.13∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.09∗∗∗ -0.06 0.09
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Capital Account Openness 0.67∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10)
Joint Democracy -0.43∗∗∗ 0.05 -0.69∗∗∗ -0.01 -1.45∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.18) (0.20)
Shared Region 0.80∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Same Income Level 0.01 0.03 0.66∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08)
GW In-Degree -7.41∗∗∗ -6.69∗∗∗ -4.95∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.15) (0.16)
GW Out-Degree -75.74∗∗∗ -27.72∗∗∗ -10.94∗∗∗
(5.67) (1.02) (0.41)
GWDSP 0.44∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
GWESP 2.10∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.07) (0.06)
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table 2.3: A statistical comparison of logistic regression and temporal exponential random
graph models. The former do not allow the inclusion of parameters capturing structural
processes. All models contain fixed effects for year. TERGM standard errors are based on
1,000 bootstrapped iterations
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is also vital, as different variables have effects which are statistically distinguishable from
zero at different thresholds. The key result is that power in global banking, which arises
from the ability to attract and supply bank finance internationally, is a function of internal
characteristics of national political economies, dyadic similarities, and structural processes.
Previous political economy literature has argued that the size of a country’s economy
and domestic financial sector is the most significant factor in conferring financial power
(Simmons 2001; Drezner 2007). These models provide partial support for these expecta-
tions. The logit models suggest that both GDP and the size of the domestic banking sector
are significant predictors of tie formation at all thresholds. The TERGM complicate this in-
ference: the size of a country’s GDP is a related to the attractiveness of a national economy
to foreign banks at all thresholds, but the size of the domestic banking sector is no longer
significantly related to tie formation once structural factors are included in the model. The
network model thus leads to a different understanding of the ways in which key macroeco-
nomic variables matter for forming cross-national banking relationships. Once structural
processes are included, the existence of a deep and liquid banking market does not have
an effect on tie formation that is statistically distinguishable from zero at any threshold.
The size of the overall economy, however, is positively correlated with connections in all
models.
There are two ways to interpret this. The first is to conclude that compellence and de-
terrence capabilities are not related to internal banking sector size as previous literature has
suggested, but that a large overall economy does provide these mechanisms of influence and
autonomy. This conclusion would be at odds with substantial amounts of prior theory and
qualitative evidence. The second interpretation is that banking sector size is collinear with
structural processes. The positive and significant coefficient on the logit models suggests
that there is a linear correlation between banking sector size and banking interdependence.
That the statistical significance of this effect goes away when the structural parameters are
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included in the model thus indicates that the second interpretation is more likely correct:
banking sector size may be endogenous to structural properties. An implication of this
finding is that a model which does not include structural processes – that is, which assumes
that country-year observations are independent – is prone to omitted variable bias. To the
extent that banking sector size is related to power in global politics, it is as a consequence
rather than cause.
Two other macroeconomic results are worth noting. First, the current account balance
as a percentage of a country’s GDP is positive and significant at all thresholds in both the
logit and TERGM specifications. This may suggest that countries are able to attract foreign
bank partners when their national accounts are in surplus, or that they supply bank finance
to deficit countries to maintain the balance of payments. The effect of GDP growth is
negative and significant at low thresholds but insignificant at the highest in both the logit
and TERGM models, which indicates (as we would expect) that these relationships are the
most durable.
Interestingly, in the TERGMs banking crises affect the probability of tie formation only
at the lowest strata, and this effect is positive. It is unlikely that suffering from a bank crisis
makes it more likely that foreign investors wish to become exposed to a country, so this
result most likely reflects the sample period: nearly all of the banking crises from 1999-
2009 occurred in 2008-2009, and these crises tended to hit highly-internationalized banking
systems such as the United States, United Kingdom, Iceland, and Ireland. In particular, the
positive relationship may reflect a contagion mechanism whereby countries exposed to the
U.S. suffered from the spread of the subprime crisis. If so, this would further reflect the
influence of the U.S. in global banking.
The differences between the logit and TERGM models are especially pronounced for
some of the political variables. In particular, regime type is a significant predictor of attrac-
tiveness in the logistic regression at all thresholds but is insignificant at traditional levels
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in the network models which include endogenous processes. Had the results been simi-
larly insignificant across both classes of models we might conclude that these variables are
“sticky”, meaning that they do not often change. But the differences across the models
again suggests that a logistic specification may be prey to omitted variable bias by overes-
timating the effect of regime type. This qualifies the routine claim that more democratic
countries are better able to reassure global capital markets, at least in terms of aggregated
banking markets.
The opposite is true for the regulatory institution variable: the regression models show
no effect which is distinguishable from zero, while the network models show that at the two
lowest strata banks are less likely to be active in a foreign system in which domestic banks
are regulated by their central bank. At the two lowest thresholds the significantly negative
effect that locating a regulatory central bank has on forming ties provides an additional
piece of evidence that domestic central banks may be working to provide a competitive
advantage for the firms they regulate (Copelovitch and Singer 2008), and that this arrange-
ment impacts financial market behaviors (Winecoff 2014). If bestowing rents prevents
countries from gaining prominence in the global financial system this could actually work
to reduce a country’s financial power.
Capital account liberalization is positively associated with cross-national banking rela-
tionships at each threshold, supporting the intuition that financial openness is a prerequisite
for establishing cross-national bank ties. This has implications for the rise of emerging
markets. There has been much speculation that emerging economies are poised to domi-
nate global capital markets in the coming years; some accounts suggest that this is already
happening (Cohen and DeLong 2010; Subramanian 2011). This analysis suggests that
such conclusions are premature. Consider as examples the often-discussed BRIC countries
– Brazil, Russia, India, and China.30 If capital account liberalization is a prerequisite for
30In 2009, their KAOPEN scores (on a scale of -1.86 to 2.44 where higher indicates greater openness)
were 0.41, 0.15, -1.17, and -1.17 respectively. Anything below 0 is below the world mean, but for developed
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power in the banking network then all of them are lagging behind the curve. After having
a closed capital account for many years, Brazil modestly liberalized during the 2000s. But
Brazil never reached anything near full openness, and they re-enacted capital controls fol-
lowing the global financial crisis. Russia’s capital account was mostly closed until 2009,
when several liberalizations were enacted. But these were fairly minimal, and they re-
main more closed than the typical country. India and China remain among the most closed
countries in the world in terms of capital movement. These countries are most commonly
believed to move into a global (rather than regional) leadership position due to their large
populations, rapid growth rates, and increasing embeddedness in trade and production sys-
tems, but all of the reported models suggest that this is unlikely even absent higher-order
structural processes, at least until they enact serious reforms.31
Dyadic variables are also related to the probability that national banking systems be-
come linked, but like the monadic variables their statistical significance is sometimes af-
fected by whether structural processes are included in the model or not. Assortative mixing
according to regime type is negatively associated with tie formation at each threshold in the
logit models but not in the TERGMs.32 Thus, both the individual and joint effect of regime
type is overstated by the logit models which assume independence of observations.33 The
same is not true for regional proximity – which is significantly related to tie formation at all
strata – or a similar income, which has a positive effect on international bank linkages that
countries the mean is 1.26. All of these countries remain much more closed to finance than they are to trade.
31There is some evidence that China is aware of this and is beginning to take action. But these steps have
been very small. As a result, China’s presence in global banking is slight; indeed, China is barely even
observable in the network (Oatley et al. 2013).
32Joint democracy is operationalized as both countries having a Polity2 score greater than or equal to 4.
The results do not change if regime type similarity is operationalized as the same Polity2 score.
33The same result has been found in other issue-areas (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011b). It is therefore
worth considering whether this is true more generally in cross-national empirical work. If so, we might
wonder why. One possibility is that, absent crises, democratic polities do not care about things like cross-
national banking ties, economic sanctions, investment treaties, or the minutiae of trade policy. This would
probably not surprise comparativists (Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2008), but such contingencies are not
yet well-developed in IPE models.
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is statistically distinguishable from zero at the two higher strata in both model types. This
suggests that, at least in terms of proximity and income levels, like is attracted to like. As
discussed above, this assortative mixing can provide autonomy, by shielding countries from
outside pressure. Recent regionalization efforts may be understood in this light, although
the European crisis – which was only beginning as the sample period ended – may change
this dynamic moving forward.
The network models strongly demonstrate the importance of endogenous structural pro-
cesses in the global banking system. The effect of direct links is captured by two geomet-
rically weighted degree (GWID and GWOD) terms in the model, one which captures the
in-degree distribution (i receives bank finance from j) and one which captures the out-
degree distribution (i sends bank finance to j).34 These terms are analogous to more tra-
ditional k-star statistics, but are more parsimonious (Hunter and Handcock 2006). Rather
than specifying a model which includes a separate parameter for 2-star, 3-star, 4-star, etc.,
the GWID and GWOD terms captures the general effect, geometrically weighted with a
decay parameter. As such, these terms reflect “anti-preferential attachment” mechanisms
which operate within the network (Hunter 2007). A positive coefficient indicates that the
probability that an additional tie will attract future ties decreases geometrically with node
degree. As we can see, both GWID and GWOD are negative and statistically significant
at all thresholds, which provides strong evidence that preferential attachment is driving
part of both the in-degree and out-degree distributions within the network: countries which
strongly-tied to the rest of the network are more likely to attract new connections than
weakly-tied countries even after accounting for the state of the rest of the network.
34All of the geometrically weighted measures require specification of a decay parameter α. There is no
statistical rule for how this should be done. Rather, the appropriate α is selected via an inductive process for
improving model fit. In almost all cases the qualitative results do not change under different α although the
quantitative results vary. That was true in my case. I specified these models under a wide variety of α. The
substantive interpretation of the results was consistent, although several magnitudes changed. The models I
report are some of the most conservative models, i.e. those in which the structural processes were given a
relatively low weight.
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We are also interested in the effect of indirect ties. The geometrically weighted edge-
wise shared partners statistic (GWESP) measures whether national banking systems which
are tied together are more likely to have more than one shared partner than would be ex-
pected by chance. For example, if the U.S. and U.K. are tied to each other, we would
expect them both to be tied to others, such as Germany, Canada, or France. The geomet-
rically weighted dyadwise shared partners statistic (GWDSP) indicates whether countries
with shared partners tend to cluster together whether or not they are directly connected.35
In other words, if two national banking systems share one partner, then GWDSP estimates
whether they are more likely to share other partners. When GWESP and GWDSP are in-
cluded in the same model, as they are here, GWDSP represents the base effect of having
shared partners – the effect when there are no direct ties between two countries – while
GWESP isolates the effect for banking systems which are directly connected. Both terms
are positive and statistically significant, indicating that shared partners are not attracted
randomly. This indicates that triadic processes are present and salient in the global banking
system.
Taken together, the endogenous effects are quite powerful at all thresholds. They in-
dicate that power in the global banking system, as operationalized by the ability to attract
and send finance capital across national borders, is driven in large part by structural pro-
cesses. Thus, inequalities in global banking are likely to become exacerbated over time
irrespective of the internal properties of countries or shared attributes of them, although
some monadic and dyadic factors also contribute. The structural variables are highly sta-
tistically significant and substantively large at every threshold in the network models, even
when the size and significance of other variables weakens. At higher strata of the network,
much of the activity is determined by structural properties rather than country attributes.
35GWESP and GWDSP are analogous to the alternating k-triangles and alternating 2-paths statistics, re-
spectively.
73
These results provide strong support for the speculation of Oatley et al. (2013) that pref-
erential attachment mechanisms are important in global finance, additionally suggests that
higher-order processes such as triadic closure are present, and suggests that empirical or
theoretical models which do not account for complex interdependencies are likely to lead
to false conclusions.
2.9 Summary and Conclusion
Processes that operate at the level of the system are of increasing concern for policy-
makers in the wake of the global financial crisis (Haldane 2009). Regulators have shifted
focus from the internal attributes of individual firms (“too big to fail”) to the structure
that arises from the connections between them (“systemically important financial insti-
tutions”, or “SIFI”). Post-crisis domestic and international regulatory reforms have thus
placed greater emphasis on the supervision and control of these prominent units, and place
greater regulatory burdens on them. In the recent revision of the international Basel capital
accords, for example, SIFIs may need to maintain 40% higher equity-to-assets ratios than
other firms because of their systemic risk. Institutions which engage them as counterparties
will also be required to maintain additional capital as protection against counterparty risk.
Thus, the Basel Committee recognizes that system stability depends on the ways in which
institutions are interdependent, which is not a pure function of size (Bank for International
Settlements 2011). So there is an increasing understanding that not only should regula-
tory efforts not be conducted only at local levels, they should be less concerned with the
risk-taking activities of individual firms and more concerned with the broader system of
financial linkages.36
Despite the increasing importance given to system structure by policymakers, aware-
ness of it has so far not percolated far into international political economy scholarship,
36While regulators place increasing importance on systemic risk and patterns of connections, they have not
articulated a clear sense of which systemic properties they believe to be important. This remains an important
question for future analysis.
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where theories of interdependence are often presented in terms of diffusion.37 Some of
these processes include norm diffusion (Abdelal 2007; Chwieroth 2007, 2009), competitive
pressures generating a “race to the bottom” (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006), com-
petitive pressures generating a “climb to the top” (Prakash and Potoski 2007), the spread
of liberalization as a general phenomenon (Simmons and Elkins 2004; Pitlik 2007), and
policy diffusion based on national similarities (Brooks 2007) or multinational production
chains (Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009). While this literature has made many theoret-
ical and empirical advances, studies of diffusion are concerned with the spread of policies
rather than outcomes (Gilardi 2012). Moreover, diffusion is only one type of interdepen-
dent process, and does not consider the overall structure of relationships to be meaningful,
insofar as diffusion analyses typically do not include endogenous processes.38 Very little
work in international political economy has considered structural dynamics in a theoreti-
cal context which employs an inferential quantitative methodology.39 A major goal of this
study is to try to address that gap, using the most thorough extant data available to shed
light on a question of obvious importance for conceptions of power in the world economy:
what drives developments in the global banking system?
In the six years since the onset of the global financial crisis International Organization
has not published any research articles related to the crisis, limiting its discussion to a single
post-crisis survey of the pre-crisis literature on financial regulation (Helleiner and Pagliari
2011). International Interactions published a highly-critical set of commentaries on the
state of international political economy in light of the crisis. The Review of International
Political Economy has had two special issues related to the crisis. The most recent, in
2012, concerned the governance of global financial markets from a variety of perspectives;
37When they are considered at all (Keohane 2009).
38Diffusion analyses posit a relationship between some unit i and another unit j. Such an analysis is thus
relational but it is not systemic: a diffusion analysis might not pick up the effect of unit k (and h and etc.) on
both i and j. A network analysis would.
39An important exception is Ward, Ahlquist, and Rozenas (2013).
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no articles examined how these markets are formed or how they perform. The previous
special issue, from 2009, contained case studies of previous crises in Argentina, Russia,
Turkey, and Malaysia and Taiwan but no articles on the functioning of the global financial
system. One article reviewed recent books on diffusion, but concerned itself almost entirely
with policy (rather than outcome) diffusion (Meseguer and Gilardi 2009); another focused
on particular technologies associated with financial innovation and the need for “bottom-
up” explanations of the politics of finance (Mu¨gge 2009).
While it is impossible to know for sure why global finance has been neglected by IPE
(Mosley and Singer 2009), one possibility is that is has been difficult to find a quantitative
methodology which shares the assumptions of much prior theory. Prior to the crisis empir-
ical IPE had overwhelmingly converged on a set of statistical methodologies that empha-
sized hypothesis testing but assumed that observations were independent from each other
and distributed identically (Cohen 2009b; Maliniak and Tierney 2009; Oatley 2011). The-
ories of global finance remained systemic, and typically assumed that observations were
not independent but interdependent (Cohen 2006; Keohane 2009; Helleiner 2011). Recent
advances in inferential network statistics have made it possible to include node- and dyad-
level covariates along with structural parameters in the same model, thus allowing hypoth-
esis testing in a systemic context that encourages theorizing the structural dynamics. One
class of models in the exponential random graph family is used in this paper. The results
indicate that monadic, dyadic, and systemic characteristics all impact the development of
the global banking system.
This paper contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature on global banking. It
conceptualizes power in the global banking system as resulting from the ability to attract
and supply bank finance internationally. It theorizes that monadic, dyadic, and systemic in-
puts can impact the distribution of banking power in linear, multiplicative, and exponential
ways respectively. This approach suggests that both country- and dyad-level variables –
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such as the size of the economy or common levels of development – and endogenous struc-
tural processes – such as preferential attachment and triadic closure – affect the ability to
form the cross-national banking relationships which are the basis of financial power. To test
these expectations, I employ a temporal inferential network model to analyze effects at all
three strata, operationalized as thresholds of tie strength, and finds important dynamics at
each level. The network model is compared to a regression-based approach which does not
include structural processes, and the findings suggest that neglecting structural processes is
likely to lead to false inferences.
This paper makes contributions on theoretical and methodological grounds. Theoret-
ically, it provides a “formal, systematic analysis of the sources [and] determinants” of fi-
nancial power which has so far been missing from the political economy literature (Cohen
2000). Methodologically, it has shown how the global banking system may be analyzed
using quantitative inferential models in a way which goes beyond a comparison of relative
differences in national attributes, and why it is important to do so. As such, it provides
an opportunity for research under the positivist epistemology preferred by American inter-
national political economists which is neither “myopic” nor “reductionist” (Cohen 2009b;
Oatley 2011).
Future research might examine other parts of the global financial system – such as direct
investment, portfolio investment involving non-bank entities, and the currency system – to
see if they are organized similarly to the banking network. The applicability of the com-
plex network approach can also be generalized to other aspects of global politics. Strange
(1987) emphasized the importance of power in four subsystems: global security, trade and
production, knowledge, and finance. Some scholars have begun looking at elements of
these subsystems using complex network theory and methodologies, but there is room for
much more progress along these lines.40 In particular, the analysis of multiplex networks –
40Exponential random graph models and their extensions have been utilized in studies of the alliance
regime (Cranmer, Desmarais, and Kirkland 2012; Cranmer, Desmarais, and Menninga 2012), militarized
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networks of networks – would allow us to examine how certain dimensions of global pol-
itics (e.g. prominence in global banking) affects other dimensions of global politics (e.g.
prominence in global trade).
Finally, the analysis here suggests that there may be limits to the utility of “unpacking
the black box” of domestic politics, at least insofar as we seek to explain global outcomes
from local conditions. While some domestic variables have an impact on outcomes in the
global banking system, the effect of regime type in particular is contingent upon what type
of model is estimated. When observations are assumed to be independent, regime type has a
positive effect on the formation of cross-national banking relationships. When observations
are modeled as interdependent it does not. This follows other recent analyses which have
similarly found the effect of regime type to be overstated in the trade system (Oatley 2011;
Ward, Ahlquist, and Rozenas 2013) and security system (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011b).
Future work needs to take more seriously the ways in which domestic and international
factors interact within the context of a complex adaptive system.
disputes (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011b), sanctions system (Cranmer, Desmarais, and Henrich 2013), and
terrorist networks (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011a), while international trade has been modeled using latent
space approaches (Ward, Ahlquist, and Rozenas 2013). But these studies have barely scratched the surface.
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3 BEYOND TOO BIG TO FAIL: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, REGULATORY
REGIMES, AND BANK BEHAVIORS
Underlying the dominant theories of financial regulation is the view that market pro-
cesses create a prisoner’s dilemma: competition erodes profits and thus does not benefit
incumbent firms, but the pursuit of profit incentivizes excessive risk-taking which period-
ically culminates in financial instability that generates negative social externalities. All
would be better off if firms converged on more prudent behavior, but each individual firm
is better off acting more riskily. Absent intervention by governments a suboptimal result is
likely. Regulation can alter the structure of market interactions in Pareto-improving ways
by halting the deterioration of lending practices and promoting financial stability. Because
regulations are political creations, however, they are susceptible to “capture” whereby in-
fluential private actors manipulate public policy for their own benefit at the expense of the
society at large. For this reason policymakers and scholars have traditionally focused on the
conditions under which regulations are likely to promote social welfare rather than private
rents.1
I argue that these accounts fundamentally misunderstand the role of financial institu-
tions as intermediaries between suppliers and demanders of finance capital. Because finan-
cial firms must first attract capital in order to profit from distributing it, they face multiple
incentives from markets. Competitive pressures do incentivize firms to engage in riskier
lending as traditional race to the bottom accounts describe, but there is a countervailing
1See, e.g., Pigou (1932); Demsetz (1968); Stigler (1971); Peltzman (1976, 1989); Kapstein (1989); Oatley
and Nabors (1998); Barth, Caprio Jr., and Levine (2001); Simmons (2001); Singer (2004); Drezner (2007).
market incentive to prudence: safer firms can access finance at more attractive rates. Be-
cause financial institutions profit by maximizing the spread between the return to assets
and cost of liabilities, at some margins a safer firm may also be a more competitive firm.
As such, we should expect heterogeneity in firm behavior: some will signal risk manage-
ment, others will signal prudence. Both are competitive strategies for profit-maximizing
firms operating at different margins. Firms will differentiate their behaviors based on their
individual characteristics, their position within the national market, the national market’s
position within the global market, and variation in political institutions, macroeconomic
fundamentals, and regulatory policies.
I start from the assumption that what matters to financial firms is the risk-adjusted rate
of return. High-risk/high-return strategies are not necessarily more appealing than low-
risk/low-return strategies for all firms. This basic understanding of firm incentives has not
been well-assimilated into theories of the political economy of finance. It has been hinted
at, particularly in studies of foreign direct and portfolio investment which posit that political
risk is highly salient to investors, thus suggesting that financial investors are risk averse
rather than risk acceptant, but have not been incorporated into models of financial firms’
preferences more generally.2 The literature on financial regulations uniformly assumes
opposite preferences.
Analyzing whether firms are either risk-seeking or risk-averse is, I contend, the wrong
approach. It presumes that firms are homogenous: they will either race to the bottom
or climb to the top; either way, their behaviors will converge. Yet an understanding that
firms are concerned with risk-adjusted return suggests that firms should choose a variety
of investment behaviors, as there are many risk-reward mixes which will yield a similar
risk-adjusted return in expectation. Therefore, we should expect firm behavior to be het-
erogenous and, as I demonstrate below, this is what we observe. To explain why different
2See, e.g., Mosley (2003); Tomz (2007).
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firms choose different investment strategies, I extend into a political economy context a
small literature in financial economics concerned with firms’ “preferred habitat”. Different
firms prefer to operate in different market locales: some pursue arbitrage strategies, oth-
ers are “vanilla” banks, still others trade in junk bonds. Some large institutions may exist
within several locales simultaneously; most firms in the global banking system exist within
a specific market locality.
This article thus contributes to several literatures. It agrees with Strange (1992) that
analyses at the firm-level are increasingly important to political economy, and with Mosley
and Singer (2009) that this is especially true for financial firms. It agrees with the finding
of Young (2012) that such an accounting requires a reconsideration of the ways in which
financial firms influence politics (and vice versa), and provides a partial explanation of how
firms’ policy preferences may be formed. It also provides an account of firm behaviors
which may be usefully applied to the growing literature studying comparative financial
regulations.3
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section I briefly describe the common
view of financial markets which undergirds extant political economy theories of regulation,
show empirically that these assumptions of firm behaviors are not realistic, and discuss the
implications of this for existing theories concerning the relationship between financial firms
and governments. Following that, I present an alternative theory of bank behavior which
focuses on their position within a political economy, and generate hypotheses that follow
from that logic. I then construct and conduct an empirical test of these hypotheses using
a Bayesian regression analysis of the best observational firm-level data available before
summarizing and concluding.
3E.g., Copelovitch and Singer (2008); Winecoff (2014).
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3.1 The Common View of Bank Behavior
Standard political economy accounts of bank behavior are seemingly inferred from
the capital structure irrelevance principle of the representative agent model of Modigliani
and Miller (1958): given certain assumptions – efficient markets, zero transaction costs
or taxes, symmetrical information – the value of a firm is unaffected by whether it is fi-
nanced by equity or debt.4 However, under common conditions of taxation such as the
deduction of interest payments, equity financing becomes relatively more expensive and
debt financing becomes more attractive (Modigliani and Miller 1963). Thus, in real-world
political economies firms have an incentive to leverage their equity capital, thus multiply-
ing gains (or losses) from their asset portfolios. In the typical account, this incentive is
only diminished by the willingness of lenders to continue extending debt finance (“market
discipline”), or by regulatory requirements which force firms to finance their operations
with a minimum level of equity capital to mitigate against the risk of insolvency.5 In this
framework, even with symmetrical information and no transaction costs, absent taxation
firms are risk-neutral but in the face of taxation firms are risk-acceptant.
In other words, given simple assumptions, there is an expectation that firms will “race to
the bottom” by progressively increasing leverage in order to finance risk-taking activities.
Funding via equity capital is costly: it represents foregone earning potential. But financing
asset accumulation via debt can also be costly: it increases the sensitivity that a bank has
to the risk in its asset portfolio. If banks increase leverage too much their counterparties’
investments will be less secure, which may cause them to demand higher financing costs
(e.g. a higher interest rate) as compensation. So a profit-maximizing firm must consider
4In terms of basic accounting a firm’s assets less its liabilities equals its equity. Whether asset accumula-
tion is funded by increasing equity or debt is thus trivial.
5Firms with high leverage may be pushed into insolvency by even relatively small downturns in asset
performance, since a small equity base must cover a large set of liabilities. The case for regulation on welfare
grounds is that financial instability has negative societal effects, so government should limit the extent to
which firms may accept risk while managing others’ money.
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two variables pertaining to the opposite sides of their balance sheet: the amount of risk in
their asset portfolio, and the cost of their financing operations. Enough income must be
earned from assets to pay off liabilities. High leverage requires high returns in order to be
profitable; lower leverage requires lower returns. To generate high returns, firms will be
more likely to accept larger risks.
In its simplest form, a so-called “vanilla” bank which accepts deposits and makes loans,
banks can increase profit in two ways: they can lend more at any given rate of profit, or they
can lend the same amount at a higher rate of profit. The rate of profit is determined by the
difference between the cost of a firm’s liabilities (i.e. its deposits) and the return on its assets
(i.e. the loans it extends). When banks merely channel funds from savers to borrowers,
profits are earned by exploiting an interest rate spread which arises from managing risk
inherent in maturity mismatches: borrowers wish to borrow long term, while creditors
prefer to lend for shorter durations. Deposits are paid an interest rate, while loans are
charged an interest rate. The bank’s profit is the difference between the quantity of funds
deposited and the quantity of funds lent, adjusted by their respective interest rates. The
interest rates are determined by risk. Banks charge higher interest rates to riskier borrowers
or for longer term loans. Banks pay little interest on demand deposits, as they are of short
duration and are very low risk. The same dynamic exists in non-vanilla banking systems,
where bank assets and liabilities may come in the form of complex financial instruments
rather than simple loans and deposits. Restating the above in a slightly more general way,
banks can increase profit either by earning more from their assets, which may involve
increased risk-taking, or by paying less for their liabilities.
Even vanilla banking markets could contain race to the bottom dynamics. As banks
compete for profits, the spread between income earned from assets and fees paid to liabil-
ities will shrink. Banks will seek to capture market share by charging less on assets, or
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by paying more on liabilities. The cumulative result is that banks lend more at lower mar-
gins, which leaves them susceptible to illiquidity or insolvency should their investments
under-perform. Conversely, banks may seek to maximize the interest rate differential by
making riskier loans and charging a premium for them. Eventually this strategy may also
leave firms susceptible to market downturns or other idiosyncratic risk. Both behaviors are
generally present in the run-up to banking crises, such as the one triggered by the subprime
mortgage collapse.6
Continuing this logic, the more competitive a market is the greater the temptation for
banks to lend more and/or lend more riskily. In this way, banking markets represent a
prisoner’s dilemma. If banks could make credible commitments to not undercut their com-
petitors, they could all lend a reasonable amount at a reasonable interest rate, guaranteeing
a reasonable profit at low risk in perpetuity. But banks cannot make such a commitment,
since each firm benefits from capturing more market share. The result is that competitive
pressures drive risk accumulation which may eventually culminate in a crash. A third-
party intervener, in the case a government, is needed to change the structure of the strategic
interaction by making a commitment to prudent behavior credible. This is done through
regulation, by setting a floor under which risk-taking activities cannot fall.
This process is mirrored in the global political economy. Each state benefits when their
firms possess a competitive advantage over their foreign rivals. But the pursuit of that
advantage can lead to a situation where each state allows its firms to accumulate assets
via debt finance rather than equity finance. If all states participate, and competition forces
them to do so, financial markets may generate quite a lot of instability while profits are
6It was not just risky mortgage lenders, investment banks, and hedge funds which suffered from the crisis.
Money market mutual funds “broke the buck”, meaning that their shares dropped below $1 in value. Prior
to the subprime crisis, this had happened once in the nearly four decades since money market funds have
been in operation; during the subprime crisis the oldest money market fund, the Reserve Primary Fund,
broke the buck, and Federal Reserve researchers conservatively estimated that at least thirty-one others, and
possibly as many as seventy-eight, would have done so had their management companies not intervened in
an unprecedented manner (Brady, Anadu, and Cooper 2012).
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competed away.7 As states become more tightly integrated and international markets more
competitive, so the thinking goes, instability can spread from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
in ways which are unpredictable ex ante.8 A credible international regulatory standard is
necessary to alter the structure of the interaction so that defection is no longer rewarded,
thus preventing the origination and spread of crises. Such regulatory requirements have
typically involved mandating a minimum level of equity capital which banks must maintain
against the risk of default in their asset portfolios.
Such a story expects banks in aggregate to behave as in figure 3.1, which represents the
portion of banks’ asset accumulation which is funded by equity (i.e. “tier 1”) capital: com-
petition should force homogeneity – variance in bank capital-to-assets ratios should be low
– and the central tendency should be to match the regulatory minima, plus a small buffer to
protect against idiosyncratic risk. To behave in any other way would be uncompetitive, and
uncompetitive firms will not last long in a dynamic market such as finance. To keep their
domestic banking sectors competitive in increasingly integrated global financial markets,
governments will tend not to regulate more strictly than the international regulatory stan-
dards such as the Basel capital accords. So, from the standard models we should expect
convergence in bank behaviors.
I do not exaggerate the implications of the standard models with the simulation por-
trayed in figure 3.1. Even the complication allowing a small capital buffer is recent to
the economics literature (Ngo 2006, 99): “Virtually all models of bank decision making...
7This simplistic account obviously ignores another dimension: borrowers benefit when more credit is
available at lower rates. As Rajan (2010) points out, governments may often wish to expand the supply of
credit available to its citizens at low rates. While this aspect of the politics of finance is certainly important,
it is beyond the scope of this analysis.
8Like other parts of this section, for purposes of logical clarity this assertion is overly simplistic. As
Oatley et al. (2013) point out, not all financial integration is equal, and not all financial crises are equally
likely to spread through the system. Accordingly, this point should be taken as illustrative of one possibility,
not a certainty.
85
Figure 3.1: The view of bank behavior fundamental to prevalent theories of regulation:
due to competitive pressures, banks behave similarly and minimally comply with statutory
regulations such as the international Basel capital accords.
tended to assume that capital requirements are binding constraints on bank behavior.” Ab-
sent those constraints banks would increase leverage, which implies increased risk. The
capital buffer, represented by the distance between the regulatory standard (red vertical
line) and the majority of the density in figure 3.1, was modeled as nothing more than in-
surance against an accidental erosion of capital which would lead to closure of the firm by
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regulators.
The political economy literature puts it even more bluntly, as Meseguer and Gilardi
(2009) noted in a post-crisis survey: “[C]ompetition has caused a race to the bottom in
trade barriers, capital account regulations, tax rates, and government intervention in the
economy in general.” This echoes the rationale behind the origination of global capital reg-
ulations as recounted by (Kapstein 1989, 324): “In an interdependent financial community
in which every state wants to enhance or maintain the competitiveness of its banking sec-
tor, deregulation by one state must be countered by that of others. This competitive spiral
forces regulation toward its lowest common denominator.”
There’s just one problem: banks do not behave this way.9 As figure 3.2 demonstrates,
the central tendency of bank behavior is to be well above the regulatory minimum, and the
variance is quite large. There does not appear to be a race to the bottom or a climb to the
top. Instead, banks differentiate themselves. Remember the role that investor confidence
plays: in a world in which firms are racing to the bottom, a firm that behaves less riskily can
distinguish itself from other firms by signaling its quality. In the vanilla case, if depositors
are convinced that their funds will be safer at the prudent firm they will demand a lower
interest rate for their deposits, thus increasing the interest rate spread (and profit) for that
firm. Firms that behave too riskily will find their access to finance limited. So markets can
reward firms that climb to the top, those that race to the bottom, and those which pursue
a mixed strategy. Rather than expecting market pressures to homogenize firm behavior,
we should expect diversification as firms invest asymmetrically in pursuit of profits.10 The
difference between figure 3.1 and figure 3.2 is puzzling from the perspective of prior theory.
Also puzzling is the fact that we observe this diversification within and across coun-
tries and time, as figure 3.3 shows. This has major implications for the ways in which
9Neither do governments (Walter 2012).
10Indeed, firms differentiate themselves even in how they conceptualize, measure, and report profit
(Mackenzie 2005).
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Figure 3.2: Risk-weighted tier 1 capital adequacy ratios, 2000-2006. The central tendency
is higher and the variance is wider than standard theories would expect, indicating no
homogenous race to the bottom.
political economists understand the relationship between firms and governments. Govern-
ments responded to the subprime crisis by tightening regulatory structures at the domestic
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and international levels.11 The ostensible purpose of these regulatory reforms is to coun-
teract race to the bottom dynamics in financial markets: absent regulation, firms utilize
progressively riskier lending strategies in order to capture greater market share.12 Absent
regulation, eventually this “mania” will culminate in instability and crisis.13 Embedded in
this account are two substantive claims: one regarding the behavior of private actors oper-
ating within a competitive market system, and the other regarding the effect of regulatory
policy in conditioning those behaviors. We have seen above that the former claim is highly
questionable; the latter may be as well.
The standard public interest case for economic regulations focuses on their potential
for improving social welfare, especially their ability to correct market failures that arise
when some economic activity generates negative externalities, monopoly conditions, or
other market failure.14 Rules restricting banking activities generally focus on the social
costs associated with bank failures. These include counterparty default risk, where losses
in one bank prevents it from meeting its obligations to other firms, which may in turn lead
11At the domestic level many countries have made drastic revisions to their regulatory codes. In the United
States, for example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is “arguably the most
significant financial legislation in modern history” according to Kathleen Casey, then a Commissioner of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch012311klc.htm, last
accessed August 16, 2012). At the international level, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, housed
at the Bank for International Settlements, agreed on a new global standard – its third in three decades –
regulating banking activities.
12Although some revisionist accounts, such as Friedman and Kraus (2011), argue that the activity of banks
in the lead-up to the crisis does not comport with a view of risk maximization, noting that banks over-
whelmingly invested in highly-rated securities which were insured by credit default swaps. These assets
were privileged by regulatory structures such as the Basel accords. In this view, the crisis resulted from risk
concentration rather than risk taking, and this concentration is at least partly as response to the alteration of
incentives caused by earlier regulatory reforms.
13This view was presented at least as early as Marx (1867) and has been reiterated by many since, including
Polanyi (1944) and Minsky (1986). But this view is also dominant in orthodox political economy, notably
Kindleberger and Aliber (2005) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). The government’s role in intervening during
panics was first articulated by Bagehot (1873). For a historical description of central bank activities during
crises, and a journalistic comparison of central banks’ responses to the 2007 crisis, see Irwin (2013).
14There is a long economic literature concerned with this question. For classic examples see Pigou (1932)
and Demsetz (1968). An in-depth treatment of this literature is found throughout Crew and Parker (2006).
Ha¨gg (1997) surveys the economics literature from a European perspective.
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Figure 3.3: Risk-weighted tier 1 capital adequacy ratios, 2000-2006, by World Bank in-
come class. The horizontal red line is the minimum tier 1 ratio under the Basel accords.
There is a quote a lot of variation both within and across these groups, and within and
across time periods.
to illiquidity or even insolvency in those firms; depositor losses; output losses in the real
economy stemming from bank collapses and a fall in available credit; and potential public
sector financing of illiquid or insolvent firms. To the extent that these costs are not borne by
the banks that incur them they represent negative externalities. Policymakers try to protect
their economies from these effects by restricting the risk-taking activities of banks. If they
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are successful, the market failure will be mitigated.
A second strand of research, originating in the public choice school of economics,
argues that the effect of regulation on markets can itself lead to market failure. Powerful
private sector agents may be able to manipulate regulations to entrench their position as
market leaders, thus collecting rents from society and creating inefficiency in regulated
markets.15 When resources are expended in pursuit of rent capture rather than productive
enterprise, the economic result is socially suboptimal. Such an outcome not only reflects
political inequities, it may exacerbate them.16
While early research was focused on domestic economies, later scholarship extended
the logic to international markets and emphasized the role of politics in influencing the
creation and reformation of regulatory regimes. Kapstein (1989, 1991) presents a public
interest account of regulatory harmonization, arguing that the first international Basel ac-
cord on banking supervision as being welfare-enhancing, as it halted competitive pressures
that put downward pressures on firm practices. Thus, it provided a “level playing field” on
which competition could occur thus halting a race to the bottom. Others – including Kras-
ner (1991); Oatley and Nabors (1998); Simmons (2001); Drezner (2007) – emphasized the
role that state power plays in affecting the content and timing of international regulatory
harmonization, and argues that globalization provides new opportunities for rent capture.
By skewing international agreements in ways that benefit their firms, powerful states can
potentially increase domestic financial stability and domestic competitiveness. Far from
leveling the playing field, this research argues that the first Basel accord tilted it in favor of
the entrenched states at the center of the system (especially the United States and United
Kingdom) at the expense of their nascent challengers (especially Germany and Japan).
Both of these traditions portray the relationship between regulation and competitiveness
15See, e.g., Stigler (1971); Peltzman (1976, 1989).
16Worry about the political influence of financiers is ubiquitous throughout history. One notable recent
example is Johnson and Kwak (2011).
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as a race to the bottom. They emphasize the downward pressures markets put on prudential
behavior, and expect firms to find regulations onerous. Taken together, these views of
regulatory politics expect firms to minimally comply with regulatory burdens if they are in
compliance at all. That is, they expect figure 3.1 to accurately describe banking markets.
As it does not, these accounts of regulatory politics are deficient in some way.
Nor can this behavior be explained by the emerging literature on private regulations.
Scholars have recently begun paying attention to the role that “private politics” plays in
governing the global economy. Concluding a special issue of Business and Politics dedi-
cated to the topic, Bu¨the (2010) agrees with the definition of private politics as designed
to “influence economic activity... without reliance on public institutions or officeholders”
(Baron 2001, 7). Often these private regulations are enacted by market participants in an
effort to ward off public interference – when market activities generate negative social ex-
ternalities – or to harmonize production standards to facilitate the development of scale
economies.17 While private regulations may be powerful constraints on private action in
many contexts, in the case of banking the politics has been public, not private, as there are
no international private sector professional organizations enforcing “best practices” above
minimum capital requirements.18 Moreover, the private regulations literature assumes the
same firm incentives as the public regulations literature, and so would generally not expect
regulatory over-compliance in the absence of non-public constraints.
Others have argued, and demonstrated empirically, that the “race to the bottom” narra-
tive does not well describe other types of markets. Some of the extant “capital competi-
tion” literature identifies other mechanisms that affect policy choices and market responses.
Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) provide an empirical test of a tournament model showing
17Others, such as Vogel (2009) and Prakash and Potoski (2007) emphasize “civil regulation”, in which
non-state actors seek to constrain global firms through professional associations, standards of best practices,
and other means. For a thorough review of this literature see Vogel (2008).
18Singer (2007) presents theory and evidence explaining some of why and how this has been the case in
banking but not in securities markets.
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that a country’s capital taxation policies are informed by domestic political considerations
and the political institutions of competitor countries. In most cases, they find, domestic po-
litical constraints insure against a sprint to low capital taxation. Mosley (2000, 2003) finds
that markets prioritize certain macroeconomic policies when making decisions on where to
allocate capital, but usually in ways that encourage policy stability, rather than erode it.19
Other studies have found that markets in many industries often, if selectively, reward (or
do not punish) firms that maintain standards above their legal requirements.20
However, the causal mechanisms described by these studies are not likely to obtain
in global banking for several reasons. First, the “California effect” literature describes a
different phenomenon than the one under observation here: that once de jure regulatory
innovations are enacted in one jurisdiction they tend to carry over into other jurisdictions
de facto, often because multinational corporations wish to maintain uniform production
standards. In the case of banking there is no such regulatory innovation; firms are over-
complying on their own. Additionally, “California effect” explanations generally involve
transnational firms exporting advanced-economy standards to emerging markets. While
this might explain some the activity of some financial institutions, it cannot explain the
majority of them. In particular, it cannot explain the heterogeneity of financial institutions
within the same jurisdiction. Second, the observation that governments often do not race
to the bottom when setting regulatory policy does not explain why firms over-comply with
the regulations that already exist. Standard models of government over-regulation – that is,
19There is some evidence of herding behavior, as policies diffuse through the system. Simmons and Elkins
(2004) note the spatial and temporal clustering patterns in economic liberalization movements. Pitlik (2007)
shows that economic liberalization, as measured by a broad index of economic freedom, percolated through
the OECD from 1970-2000 in a way consistent with the expectations of the diffusion literature. Chwieroth
(2007, 2009) focuses on the role of epistemic communities and norms, respectively, in driving the liberaliza-
tion of finance. My point is not to dispute the findings of these articles which emphasize convergence, but
rather to note that at least in the area of banking markets, there is still quite a lot of cross-national divergence
in need of explanation.
20See, e.g., Garcia-Johnson (2000), Mosley and Uno (2007), Mosley (2008, 2010), and Greenhill, Mosley,
and Prakash (2009).
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regulation of the domestic economy in ways stricter than international minimum standards
– generally rely on bottom-up explanations rooted in domestic politics. Standard models of
financial firm behavior have the opposite expectation of grassroots pressure, as competition
is expected to generate downward pressure on standards.21
Perhaps surprisingly, there is also little micro-level theory in financial economics that
can explain this phenomenon. Much of the economics literature on financial market be-
havior, such as that in the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) tradition, ignores the role of
regulation almost entirely.22 The EMH tradition suggests that regulation is at best unnec-
essary and at worst undesirable: markets perform best when they are least constrained. If
there is no need to explain regulation then there is even less need to explain firms’ responses
to it, so the EMH tradition contributes little to this conversation.23
As noted above, some recent literature presents over-compliance as a simple buffer to
protect against falling into regulatory non-compliance. Barrios and Blanco (2003) present
a model of firm incentives under two conditions – one in which firms face minimum cap-
ital requirements and one in which they do not – and show theoretically and through an
empirical analysis of Spanish banks that maintaining a capital buffer is optimal when firms
are regulated so long as the sanction for non-compliance is sufficiently severe. Similarly,
Ngo (2006) presents a model of “precautionary” over-compliance in which there is a profit-
maximizing equilibrium for banks to over-comply with capital regulations, but only if the
expected cost of regulatory breach is lower than cost of raising additional capital.24 In other
words, these studies still suggest that bank behavior is dominated by a race to the bottom,
21Note that there may be an exception here, if domestic polities force local governments to regulate do-
mestic financial sectors more strictly than the international requirement. I consider this possibility in greater
detail below.
22See, e.g., Fama (1965, 1970); Merton (1973).
23It should also be noted that EMH is about asset prices, particularly the prices of financial instruments,
and not about firms’ attitudes towards risk per se. It is worth mentioning, however, since firms’ profits depend
on the price differences on the asset and liabilities sides of the balance sheet.
24Additionally, Ngo finds that these pressures are stronger when the sanction from regulators is higher.
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but condition that dynamic on the presence of capital regulation. There are at least two
reasons to doubt these accounts. First, the amount of over-compliance is – in many cases at
least – well beyond what would be required to mitigate fear of regulatory breach. Second,
the variation in over-compliance both within and across regulatory jurisdictions suggests
that other factors are influencing banks’ behaviors.
One plausible explanation for over-compliance is market discipline. That is, markets
may punish firms which take on excessive risk, or reward prudent firms, by lowering the
price they must pay for finance. Indeed, market discipline played a key role in the first
major revision to the Basel Capital Accord, comprising one of the three “pillars” intended to
promote financial stability.25 In the words of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2001):
Pillar 3 recognises that market discipline has the potential to reinforce capital
regulation and other supervisory efforts to promote safety and soundness in
banks and financial systems. Market discipline imposes strong incentives on
banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound and efficient manner. It can
also provide a bank with an incentive to maintain a strong capital base as a
cushion against potential future losses arising from its risk exposures.
The Basel Committee, in other words, expected over-compliance with capital regu-
lations. It might even be inferred that they expected markets to play the largest role in
disciplining banks, as the statutory capital requirements in the Basel accords were well be-
low typical bank behavior.26 The international capital regulation, therefore, contained at
its core the belief that firms would not race to the bottom, that competitive markets did not
25The other two were statutory minimum capital requirements and the supervisory review process.
26In their most recent revision to the Basel accords, which followed the subprime crisis, the Basel Com-
mittee has drastically increased statutory requirements and reduced the reliance on market discipline in their
regulatory framework.
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represent a prisoner’s dilemma, and therefore that only minimal regulation was necessary.27
But emphasizing market discipline suggests homogeneity in firms’ behaviors, and we have
already seen that the opposite is empirically true.
Partially motivated by a desire to bridge the gap between theory and observation, a
small empirical literature from several disciplines has begun to examine the phenomenon
of regulatory over-compliance. Here, too, there is disagreement. In an early example,
Peltzman (1970) found that increasing capital regulations had no effect on bank behaviors.
Somewhat more recently, Jacques and Nigro (1997) found that they did. In an analysis
of Indian firms, Ghosh and Das (2005) argue that firm behaviors are influenced primarily
by markets when markets are competitive, but are sensitive to capital requirements when
markets are uncompetitive. In a panel study of seventy-eight large firms in twelve industrial
countries, Brewer III, Kaufman, and Wall (2008) find the opposite: banks hold more capital
when markets are less competitive and when regulatory requirements are stricter, while also
finding that bank-specific factors such as firm size influence capital holdings.
A study of OECD firms in 1999 found that “[t]he direct effect of regulation, measured
in terms of regulatory power and stringency, seems ambiguous” (Bernauer and Koubi 2006,
510). Nevertheless, they argue that statutory regulations and market discipline may be com-
plements rather than substitutes. That is, markets reward prudent firms but they also reward
firms operating in prudent financial systems. Some firms could benefit by free-riding on
the safe behavior of others. This, in turn, could put downward pressure on capital cushions
that protect against firm insolvency more generally as firms try to maintain competitive-
ness. Regulations can eliminate this free-riding behavior by mandating a minimum capital
adequacy requirement, while markets reward over-compliance with it. In this way, markets
and regulations can reinforce each other. Christensen, Hail, and Leuz (2011) examine se-
curities regulations in the European Union, and find that firms’ cost of capital declines as
27The view of policymakers, in other words, was at odds with that of predominant theory.
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regulations get tighter, indicating that there is a market reward for prudence. While similar
in some respects, this differs from the Bernauer and Koubi finding in both scope – banks
versus securities firms – and the central mechanism for establishing market credibility –
state versus firm. But here, again, the main question is about the central tendency of the
distribution, not the spread.
These questions have become more pressing since the subprime crisis. Unfortunately,
we still have few definitive answers. The ambiguity is likely due to several factors. First,
many prior studies are restricted in empirical scope to particular countries, years, or firms
because of data limitations. Second, they generally attempt to demonstrate whether firms
race to the bottom or climb to the top as they are disciplined by markets, when it is con-
ceivable that both factors are in operation simultaneously – to varying extents – across time
and space, as firms try to maximize the spread between the return on their assets and the
cost of their liabilities at multiple margins. Third, they generally neglect the broader polit-
ical economy within which financial firms are embedded. Fourth, they often treat firms as
functionally equivalent, which leads to an expectation that they will behave similarly under
similar conditions. None of the papers cited above include several key political variables
along with firm-level variables in the theoretical or empirical models. In the remainder of
this paper I attempt to improve on all four of these dimensions.
3.2 Embedding Firms Within Political Economies
If we are to construct a realistic theory of bank behavior which considers the broad po-
litical, economic, and financial environments with which they operate, we might be begin
by calling into question the usefulness of representative agent models such as that proposed
by Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963). Indeed, researchers in the burgeoning social sci-
ence of finance tradition have done so, noting that the Modigliani and Miller model was not
“performative”, in that it did not influence behavior after being proposed, nearly as much
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as later models such as the capital asset pricing model (Mackenzie 2006).28 We need not go
far afield to do so: contemporaneous to Modigliani and Miller, Culbertson (1957) proposed
a model in which investors have a “preferred habitat”, which was extended in the follow-
ing years (Modigliani and Sutch 1967; Modigliani and Shiller 1973). This model suggests
that heterogenous agents have heterogenous preferences over investments, and demand a
risk premium to invest outside of their preferred habitat. Firms, in other words, wish to
occupy different positions within the market, make different sorts of investments, take on
different types (and amounts) of risk. The aggregate result of firms operating within their
own habitats does not deviate from an efficient market under typical assumptions (Mishkin
1980).
Both the original preferred-habitat model and recent formal applications of it have fo-
cused on the term structure of bond maturities and opportunities for arbitrage (Vayanos and
Vila 2011; Guibaud, Nosbusch, and Vayanos 2013), but there is no a priori reason why the
framework is not generalizable.29 In fact, such complications are desperately needed. In his
2011 Presidential Address to the American Finance Association, John Cochrane concluded
with the following:
Discount rates vary a lot more than we thought. Most of the puzzles and
anomalies that we face amount to discount-rate variation we do not under-
stand. Our theoretical controversies are about how discount rates are formed.
We need to recognize and incorporate discount-rate variation in applied proce-
dures.30
28It’s worth noting that performativity theories would also expect convergence in behavior rather than
diversity.
29I thank Iain Hardie for exposure to Vayanos and Vila (2011).
30Cochrane specifically referenced preferred habitat theory as a way to complicate representative agent
approaches in productive ways.
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Despite their flexibility, and the fact that preferred-habitat models empirically out-
perform representative agent models, they are seldom employed in financial economics
and (to my knowledge) have never been employed in the political economy literature. Dis-
count rates can vary according to risk-tolerance, and firm preferences over risk can be
influenced by variables at multiple levels: micro-variation occurs at the level of the firm,
meso-variation occurs at the level of the national political economy, while macro-variation
occurs in the global political economy. Each of these levels condition banks’ attitudes
towards risk, but they must respond to all of them simultaneously.
The well-being of banks is always contingent upon the state of the broader economy.
Because banks “borrow short to lend long” – meaning that the term of their assets is longer
than the term of their liabilities – banks are susceptible to unexpected macroeconomic
changes. If a recession leads to a sufficiently large increase in the number of defaults on
loans issued by banks, then they will not have sufficient capital (or liquidity) to meet their
obligations. Even banks which are fundamentally sound in normal times can be rendered
insolvent by major economic shocks. To protect themselves, during periods of economic
distress banks will often sharply curtail lending and protect their equity. Conversely, in
expansionary periods bankers will be willing to extend credit to producers and consumers
with a reasonable hope that they will be repaid.
This simple logic is well-understood, but contained within it is an expectation that
banks may decrease risk-taking in some contexts even absent restrictions on their activities.
Extending the thought a bit further, we might expect banks to have some incentive for
signaling stability even when the economy is performing well.31 Banks that are capable of
credibly signaling a prudential approach will be able to attract finance at lower cost during
economic expansions, thus increasing the spread between the return to assets and the cost
of liabilities. Behaving in this way may help them maintain confidence during economic
31In fact they frequently do in advertisements, stressing their longevity and stability as a means of signaling
security to investors.
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contractions. Alternatively, banks may choose to increase risk-taking during economic
expansions when the likelihood of repayment is highest, again increasing (but in a different
way) the spread between the return to assets and the cost of liabilities.
Considering the broader macroeconomic environment within which banks operate would
lead us to a different expectation than traditional political economy models would suggest:
banks may choose to emphasize prudence even absent regulation, or they may respond to
positive economic conditions by increasing risk-taking. The ratio of bank capital to its
assets will grow if the former and shrink if the latter. There is no a priori reason to pre-
sume that either effect will dominate in all circumstances, since there is an economic logic
underpinning both strategies.
In a similar way, banks may respond in varied ways to changed monetary conditions.
Monetary policy affects the macroeconomy indirectly; it must be channeled through banks.
If central banks wish to increase nominal growth rates they will increase the money supply
through open market operations and by lowering the interest rate paid at their discount
windows. An increase in the money supply affects banks in two ways: first, by decreasing
the cost of funds available to them, banks will make investments even at lower expected
return; second, because most financial contracts are specified in nominal terms, an increase
in the price level has the effect of lowering the real rate of return on investments. For this
reason, price inflation is said to benefit borrowers and harm lenders. Banks, however, are
both borrowers and lenders. Their position is improved by access to lower-cost finance
with which to generate some nominal return, but weakened by a decrease in the real rate of
return on assets already under contract.32 Again, they may respond to a price level increase
in asymmetric ways: by accepting the same level of risk but with lower cost of finance, or
by accepting more risk.
32This simplification neglects such important matters as whether the increase in money supply was ex-
pected, how large the time mismatch is between the maturity of assets and liabilities, and other such factors. I
use it simply to illustrate that the same macroeconomic development – a price level increase – could motivate
opposite bank responses.
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Faced with these different macroeconomic conditions, different banks may prefer dif-
ferent approaches in an attempt to succeed in competitive markets. Microeconomic factors
will certainly play a role. These at first may appear to be idiosyncratic – particularly in a
large-N analysis – but there are reasons to suspect that, in general, different types of firms
may have different preferences over the type and amount of risk they are willing to accept.
These relate to individual firms’ places within the macrofinancial environment. Some firms
may focus on burnishing their reputation as a safe intermediary, channelling funds from
savers to borrowers in low-risk ways. We might expect firms that primarily or exclusively
engage in retail banking – such as commercial banks – to place a particularly high empha-
sis on improving perceptions of their security. We might also expect firms that are publicly
listed on an equity market to privilege prudence, both because of shareholder discipline and
also because public disclosure laws demand greater transparency from these firms. Since
there is a way for them to be scrutinized, and a group for whom scrutinizing is rational,
the incentive to appear prudent is stronger for this type of firm than for private equity firms
who engage in more speculative trade.
The firms with the greatest need to signal prudence to markets and the least ability to do
so are those whose activities are opaque but still attract scrutiny. If these firms are success-
ful in signaling prudence – whether they are risky or not – then they may profit by attracting
finance at low cost. One way to do this is by increasing capital-to-asset ratios via regulatory
arbitrage.33 Investment banks are often in this position. Many of their activities are com-
plex enough that they appear above board to the investors, regulators, ratings agencies, and
counterparties who scrutinize them, but entail greater risk-taking than more simple forms
of banking. Commercial banks are in the opposite position, since their activities are far
33In particular the manipulation of the risk-weight baskets that have become a hallmark of capital regu-
lations in the era of the Basel accords. For one example of this in practice see the discussion of Friedman
(2009) and Friedman and Kraus (2011), who provide a microeconomic rationale for the over-investment in
securities backed by subprime mortgages, credit default swaps, and the sovereign debt of peripheral OECD
economies.
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more transparent. As a result, we might expect investment banks to signal greater prudence
via higher capital-to-asset ratios than commercial banks.
Similarly, we might expect large firms – which tend to be better diversified – to have
less need to signal prudence than smaller firms, who are more susceptible to idiosyncratic
risk.34 Banks operating within large, deep financial markets will have a greater incentive to
signal safety to investors because of the presence of a larger number of competitor firms.
Banks operating in countries with high savings rates will have an easier time attracting
finance whether they signal prudence or not.
All of these dynamics are embedded within a macropolitical system. Monetary pol-
icy is set by central banks. The mechanisms for calculating capital-to-assets ratios are
determined by regulatory authorities, who also determine the minimum amounts of capital
financial institutions must hold. While the relationship between governments and finance is
complicated, multidimensional, and in some ways symbiotic, for the purposes of this paper
I wish to take the political context within which financial firms compete as exogenously
given and theorize about how different political institutions and policies might influence
firm behaviors.35 There are at least two categories of macropolitical variables which must
be considered: the institutional governance framework, and the policy choices of the gov-
ernors. In the former category we could place the choice of regulatory institution – whether
the central bank or another institution – and whether the government is consolidated, re-
spects property rights, and faces popular pressure through a democratic process. In the
latter category we may include statutory regulations that affect banks directly, such as mini-
mum capital adequacy ratios, but also policy choices that influence banks indirectly, like the
resolution of the macroeconomic “Trilemma”.36 Previous literature has demonstrated that
34Some of these large firms may also benefit from implicit or explicit bailout guarantees.
35For the modal firm this is an accurate reflection of reality. First Bank of Chapel Hill has negligible
influence over the stance of monetary policy.
36That is, a government can only choose two of exchange rate stability, monetary independence, and capital
account openness.
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financiers prefer stable, transparent governments that respect property rights over unstable,
inscrutable, confiscatory governments (Mosley 2003), and that central banks which also
regulate financial sectors pursue more bank-friendly monetary policies than non-regulatory
central banks (Copelovitch and Singer 2008; Winecoff 2014). Nothing in the discussion
presented here contradicts these expectations.
Decisions over the trilemma could play a significant role in conditioning firm behaviors.
Previous literature has asserted that protectionist financial policies, such as closing of the
capital account, may induce prudence in financial markets (Rosenbluth and Schaap 2003;
Barth, Caprio Jr., and Levine 2001). These accounts assume that such protectionist policies
will alleviate strains arising from the race to the bottom; if race to the bottom dynamics do
not exist in the first place, however, then there is no reason to expect banks to alter their
behaviors in a major way. In fact, if the removal of foreign competition prevents market
discipline from taking hold, then local firms may act more riskily while securing rents from
society. If central banks retain monetary independence, then banks will know that they will
be able to respond to cyclical downturns with countercyclical monetary policy. They may
also expect central banks to act as lenders of last resort during periods of financial distress.
As mentioned above, if central banks also regulate the banking sector they will often pro-
vide tailor monetary policy to needs of the banking sector more than they otherwise would.
Therefore, we should expect banks operating in systems where the central bank possesses
a large degree of monetary independence to act less safely than other banks.
3.3 Expected Relationships
The previous discussion leads to several hypotheses concerning the behavior of banks,
which are summarized in table 3.1. In general, we should expect bank-level characteristics
to have a greater impact than regulatory variables, since banks operating within the same
market have incentives to differentiate their behaviors in order to perform well within their
preferred habitat. Therefore, in expectation the average effect of many policy variables
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should be small and perhaps indistinguishable from zero at traditional levels of statistical
significance, particularly when viewed across time (since variables such as political insti-
tutions do not vary much within countries).
Large firms (measured by assets) should have lower capital-to-assets ratios, meaning
that their assets are funded by higher levels of debt and/or their asset portfolios are riskier.37
There are several reasons for this expectation. First, large “too big to fail” firms may have
such systemic importance that an implicit (or explicit) guarantee of government support in
times of need gives them license to act more riskily without repercussions from markets.
Second, larger banks are more likely to be active in international markets, which increases
the competitive pressures they face to capture market share (Brewer III, Kaufman, and Wall
2008). Third, larger banks are more likely to be better diversified, which can reduce their
susceptibility to a market downturn, thus making high capital holdings less necessary for
signaling prudence.
Other bank-level characteristics should also have an effect on firms’ capital ratios.
Publicly-owned banks that are listed on equity exchanges should act less riskily than privately-
owned firms, as indicated by higher capital ratios, as shareholders have an opportunity to
discipline them. Different types of institutions should maintain different levels of capital.
Firms with riskier or more opaque asset portfolios, such as investment banks, will need
to maintain higher capital ratios to maintain investor confidence than firms with less risky
asset portfolios, like traditional commercial banks.
Several policy variables should be associated with banks’ capital ratios. A country’s
openness to foreign capital affects the competitive environment firms operate in. Rosen-
bluth and Schaap (2003) argue that “profit-padding” regulations, such as financial pro-
tectionism through capital controls, can induce prudent behavior from firms. Conversely,
less-protected firms, those subject to more foreign competition, will be able to maintain
37For a discussion of why I focus on capital-to-assets ratios, as well as definitions, see the appendix.
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a large capital base without losing market share. So we should expect firms operating
in more open jurisdictions to maintain lower capital ratios than those in less open juris-
dictions. The other macroeconomic “Trilemma” variables could also impact the environ-
ment within which banks operate. If banks have confidence that the management of the
macroeconomy will be conducted well, then they will have less need of protecting against
economy-wide downturns. Thus, monetary independence for central banks should be as-
sociated with lower capital ratios, while fixed exchange rates are associated with greater
capital adequacy.
Specific features of the national regulatory environment may also influence bank be-
haviors. To the extent that over-compliance is a common practice, and figure 3.2 indicates
that it is, we should expect national minimum ratios to have little effect on most banks’
behavior. However, banks may expect preferential policy when they are regulated by cen-
tral banks (Copelovitch and Singer 2008), and this may encourage them to act more riskily
than they would if monetary and regulatory authority were separated (Winecoff 2014). This
expectation should be exacerbated when regulatory central banks have monetary indepen-
dence (i.e., they do not have to maintain a fixed exchange rate). Deposit insurance schemes
are commonly viewed as leading to moral hazard as markets have less incentive to disci-
pline financial institutions (McCoy 2006), although some empirical evidence supports an
alternative model (Gropp and Vesala 2004).
The macroeconomic environment in which banks operate may also condition their ac-
tions. Specifically, economic growth rates, wealth levels, inflation rates, savings rates, and
the size of the financial sector may influence bank behaviors. Lower income countries
are likely to have smaller, less competitive, and less sophisticated financial markets. As
national income increases, therefore, financial technology and market monitoring mecha-
nisms should also increase, causing firms to increase capital buffers. As the reference group
in the models below are high income non-OECD countries, I would expect firms operating
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Variable Direction
Publicly Listed +
Investment Bank +
Commercial Bank -
Firm Size -
Banking Sector Size -
Domestic Savings Rate -
Inflation Rate +
Amount of Internationalization -
Low Income -
Lower-Middle Income -
Upper-Middle Income -
OECD +
Growth Rate +
Capital Account Openness -
Exchange Rate Stability +
Monetary Independence -
Deposit Insurance -
Regulatory Central Bank -
Minimum Capital Requirement ˜
Regime Type ˜
Table 3.1: Expected determinants of banks’ capital ratios. The baseline institution is a
bankholding corporation in a non-OECD high income country.
in less wealthy economies to have lower ratios.
When economies are growing firms have less need to act riskily in order to boost profits,
thus they will be more likely to fund asset accumulation via equity rather than debt. When
inflation is high funding via debt becomes more attractive, as it does when domestic savings
are high (i.e. when borrowing costs are low). If the race to the bottom narrative is true,
then larger banking sectors should force imprudent behavior are profits are competed away.
The amount of foreign claims on domestic banks provides an indication of the health of the
domestic financial sector. If domestic banks are in good condition they will attract foreign
interest at greater rates, and will also have less need to signal prudence via overly large
capital buffers.
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3.4 Data
The dependent variable is bank capital ratios (CAR) taken, along with with other bank-
level characteristics, from the Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope database of financial firms.38
To minimize cross-national variation in how supplementary capital ratios are calculated,
and thus more closely compare like-to-like, I follow previous literature and focus on core
tier 1 capital (Bernauer and Koubi 2006), which are transformed to the logarithmic scale to
reduce the influence of outliers. These data are pooled, and I include controls for country
and year to account for idiosyncratic temporal or national effects. Explanatory variables
include other firm-level measures from the BankScope data set, including whether a firm
is listed on a public exchange (Listed). I also include a firm’s total assets as a measure of
firm size, which has also been transformed to the logarithmic scale.
At the national level I include several types of variables: macropolitical, macroeco-
nomic, and macrofinancial. Considering the first of these, I include the minimum capital
ratio that governments mandate firms maintain and a binary variable indicating whether the
banking regulator is a central bank (= 1) or a separate agency (= 0), both taken from the
World Bank surveys described below, as is a dummy indicating whether bank deposits are
guaranteed by the government. I also include several institutional variables corresponding
to the political environment within which firms operate. I include each of the three com-
ponents of the “Trilemma indexes” – monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and
capital account openness – described by Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2008). All three are
bounded in between zero and one, with higher values indicating greater policy flexibility in
38BankScope contains data from many different types of financial firms, including real estate lenders,
government-owned banks, cooperatives, and others. Because this analysis focuses on the interplay between
market pressures and public regulations, I only include firms likely to be subject to the sort of capital re-
quirements under study. Therefore, I limit the sample to commercial banks, bank holding corporations, and
investment banks, and control for firm type. While BankScope is the largest data base of financial firms, it is
not universal. It tends to overrepresent large firms in more developed countries. Nevertheless, it remains the
most complete set of firm-level financial data. I discuss how capital ratios are calculated and why they are
important in an appendix.
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that area.39 I also control for the type of political regime that governs the countries within
which banks operate, using the Polity2 score from the POLITY IV data set. Higher scores
on this measure indicate a more democratic country.
I capture the macroeconomic environment using several variables, all taken from the
World Bank World Development Indicators. First, I indicate what income class a country
belongs to, which is an ordered categorical variable (broken up into a series of binary
variables) that can take on values of “low income”, “low middle income”, “upper middle
income”, “non-OECD high income”, and “OECD high income”. I also include the GDP
growth rate, gross domestic savings rate, and inflation rate (GDP deflator). Each of these
are transformed to the logarithmic scale. The current account balance as a percentage of
GDP is also included, as the country’s national accounts impact net capital flows into or
out of a country.
To take account of the macrofinancial environment firms face, I include three variables.
The first is the total amount of assets controlled by the domestic banking sector. These
came from the same BankScope data as the firm-level variables, and was create by sim-
ply summing each individual firm’s asset holdings for each country-year included in the
sample. The second is the gross domestic savings rate (% GDP) for each country-year,
which comes from the World Bank World Development Indicators data set. The last is the
amount of “internationalization” of a country’s banking sector, measured as the amount of
foreign claims on that banking sector. These data are taken from the Bank for International
Settlements consolidate banking statistics on an immediate borrower basis.
There are several data limitations. No cross-sectional time series data on government
39Due to the ‘n-1’ phenomenon, one state in a system of ‘n’ countries can maintain all of monetary inde-
pendence, exchange rate stability, and capital openness. The authors ascribe this role to the United States,
but the formula used in computing the values of the index is undefined for this country, thus creating missing
data. I therefore imputed the highest value for each variable – indicating greater policy flexibility – for the
U.S.
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regulations presently exists. The best data come from the World Bank “Banking Regula-
tion and Supervision” surveys. These surveys – which asked government officials dozens
of questions related to banking supervision, including what the minimum capital adequacy
ratio was in their jurisdiction and which agency regulated the domestic banking sector –
represent the best cross-national data on government policies related to financial market
supervision. While response to the survey was not universal, a majority of countries partic-
ipated in each year.40 Therefore, in order to include statutory regulations, the existence of
deposit insurance, and the location of regulatory authority in the analysis, I restrict the anal-
ysis to the years in which those surveys were concluded.41 The survey was conducted with
the goal of transparency, so the collectors of the survey information made the results public
and encouraged reporting of discrepancies between survey responses and actual practice.
Nevertheless, some divergence between de jure responses and de facto practices may exist.
While these surveys leave some things to be desired, they remain the most complete and
accurate cross-national data on governments’ regulatory policies available at this time.
Restricting the analysis to these years follows from, but is an improvement on, previous
literature that examined banks’ capital ratios. It improves previous literature in several
ways. First, it looks at all three periods in which the surveys were conducted, and examines
the largest number of firms across jurisdictions. Previous studies either focused exclusively
on the United States (Bernauer and Koubi 2002, 2009), a single time period (Bernauer and
Koubi 2006), or a severely limited sample of firms (Brewer III, Kaufman, and Wall 2008).
I include all investment banks, commercial banks, and bank-holding corporations for all
countries and years available. Therefore, to my knowledge, the analysis presented here
is the most comprehensive yet undertaken in terms of each of firms, countries, and years.
40Non-respondents were generally the smallest and poorest countries. All OECD members participated in
each of the three surveys.
41The years included are 2000, 2003, and 2006. An additional survey was released in 2012, but data for
that year is not available for most of the variables in the model. For a discussion of the surveys see Barth,
Caprio Jr., and Levine (2001); Barth, Caprio Jr., and Levine (2008).
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More specifically, to my knowledge it is the only study of the political economy of banking
to include banks from emerging markets in a comparative sample.
3.5 Method
I analyze these data using Bayesian regression methods, which employ different as-
sumptions about the data generating process from frequentist or likelihoodist approaches.
Bayesian models approach the observed data as fixed – rather than sampled randomly from
a population – and the coefficients as drawn a random distribution rather than a point esti-
mate of the true value of a parameter existing in nature. The distribution of the coefficients
– called the “posterior” – is interpreted using standard measures of central tendency and
dispersion, but because Bayesian methods estimate a proper probability density for the
posterior, within a Bayesian context we are not limited to simple tests of statistical signif-
icance. Instead, we can estimate with precision the probability that an effect is positive or
negative by considering how much of the parameter’s distribution is above and below zero.
In addition to different assumptions about the data generating process and attractive inter-
pretive properties, Bayesian methods allow – indeed require – the incorporation of prior
beliefs about the effects of explanatory variables on the outcome variable.42 In my case,
because the size of my data set is large enough for the results to be driven by the data even
with strong priors, I specify several models using low-information priors.43
All models have the same specification of the determinants of banks’ tier 1 capital
ratios and employ diffuse normal priors – which contain little information outside of the
observed data – for all parameters. The empirical model is a Bayesian regression estimated
using the MCMCpack package in the R statistical environment. The MCMCpack package
uses Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations to estimate the distribution of the
42Mathematically, likelihood approaches incorporate “flat” priors as well, which assigns an equal likeli-
hood to all possible values of the parameter, whereas Bayesian approaches accommodate any specification of
prior beliefs as well as subjective confidence in those prior beliefs.
43Employing low-information priors reduces the importance of subjective beliefs about the model’s per-
formance previous to estimation and gives more weight to the observed data.
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posterior. In this case, I discarded the first 50,000 simulations as burn-in, and estimated
500,000 post burn-in iterations of the chain. I specify four models. One for each year for
which the World Bank surveys discussed above were conducted – 2000, 2003, 2006 – and
one which pools all years.
3.6 Results
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Figure 3.4: Correlates of banks’ risk-weighted tier 1 capital adequacy ratios as estimated
by a Bayesian linear regression.
Figure 3.4 presents the results from the Bayesian linear regressions on banks’ tier 1
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capital adequacy ratios for each year in which the World Bank conducted surveys on bank
supervision, as well as a pooled model with controls for year.44 The Bayesian version
of coefficient estimates – posterior mean – is the point estimate, while the 95% credible
interval represents the spread of the distribution. The results are mostly stable across the
sample period although, as we might expect, there is some variation across time. Banks
were on average better capitalized in 2003 and 2006 than they were in 2000 (the base
year). In no sample are banks sensitive to the type of political regime.
The firm-level explanatory variables typically have large and substantively important
effects on firms’ risk-taking behaviors as measured by capital adequacy ratios. Banks that
are publicly listed on equity exchanges have higher capital ratios than firms that retain pri-
vate ownership, although the mean effect is most easily distinguishable from zero in 2006.
This is not surprising, as we would expect public shareholders to demand more prudent
management of risks and because publicly-listed firms have greater legal requirements for
transparency, which incentivizes prudence. Commercial banks tend to have a smaller cap-
ital cushion than the reference group – bank holding corporations – in the earlier years in
the sample, while investment banks have much higher ratios in the later years. This pro-
vides some evidence that investment banks have a greater need to signal prudence, as their
investment activities are more opaque. It also calls into question traditional race to the
bottom narratives, as investment banks are typically regulated less stringently than deposit-
taking institutions. Larger firms, as measured by the amount of total assets controlled by
the firm, tend to have lower capital ratios on average. This relationship is persistent at all
periods, and is substantively meaningful. Large firms might maintain lower capital ratios
because they are better diversified – as some portfolio theory would suggest – or because
they possess an implicit government bailout guarantee – which weakens the discipline of
markets. Disentangling these effects would be a profitable extension of this analysis for
44The results for each model are depicted individually (i.e. in a larger format) in the appendix.
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political economists.
Macrofinancial variables have some of the largest and most consistent effects. Firms
which operate in large domestic banking markets, as measured by the aggregate assets con-
trolled by the banks in the sample, have higher tier 1 capital ratios. To the extent that larger
financial sectors are more competitive, this provides further suggestive evidence against the
the race to the bottom. It also provides some reason to question whether financialization of
the economy, at least as measured by raw size, necessarily leads to increased risk-taking;
the finding that larger banking sectors are associated with better firms capitalization may
demonstrate increased market discipline. At the same time, when banks have easy access to
depositor funds, as measured by the domestic savings rate, asset-financing via equity capi-
tal rather than debt tends to be lower. This, again, suggests a market discipline mechanism
may be an important driver of firm capitalization. The amount that a banking system is
internationalized, as measured by the number of foreign claims on domestic banks, is asso-
ciated with lower firm capital ratios but the substantive effect is fairly weak. This indicates
that any effects from exposure to foreign competition, at least as measured by counterparty
participation, are fairly minimal.
The effect of macroeconomic variables is mixed. The inflation rate does not have an im-
pact on bank capital ratios which is consistently distinguishable from zero, which supports
the findings of prior work (Winecoff 2014).45 The effect of economic growth is similarly
small and inconsistent, while the current account balance as a percentage of domestic GDP
is unrelated to banks’ capital ratios.
Banks which operate in all income categories other than the base category – high in-
come non-OECD countries – maintain lower capital ratios on average except for banks
in upper-middle income countries, where the difference is typically not statistically sig-
nificant at normal levels (and changes sign). Banks in poorer countries have much lower
45However, the impact of the inflation variable becomes more important as we move forward in time: by
2006 the negative association with bank capital is larger and statistically significant at traditional levels.
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ratios. This could be due to weaker market discipline, less bureaucratic capacity which
could enforce regulations, or different bank-state relations in poorer than in richer coun-
tries. Banks in OECD economies also have lower ratios, however. These economies have
the most extensive regulatory and the best means to enforce them. Perhaps this relationship
indicates that market confidence is improved by having strong regulatory capacity. If so,
Bernauer and Koubi (2006) could be correct in concluding that markets and governments
are complements rather than substitutes. It could also indicate capture of the regulatory ap-
paratus by more-financialized economies, but the regulatory structure of these economies
had mostly harmonized via the Basel capital accords during the sample period and there
is no evidence that monitoring or enforcement was worse in OECD economies than others
during the 2000s.
The relationship between policy variables and bank capital adequacy is weak in most
cases. Interestingly, the level of minimum capital requirements does not have a consistent
effect on the amount of core capital relative to assets that banks maintain, and when pooling
all three years there is no association. This contradicts the finding Jacques and Nigro (1997)
and Brewer III, Kaufman, and Wall (2008), suggesting that their analyses may have suffered
from omitting relevant variables or from selection effects due to smaller sample sizes. It
also suggests that post-crisis regulatory reform efforts which have focused on improving
bank capital may not have the desired effect. Banks operating in systems were deposits
are insured by the government are better capitalized on average, which may indicates that
deposit insurance schemes do not foster moral hazard that would encourage firms to act
more riskily. Banks regulated by central banks have less capital against their assets in three
of the four models, and the effect is statistically distinguishable from zero in the pooled
model.
The “Trilemma” variables also have little to do with bank behaviors, on average, af-
ter the effect of the other variables is considered. Capital account openness is negatively
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related with bank capital in 2006, but not in the other years or the pooled model. This
calls into question the argument made by Rosenbluth and Schaap (2003) that governments
will be able to induce prudential behavior by domestic firms by limiting foreign competi-
tion; if anything, the opposite is true. Exchange rate stability has no statistically significant
relationship with capital ratios and neither does monetary independence. The interaction
between monetary independence and a central bank having a regulatory mandate has no
multiplicative effect.
Taken together, these results that firms risk behaviors as measured by risk-weighted
capital-to-assets ratios vary according to the macroeconomic and macrofinancial environ-
ments in which firms operate, and vary according to some macropolitical factors but not
others. There is also meaningful variation at the microeconomic level. This suggests that
trying to analyze any one of these factors outside of the context of the others is likely to lead
to incomplete, if not false, inferences regarding the determinants of firms’ risk behaviors.
The results thus agree with Bernauer and Koubi (2006): the direct effect of capital adequacy
regulation on firm behaviors is decidedly mixed and may be overstated by policymakers,
especially by comparison to firm-level and country-level variables. There does not appear
to be any consistent race to the bottom or climb to the top. Instead, firms differentiate
themselves according to their type and position within markets.
3.7 Conclusion
Previous political economy of finance research has typically assumed that banks “race
to the bottom” by acting more riskily when faced with competition. Theories of regulatory
politics have been constructed based on this belief, which assumes that the central tendency
of bank behavior should be minimal compliance with regulations, if not avoidance, and
the variance should be low as all firms are pressured by markets. This paper provides
descriptive evidence that these expectations are not borne out: banks routinely over-comply
with capital adequacy regulations to a large extent, and the variance in bank behaviors is
115
significant.
I argue that this indicates a need to shift political economy theory of financial behav-
ior away from representative agent models such as those based upon the capital structure
irrelevance principal of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) and towards a model which
allows firm behaviors to vary based upon their “preferred habitat” (Vayanos and Vila 2011;
Guibaud, Nosbusch, and Vayanos 2013). There are two advantages to such a shift. First,
it provides a more realistic framework within which firms behaviors may be examined.
Second, it allows us to appropriately embed firms within a political and economic context,
thus allowing us to consider how firm preferences over policy may be formed. A Bayesian
regression analysis of the determinants of firm behaviors shows that variables at the level
of the firm are important, but so are national and international political and economic vari-
ables.
Understanding how financial firms behave is of intrinsic interest for policymakers and
scholars of political economy (Strange 1992; Mosley and Singer 2009), but it also has
implications for theories of regulatory politics. Recent scholarship has called into question
standard accounts of rent capture via lobbying (Young 2012), but to this point there are few
alternative perspectives from which new theory may be constructed. The preferred habitat
framework employed here provides one such avenue.
One advantage of this approach is that public interest and public choice accounts of
regulatory politics may be embedded within it in a way which allows firms’ preferences to
differ. Regulatory reform efforts before and since the global financial crisis have been con-
tended by financial firms which operate in different segments of the market. For example,
parts of the international Basel capital accords which rely on internal risk models to deter-
mine appropriate capital ratios have been criticized by firms who do not have the technical
expertise required to develop such models internally. As a result, the United States did not
become fully compliant with second Basel accord (Berger 2006). The United States was
116
not alone in partial compliance (Financial Stability Institute 2012), as many countries have
overstated their de facto accession to global capital standards (Walter 2008a). Comparative
analyses of these phenomena may be enriched by reference to comparative habitats.
There are limits to the analysis presented here. I have only looked at one operational-
ization of firm behavior – tier 1 capital ratios of commercial banks, investment banks, and
bank holding corporations – over a relative short period of time. A more sustained data
collection effort should be able to extend the time series. Of particular interest may be
a pre- and post-crisis comparison of firms behaviors, and the extension of such analyses
beyond banks to other types of financial institutions. Did the internationalization of the
subprime crisis have a transformative impact on financial markets? Have different types of
firms responded to regulatory changes in asymmetric ways? These sorts of questions will
become increasingly important to policymakers as the post-crisis revisions to the interna-
tional Basel accord are phased in from now until 2019 and as domestic regulations – such
as the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States – are implemented.
An additional extension might hone in on the behaviors of transnational firms. Many
large financial institutions now have a presence in multiple regulatory jurisdictions. To
what extent do they prefer international regulatory harmonization as that would minimize
compliance costs relative to taking advantage of lax taxation and disclosure requirements
in financial havens? And what are the effect on the domestic political economies that serve
as havens? The fact that some of the severest effects of the recent global financial crisis
occurred in haven countries like Ireland, Cyprus, and Iceland provides some indication
of the risks involved with courting global finance. On the other hand, countries such as
Switzerland and the Caribbean tax shelters came through the crisis relatively unscathed.
Understanding the relationship between firm behaviors and crisis is also important, but
is not explored in this analysis. The period from 2000-2006 was remarkably crisis-free
compared to the 1990s and later 2000s. Some of the firm behaviors uncovered in this paper
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may have been reactive to the 1990s crises, or may have changed significantly following
the subprime crisis. Both crisis periods culminated in a major reform to the Basel capital
accords as well as many significant domestic reforms. The ways in which firms’ risk-taking
activities were related to these crises surely had an impact on – and were responsive to –
regulatory reform efforts. As before, extending the time series back backward and forward
could provide more of an insight into the particular features of financial market behaviors.
Finally, this paper is not able to fully embed firms into the global financial system.
While detailed analysis of cross-national financial interdependencies do not exist – or at
least are not available publicly – at the firm level, the global nature of the recent crisis
underscores the importance of understanding how developments in one jurisdiction can
impact financial health elsewhere. Moreover, as financial markets become increasingly
globalized firms’ locating firms habitats within national political economies will become
less and less useful.
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A CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX
A.1 Why Focus on Capital Ratios?
There are two basic categories of banking regulations. The first are “prudential” stan-
dards – such as minimum capital-to-assets ratios (CAR) – which restrict the amount of risk
to which a bank may expose itself. The second are “profit-padding” standards, in which
governments insulate domestic firms from foreign competition.1 Lower minimum CAR
allow banks to seek greater profits through taking on greater risks. Less competition allows
incumbent banks to earn a profit without exposure to excessive risk. By providing domes-
tic banking sectors with rents, national governments intend to reduce excessive risk-taking
and promote systemic stability. Rosenbluth and Schaap (2003) argue that banks lobby for
either lower prudential standards or greater protection from competition, and governments
emphasize one type or the other depending on national characteristics. Singer (2004, 2007)
argues that regulators seek to balance stability and competitiveness through a mix of regu-
latory independence and international harmonization.
International harmonization of prudential regulatory standards became necessary fol-
lowing the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of capital controls, while technological
advances led to a large increase in financial integration. Policymakers in advanced indus-
trial economies preferred an international financial system where restrictions on capital
1Scholars have used different names for similar classifications of regulation type. For example, the “con-
fidence” regulations in Singer (2004) are not unlike the “prudential” regulations in Rosenbluth and Schaap
(2003) or the “helping-hand” regulations in Barth, Caprio Jr., and Levine (2001). Singer’s “competitive-
ness” regulations are not unlike the “profit-padding” regulations in Rosenbluth and Schaap (2003) or the
“grabbing-hand” regulations in Barth, Caprio Jr., and Levine (2001).
mobility were few.2 The desire for capital liberalization reduced the amount of profit-
padding regulatory options available to policymakers, thus increasing the importance of
common prudential standards. As a result, international regulations have focused on capi-
tal adequacy rather than protectionism. In fact, the Basel committee has often emphasized
the importance of competition as a means of monitoring and disciplining banks. Market
discipline is the “third pillar” of the second Basel accord.3 The choice to maintain open,
competitive capital markets meant that capital adequacy became the bedrock of pruden-
tial regimes at both the domestic and international levels. It became the focal point for
international harmonization efforts, beginning with Basel I, and remains so to the present.
These requirements generally take the form of capital-to-assets ratios, often weighted
according to the riskiness of a bank’s asset portfolio. The basic formula for CAR is simply
Capital
Assets
. Basel I specified two tiers of capital, separated by quality. Tier 1 capital (core
capital) includes equity capital and disclosed reserves, while tier 2 capital (supplementary
capital) includes subordinated debt, undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, and hybrid
instruments.4 Additionally, asset types are weighted according to their perceived risk. So
the Basel CAR formula is T ier1+T ier2
RWA
≥ γ, where RWA is a firm’s risk-weighted assets and
γ is some threshold of risk tolerance. Under Basel I and II, γ = 4% for tier 1 capital and
γ = 8% for tier 1 + tier 2 capital.
The relationship between capital-to-assets ratios and leverage is as follows. Assets
can be financed by either equity or debt. Tier 1 capital ratios measure the amount of a
2For detailed descriptions of how and why this preference for open capital markets became a broadly-
shared norm, see Helleiner (1994), Abdelal (2007), and Chwieroth (2007, 2009).
3Basel III lessens the reliance on market discipline in favor of higher statutory requirements.
4There is some cross-national variation in what qualifies as tier 1 and tier 2 capital under the Basel accords.
For the most part, the definition of tier 1 capital is the same for all countries, except that some forms of
preferred stock qualify as tier 1 capital for American bank holding companies. The definition of tier 2 capital
is largely left up to national regulators, and cross-national variations are sometimes quite significant. Part
of the Basel III negotiations have involved tightening these definitions, and focusing more on core Tier 1
capital. In other words, to require higher quality capital reserves, as well as higher quantity. This has been a
contentious process, as described in more detail below.
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Type of Asset Risk-Weight
Cash
0%
OECD sovereign debt
Claims on OECD banks
20%Claims on OECD securities firms
Municipal debt
Residential mortgages 50%
Unsecured loans
100%Claims on non-OECD banks
Fixed assets
Table A.1: Basel Risk Weights By Asset Type. This basic weighting schedule was in place
during the period under observation.
firm’s financing which comes from equity: Equity
Assets
. Leverage is the ratio of a firm’s debt
to its equity: Debt
Equity
. Therefore, tier 1 capital ratios are the inverse of leverage, with a
transformation allowing for variance in the risk of different types of assets. Table A.1
shows a basic risk-weighting schedule under the first Basel accord.5 As an example, a bank
holding $100 in U.S. Treasury bills would have to hold zero capital guaranteeing against
default risk, as OECD sovereign debt is considered risk-less. However, loans to commercial
enterprises carry a 100% risk-weight, so banks would have to hold $8 in capital against
$100 in unsecured commercial loans, of which $4 must be tier 1 ($100 ∗ 1.00 ∗ 0.08 = $8).
Banks would have to reserve $2 in capital against $100 in securities issued by OECD firms
or governments, of which $1 must be core capital, since the risk-weight for these assets
was 20% ($100 ∗ 0.2 ∗ 0.08 = $2).6
Capital ratios are important for regulators and investors because they provide an as-
sessment of a bank’s risk profile in a way that is fairly easy compare across firms and
jurisdictions. For this reason they have formed the foundation of prudential regulatory
5These are given in the “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards”, the
official name of Basel I, available on the BIS website at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf. The second
Basel accord complicated these ratios, primarily by allowing more variation within asset classes according to
riskiness as rated by credit agencies, bank’s internal models, or domestic regulators.
6For a more detailed discussion of how often this worked in practice, see Friedman (2009).
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regimes. They are not without fault, however. Many of the securitized investment vehicles
at the center of the subprime crisis required less capital to protect against default risk than
the underlying assets would have required if unsecuritized. When those investments failed
to pay off, many firms were left without sufficient capital to remain solvent. Nor do mini-
mum capital ratios correct over-leveraging and illiquidity, both of which contributed to the
severity of the recent crash. Indeed, high capital ratios can even make sick firms look well.
As the Financial Times noted:
The five largest US financial institutions subject to Basel capital rules that ei-
ther failed or were forced into government-assisted mergers in 2008 – Bear
Stearns, Washington Mutual, Lehman Brothers, Wachovia and Merrill Lynch
– had regulatory capital ratios ranging from 12.3 per cent to 16.1 per cent
as of their last quarterly disclosures before they were effectively shut down.
The capital levels of these five banks were between 50 per cent and 100 per
cent above the minimums and 23 per cent to 61 per cent higher than the well-
capitalised standard. The strong implication is that capital levels for most
banks – and especially for large institutions that raise systemic risk concerns –
are set by market expectations, not regulatory rules (Kuritzkes and Scott 2009).
In other words, markets considered the legal requirements to be too low, and demanded
more. As it happens, markets were more correct than governments, but they still under-
estimated the risk these firms were carrying on their books (and, sometimes, off of them).
Nevertheless, regulators and investors will continue to rely on capital ratios as a measure
of a firm’s risk exposure, because a more detailed assessment of every firm would be pro-
hibitively expensive. Capital ratios provide important information regarding the risk profile
of firms, and along with new restrictions on leverage and liquidity, formed the backbone of
the Basel III revision of global rules. For these reasons, using capital ratios as the dependent
variable in a study of bank behaviors and regulatory politics is the obvious choice.
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A.2 Model Results: 2000
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Figure A.1: Correlates of banks’ risk-weighted tier 1 capital adequacy ratios as estimated
by a Bayesian linear regression in the year 2000.
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A.3 Model Results: 2003
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Figure A.2: Correlates of banks’ risk-weighted tier 1 capital adequacy ratios as estimated
by a Bayesian linear regression in the year 2003.
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A.4 Model Results: 2006
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Figure A.3: Correlates of banks’ risk-weighted tier 1 capital adequacy ratios as estimated
by a Bayesian linear regression in the year 2006.
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A.5 Model Results: All Years
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Figure A.4: Correlates of banks’ risk-weighted tier 1 capital adequacy ratios as estimated
by a Bayesian linear regression in all sample years.
126
REFERENCES
Abdelal, Rawi. 2007. Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power,
Prosperity, and Poverty. Crown Business.
Achen, Christopher H. 2005. “Let’s Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Garbage-Can Pro-
bits Where They Belong.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 22 (4): 327.
Aizenman, Joshua, Menzie D. Chinn, and Hiro Ito. 2008. “Assessing the Emerging Global
Financial Architecture: Measuring the Trilemma’s Configurations Over Time.” NBER
Working Paper No. 14533.
Anderson, James E. 2011. “The Gravity Model.” Annual Review of Economics 3: 133–160.
Bagehot, Walter. 1873. Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market. London:
Henry S. King and Co.
Bank for International Settlements. 2011. “Global systemically important banks: Assess-
ment methodology and the additional loss absorbency requirement.” Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision Consultative Document.
Baraba´si, A.-L., and R. Albert. 1999. “Emergence of scaling in random networks.” Science
286: 509–512.
Baraba´si, Albert-La´szlo´. 2012. Network Science. Self-published.
Baron, David P. 2001. “Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated
Strategy.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10 (1): 7–45.
Barrios, Victor E., and Juan M. Blanco. 2003. “The effectiveness of bank capital adequacy
regulation: A theoretical and empirical approach.” Journal of Banking and Finance 27
(10): 1935–1958.
Barth, James R., Gerard Caprio Jr., and Ross Levine. 2001. “Bank Regulation and Super-
vision: What Works Best?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2725.
Barth, James R., Gerard Caprio Jr., and Ross Levine. 2008. “Bank Regulations are Chang-
ing: For Better or Worse?” Comparative Economic Studies 50 (4): 537–563.
Barth, James R., Gerard Caprio Jr., and Ross Levine. 2013. “Bank Regulation and Super-
vision in 180 Countries from 1999 to 2011.” NBER Working Paper 18733.
127
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 2001. “Consultive Document Pillar 3 (Market
Discipline).” Bank for International Settlements Supporting Document to the New Basel
Capital Accord.
Basinger, Scott J., and Mark Hallerberg. 2004. “Remodeling the Competition for Capi-
tal: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom.” American Political Science
Review 98 (2): 261–276.
Berger, Allen N. 2006. “Potential Competitive Effects of Basel II on Banks in SME Credit
Markets in the United States.” Journal of Financial Services Research 29 (1): 5–36.
Bernanke, Ben S. 2005. “The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit.”
Speech given as the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economists, Richmond,
Virginia.
Bernauer, Thomas, and Vally Koubi. 2002. “Regulating Bank Capital: Can Market Disci-
pline Facilitate or Replace Capital Adequacy Rules?” Working Paper.
Bernauer, Thomas, and Vally Koubi. 2006. “On the Interconnectedness of Regulatory
Policy and Markets: Lessons from Banking.” British Journal of Political Science 36 (3):
509–525.
Bernauer, Thomas, and Vally Koubi. 2009. “Taking Firms and Markets Seriously: A Study
on Bank Behavior, Market Discipline, and Regulatory Policy.” Working Paper.
Bianconi, G., and A.-L. Baraba´si. 2001. “Competition and multiscaling in evolving net-
works.” Europhysics Letters 54: 436–442.
Bonacich, Phillip. 1972. “Factoring and weighting approaches to clique identification.”
Journal of Mathematical Sociology 2: 113–120.
Bonacich, Phillip. 1987. “Power and Centrality: A Family of Measures.” American Journal
of Sociology 92 (5): 1170–1182.
Borgatti, Stephen P. 2005. “Centrality and network flow.” Social Networks 27 (1): 55–71.
Brady, Steffanie A., Ken E. Anadu, and Nathaniel R. Cooper. 2012. “The Stability of Prime
Money Market Mutual Funds: Sponsor Support from 2007 to 2011.” Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston Risk and Policy Analysis Unit Working Paper RPA 12-3.
Brewer III, Elijah, George G. Kaufman, and Larry D. Wall. 2008. “Bank Capital Ratios
Across Countries: Why Do They Vary?” Journal of Financial Services Research 34:
177–201.
Brooks, Sarah M. 2007. “When Does Diffusion Matter? Explaining the Spread of Struc-
tural Pension Reforms Across Nations.” The Journal of Politics 69 (3): 701–715.
128
Broz, J. Lawrence. 2012. “The Federal Reserve as Global Lender of Last Resort, 2007-
2010.” Working Paper.
Burt, R., P. Marsden, and P.H. Rossi. 1985. “A research agenda for survey network data.”
Columbia University workshop on survey network data .
Bu¨the, Tim. 2010. “Global Private Politics: A Research Agenda.” Business and Politics 12
(3).
Carpenter, R. Charli. 2011. “Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Network Centrality and the
Paradox of Weapons Norms.” International Organization 65 (1): 69–102.
Christensen, Hans B., Luzi Hail, and Christian Leuz. 2011. “Capital-Market Effects of
Securities Regulation: The Role of Implementation and Enforcement.” NBER Working
Paper No. 16737.
Chwieroth, Jeffrey. 2007. “Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in
Emerging Markets.” International Organization 61 (2): 443–463.
Chwieroth, Jeffrey M. 2009. Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberaliza-
tion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Clauset, Aaron, Cosma Rohilla Shalizi, and M. E. J. Newman. 2009. “Power-law distribu-
tions in empirical data.” SIAM Review 51: 661–703.
Cohen, Benjamin J. 2000. “Money and Power in World Politics.” In Strange Power, ed.
Thomas C. Lawton, and Amy C. Verdun. Ashgate Publishing.
Cohen, Benjamin J. 2006. “The Macrofoundations of Monetary Power.” In International
Monetary Power, ed. David M. Andrews. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Cohen, Benjamin J. 2008. International Political Economy: An Intellectual History.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Cohen, Benjamin J. 2009a. “Currency and State Power.” Revista da Procuradoria-Geral
do Banco Central 3 (2).
Cohen, Benjamin J. 2009b. “A Grave Case of Myopia.” International Interactions 35 (4):
436–444.
Cohen, Stephen S., and J. Bradford DeLong. 2010. The End of Influence: What Happens
When Other Countries Have the Money. Basic Books.
Conway, Drew. 2012. “Who are the most central members of China’s leadership as we
enter 2012?” Zero Intelligence Agents blog post, http://www.drewconway.com/zia/?p=
2825#more-2825.
129
Copelovitch, Mark S., and David Andrew Singer. 2008. “Financial Regulation, Monetary
Policy, and Inflation in the Industrialized World.” Journal of Politics 70 (3): 663–680.
Cranmer, Skyler J., and Bruce A. Desmarais. 2011a. “Forecasting the Locational Dy-
namics of Transnational Terrorism: A Network Analytic Approach.” Proceedings of the
European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference .
Cranmer, Skyler J., and Bruce A. Desmarais. 2011b. “Inferential Network Analysis with
Exponential Random Graph Models.” Political Analysis 19 (1): 66–86.
Cranmer, Skyler J., Bruce A. Desmarais, and Elizabeth J. Menninga. 2012. “Complex
Dependencies in the Alliance Network.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 29
(3): 279–313.
Cranmer, Skyler J., Bruce A. Desmarais, and Justin H. Kirkland. 2012. “Toward a Network
Theory of Alliance Formation.” International Interactions 38 (3): 295–324.
Cranmer, Skyler J., Bruce A. Desmarais, and Tobias Henrich. 2013. “Reciprocity and
the Structural Determinants of the International Sanctions Network.” Social Networks
forthcoming.
Crew, Michael, and David Parker, eds. 2006. International Handbook on Economic Regu-
lation. Northamption, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Culbertson, J. 1957. “The Term Structure of Interest Rates.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 71: 485–517.
Dahl, Robert A. 1957. “The Concept of Power.” Behavioral Science 2 (3): 201–215.
Demsetz, Harold. 1968. “Why Regulate Utilities?” Journal of Law and Economics 11 (1):
55–65.
Desmarais, B. A., and S. J. Cranmer. 2012. “Statistical mechanics of networks: Estimation
and uncertainty.” Physica A 391 (4): 1865–1876.
Drezner, Daniel W. 2007. All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory
Regimes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Drezner, Daniel W. 2009. “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great
Power Politics.” International Security 34 (2): 7–45.
Drezner, Daniel W. 2012. “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System
Worked.” Council on Foreign Relations International Institutions and Global Governance
Program Working Paper.
Drezner, Daniel W., and Kathleen R. McNamara. 2013. “International Political Economy,
130
Global Financial Orders and the 2008 Financial Crisis.” Perspectives on Politics 11 (1):
155–166.
Eichengreen, Barry. 2006. “The Blind Man and the Elephant.” The Brookings Institution
Issues in Economy Policy.
Eichengreen, Barry. 2011. Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the
Future of the International Monetary System. Oxford University Press.
Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth Simmons. 2006. “Competing for Capital :
The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties , 1960-2000 Competing for Capital: The
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000.”.
Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. Mackuen, and James A. Stimson. 2008. The Macro Polity.
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Fama, Eugene. 1965. “The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices.” The Journal of Business 38
(1): 34–105.
Fama, Eugene. 1970. “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work.” Journal of Finance 25 (2): 383–417.
Financial Stability Forum. 2008. “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing
Market and Institutional Resilience.”.
Financial Stability Institute. 2012. “Basel II, 2.5 and III Implementation.” Financial Stabil-
ity Institute Survey.
Freeman, Linton C. 1978. “Centrality in Social Networks: Conceptual Clarification.” So-
cial Networks 1: 215–239.
Friedman, Jeffrey. 2009. “A Crisis of Politics, Not Economics: Complexity, Ignorance, and
Policy Failure.” Critical Review 21 (2-3): 127–183.
Friedman, Jeffrey, and Wladmimir Kraus. 2011. Engineering the Financial Crisis: Sys-
temic Risk and the Failure of Regulation. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania
Press.
Garcia-Johnson, Ronie. 2000. Exporting Environmentalism: U.S. Multinational Chemical
Corporations in Brazil and Mexico. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gartzke, Erik. 2007. “The Capitalist Peace.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (1):
166–191.
Germain, Randall D. 1997. The International Organization of Credit. Cambridge, MA:
Cambridge University Press.
131
Ghatak, Maitresh. 1999. “Group lending, local information and peer selection.” Journal of
Development Economics 60 (1): 27–50.
Ghosh, Saibal, and Abhuman Das. 2005. “Market Discipline, Capital Adequacy and Bank
Behavior.” Economic and Political Weekly 40 (12): 1210–1215.
Gilardi, Fabrizio. 2012. “Tranational diffusion: Norms, ideas, and policies.” In Hand-
book of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Best Simmons.
SAGE Publications.
Gile, Krista J., and Mark S. Handcock. 2006. “Model-based Assessment of the Impact of
Missing Data on Inference for Networks.” CSSS Working Paper no. 66.
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, and He´le`ne Rey. 2007. “From World Bank to World Venture
Capitalist: US Extenal Adjustment and the Exorbitant Privilege.” In G7 Current Account
Imbalances: Sustainability and Adjustment, ed. Richard H. Clarida. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Granovetter, Mark S. 1973. “The Strength of Weak Ties.” American Journal of Sociology
78 (6): 1300–1380.
Greenhill, Brian, Layna Mosley, and Aseem Prakash. 2009. “Trade and Labor Rights: A
Panel Study, 1980-2003.” American Political Science Review 103 (4).
Greenspan, Alan. 2010. “The Crisis.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity April, 2010.
Gropp, Reint, and Jukka Vesala. 2004. “Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Market
Monitoring.” European Central Bank Working Paper Series No. 302.
Grossman, Gene M., and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg. 2012. “Task Trade between Similar
Countries.” Econometrica 80 (2): 593–629.
Group of 20. 2008. “Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Econ-
omy.”.
Guerin, Selen Sarisoy, and Stefano Manzocchi. 2006. “When FDI Flows from Rich to Poor
Countries: Do democracy and economic reform matter?” CEPS Working Document, No.
251.
Guibaud, Ste´phane, Yves Nosbusch, and Dimitri Vayanos. 2013. “Bond Market Clienteles,
the Yield Curve, and the Optimal Maturity Structure of Government Debt.” Review of
Financial Studies forthcoming.
Hafner-Burton, Emilie, Miles Kahler, and Alexander H. Montgomery. 2009. “Network
Analysis for International Relations.” International Organization 63: 559–592.
132
Ha¨gg, P. Go¨ran T. 1997. “Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the
Literature from a European Perspective.” European Journal of Law and Economics 4
(4): 337–370.
Haldane, Andrew G. 2009. “Rethinking the Financial Network.” Speech delivered at the
Financial Student Association, Amsterdam, April.
Hanneman, Robert, and Mark Riddle. 2005. Introduction to social network methods. Self-
published.
Hart, Jeffrey. 1974. “Structures of Influence and Cooperation-Conflict.” International In-
teractions 1: 141–162.
Helleiner, Eric. 1994. States and the Emergence of Global Finance. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Helleiner, Eric. 2010. “A Bretton Woods moment? The 2007 – 2008 crisis and the future
of global finance.” International Affairs 3 (April): 619–636.
Helleiner, Eric. 2011. “Understanding the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis: Lessons
for Scholars of International Political Economy.” Annual Review of Political Science 14:
67–87.
Helleiner, Eric, and Stefano Pagliari. 2011. “The End of an Era in International Financial
Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda.” International Organization 65 (1): 169–
200.
Hunter, David R. 2007. “Curved Exponential Family Models for Social Networks.” Social
Networks 29 (2): 216–230.
Hunter, David R., and Mark S. Handcock. 2006. “Inference in Curved Exponential Family
Models for Networks.” Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics 15 (3): 565–
583.
Irwin, Neil. 2013. The Alchemists: Three Central Bankers and a World on Fire. Penguin
Press HC.
Jacques, Kevin, and Peter Nigro. 1997. “Risk-based capital, portfolio risk, and bank capital:
A simultaneous equations approach.” Journal of Economics and Business 49 (6): 533–
547.
Jensen, Nathan. 2008. “Political Regimes and Political Risk: Democratic Institutions and
Expropriation Risk for Foreign Direct Investors.” Journal of Politics 70 (4): 1040–1052.
Johnson, Simon, and James Kwak. 2011. 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the
Next Financial Meltdown. New York, NY: Random House.
133
Kapstein, Ethan B. 1989. “Resolving the Regulator’s Dilemma: International Coordination
of Banking Regulations.” International Organization 43 (2): 323–347.
Kapstein, Ethan B. 1991. “Supervising International Banks: Origins and Implications of
the Basle Accord.” In Princeton University Department of Economics Essay in Interna-
tional Finance.
Kapstein, Ethan B. 1994. Governing the Global Economy: International Finance and the
State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Keohane, Robert O. 2009. “The old IPE and the new.” Review of International Political
Economy 16 (1): 34–46.
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye Jr. 1973. “World Politics and the International
Economic System.” In The Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda for
Research, ed. C. Fred Bergsten. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye Jr. 1977. Power and Interdependence: World
Politics in Transition. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.
Palgrave Macmillan.
Kindleberger, Charles. 1973. The World in Depression, 1929-1939. Berkeley, CA: Univer-
sity of California Press.
Kindleberger, Charles P., and Robert Aliber. 2005. Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History
of Financial Crises. Fifth ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons.
Kirschner, Jonathan. 2007. Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Knoke, D., and R. S. Burt. 1983. “Prominence.” In Applied Network Analysis: A Method-
ological Introduction, ed. R. S. Burt, and M. J. Miner. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publica-
tions, Inc. pp. 195–222.
Knoke, David. 1990. Political Networks: The Structural Perspective. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1991. “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the
Pareto Frontier.” World Politics 43 (3): 336–366.
Kuritzkes, Andrew, and Hal Scott. 2009. “Markets are the best judge of
bank capital.” Financial Times http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2ca160b0-a870-11de-9242-
00144feabdc0.html. Published September 23, 2009; last accessed February 2, 2011.
134
Laeven, Luc, and Fabian Valencia. 2008. “Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database.”
International Monetary Fund WP/08/224.
Laeven, Luc, and Fabian Valencia. 2010. “Resolution of Banking Crises: The Good, the
Bad, and the Ugly.” International Monetary Fund WP/10/146.
Laeven, Luc, and Fabian Valencia. 2012. “Systemic Banking Crisis Database: An Update.”
IMF WP/12/163 .
Liu, Liang, Lili Yu, and Scott V. Edwards. 2010. “A maximum pseudo-likelihood approach
for estimating species trees under the coalescent model.” BMC Evolutionary Biology 10
(302).
Mackenzie, Donald. 2005. “Opening the black boxes of global finance.” Review of Inter-
national Political Economy 12 (4): 555–576.
Mackenzie, Donald. 2006. An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Mar-
kets. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Maliniak, Daniel, and Michael J. Tierney. 2009. “The American school of IPE.” Review of
International Political Economy 16 (1): 6–33.
Malkiel, Burton. 1973. A Random Walk Down Wall Street. New York, NY: W.W. Norton
and Company.
Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. “Free to Trade:
Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade.” American Political Science Review
94 (2): 305–321.
Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett. 1993. “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic
Peace, 1946-1986.” The American Political Science Review 87 (3): 624–638.
Marx, Karl. 1867. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. 1967 ed. New York, NY:
International Publishers.
McCoy, Patricia A. 2006. “The Moral Hazard Implications of Deposit Insurance: The-
ory and Evidence.” Paper presented at the IMF Seminar on Currency Developments in
Monetary and Financial Law, Washington D.C., October.
Merton, Robert C. 1973. “Theory of Rational Option Pricing.” Bell Journal of Economics
and Management Science 4 (1): 141–183.
Meseguer, Covadona, and Frabrizio Gilardi. 2009. “What is new in the study of policy
diffusion?” Review of International Political Economy 16 (3): 527–543.
Milner, Helen V., and Keiko Kubota. 2005. “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and
135
Trade Policy in the Developing Countries.” International Organization 59 (1): 107–43.
Minsky, Hyman P. 1986. Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New Haven, CT: Yale Univer-
sity Press.
Mishkin, Frederic S. 1980. “Is the Preferred-Habitat Model of the Term Structure Inconsis-
tent with Financial Market Efficiency?” Journal of Political Economy 88 (2): 406–411.
Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H. Miller. 1958. “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Fi-
nance and the Theory of Investment.” The American Economic Review 48 (3): 261–297.
Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H. Miller. 1963. “Corporate income taxes and the cost of
capital: a correction.” American Economic Review 53 (3): 433–443.
Modigliani, Franco, and Richard Sutch. 1967. “Debt Management and the Term Structure
of Interest Rates: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Experience.” Journal of Political
Economy 75 (4): 569–589.
Modigliani, Franco, and Robert J. Shiller. 1973. “Inflation, Rational Expectations and the
Term Structure of Interest Rates.” Economica 40 (1): 12–43.
Mosley, Layna. 2000. “Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Wel-
fare States.” International Organization 54 (4): 737–773.
Mosley, Layna. 2003. Global Capital and National Governments. Cambridge, MA: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Mosley, Layna. 2008. “Workers’ Rights in Open Economies: Global Production and Do-
mestic Institutions in the Developing World.” Comparative Political Studies 41 (4/5).
Mosley, Layna. 2010. Labor Rights and Multinational Production. Cambridge, MA: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Mosley, Layna, and David Andrew Singer. 2009. “The Global Financial Crisis: Lessons
and Opportunities for International Political Economy.” International Interactions 35
(4): 420–429.
Mosley, Layna, and Saika Uno. 2007. “Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top?
Economic Globalization and Collective Labor Rights.” Comparative Political Studies 40
(8): 923–948.
Mu¨gge, Daniel. 2009. “Tales of tails and dogs: Derivatives and financialization in contem-
porary capitalism.” Review of International Political Economy 16 (3): 514–526.
Neumayer, Eric, and Thomas Plu¨mper. 2010. “Spatial Effects in Dyadic Data.” Interna-
tional Organization 64 (1): 145–166.
136
Newman, M. E. J. 2005. “Power laws, Pareto distributions and Zipf’s law.” Contemporary
Physics 46: 323–351.
Nexon, Daniel H. 2009. The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Ngo, Phong T.H. 2006. “A Theory of Precationary Regulatory Capital in Banking.” Inter-
national Review of Finance 6 (3-4): 99–128.
North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.”
The Journal of Economic History 49 (4): 803–832.
Oatley, Thomas. 2011. “The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global
Economy.” International Organization 65 (2): 311–341.
Oatley, Thomas. 2013. “The Political Economy of Imbalance.” Manuscript.
Oatley, Thomas, and Jason Yackee. 2004. “American Interests and IMF Lending.” Interna-
tional Politics 41: 415–429.
Oatley, Thomas, and Robert Nabors. 1998. “Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure,
Wealth Transfers, and the Basle Accord.” International Organization 52 (1): 35–54.
Oatley, Thomas, and W. Kindred Winecoff. 2012. “The Domestic Rooting of Financial
Regulation in an Era of Global Capital Markets.” In Research Handbook on Hedge
Funds, Private Equity and Alternative Investments, ed. Phoebus Athanassiou. London:
Edward Elgar Publishing.
Oatley, Thomas, W. Kindred Winecoff, Sarah Bauerle Danzman, and Andrew Pennock.
2013. “The Political Economy of Global Finance: A Network Model.” Perspectives on
Politics 11 (133-153).
Opsahl, Tore, Filip Agneessens, and John Skvoretz. 2010. “Node centrality in weighted
networks: Generalizing degree and shortest paths.” Social Networks 32 (3): 245–251.
Palan, Ronen. 2009. “The Proof of the Pudding Is In the Eating: IPE in the Light of the
Crisis of 2007/8.” New Political Economy 14 (3): 385–394.
Peltzman, Sam. 1970. “Capital Investment in Commercial Banking and its Relation to
Portfolio Regulation.” Journal of Political Economy 78: 1–26.
Peltzman, Sam. 1976. “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation?” Journal of Law
and Economics 19 (2): 211–240.
Peltzman, Sam. 1989. “The economic theory of regulation after a decade of deregulation.”
137
In Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics. Washington D. C.: The
Brookings Institution pp. 1–59.
Pigou, Arthur C. 1932. The Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan and Co.
Pitlik, Hans. 2007. “A race to liberalization? Diffusion of economic policy reform among
OECD-economies.” Public Choice 132 (1/2): 159–178.
Polanyi, Karl. 1944. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of
Our Time. 2001 ed. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2008. From Economic Crisis to Reform: IMF Programs in Latin
America and Eastern Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Prakash, Aseem, and Matthew Potoski. 2007. “Investing Up: FDI and the Cross-Country
Diffusion of ISO 14001 Management Systems.” International Studies Quarterly 51 (3):
723–744.
Price, David A., and John R. Walter. 2011. “Identifying Systemically Important Financial
Institutions.” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Brief.
Rajan, Raghuram G. 2010. Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World
Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2009. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries
of Financial Folly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rosenbluth, Frances, and Ross Schaap. 2003. “The Domestic Politics of Banking Regula-
tion.” International Organization 57 (2): 307–336.
Saiegh, Sebastian M. 2005. “Do Countries Have a “Democratic Advantage”? Political In-
stutions, Multilateral Agencies, and Sovereign Borrowing.” Comparative Political Stud-
ies 38 (4): 366–387.
Schrodt, Philip A. 2010. “Seven Deadly Sins of Contemporary Quantitative Political Anal-
ysis.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Seattle, WA.
Schultz, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 2003. “The Democratic Advantage: In-
stitutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition.” International
Organization 57 (1): 3–42.
Simmons, Beth A. 2001. “The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital
Market Regulation.” International Organization 55 (3): 589–620.
Simmons, Beth A., and Zachary Elkins. 2004. “The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy
138
Diffusion in the International Political Economy.” American Political Science Review 98
(1): 171–189.
Singer, David Andrew. 2004. “Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Reg-
ulatory Harmonization.” International Organization 58 (3): 531–565.
Singer, David Andrew. 2007. Regulating Capital: Setting Standards for the International
Financial System. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2012. “A Grand Strategy of Network Centrality.” In America’s
Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration, ed. Richard Fountaine, and Kristin M.
Lord. Center for a New American Security pp. 43–56.
Sobel, Andrew C. 2012. Birth of Hegemony: Crisis, Financial Revolution, and Emerging
Global Networks. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Stigler, George J. 1971. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” The Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics and Management Science 2 (1): 3–21.
Stone, Randall W. 2004. “The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa.” American
Political Science Review 98 (4): 577–591.
Stone, Randall W. 2008. “The Scope of IMF Conditionality.” International Organization
62 (4): 589–620.
Strange, Susan. 1982. “Cave! hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis.” International
Organization 36 (2): 479–496.
Strange, Susan. 1987. “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony.” International Organiza-
tion 41 (4): 551–574.
Strange, Susan. 1992. “States, Firms, and Diplomacy.” International Affairs 68 (1): 1–15.
Strange, Susan. 1998. “What Theory? The Theory in Mad Money.” Centre for the Study of
Globalisation and Regionalisation Working Paper No. 18/98.
Subramanian, Arvind. 2011. Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Domi-
nance. Institute for International Economics.
Thacker, Strom C. 1999. “The High Politics of IMF Lending.” World Politics 52 (1): 38–75.
The International Monetary Fund. 2012. “Global Financial Stability Report: Restoring
Confidence and Progressing on Reforms.” World Economic and Financial Surveys.
Tomz, Michael. 2007. Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across
Three Centuries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
139
van Duijn, Marijtje A. J., Krista J. Gile, and Mark S. Handcock. 2009. “A Framework for
the Comparison of Maximum Pseudo Likelihood and Maximum Likelihood Estimation
of Exponential Family Random Graph Models.” Social Networks 31 (1): 52–62.
Vayanos, Dimitri, and Jean-Luc Vila. 2011. “A preferred-habitat model of the term struc-
ture of interest rates.” London School of Economics Working Paper.
Vogel, David. 2008. “Private Global Business Regulation.” Annual Review of Political
Science pp. 261–282.
Vogel, David. 2009. “The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct.” In The Politics
of Global Regulation, ed. Walter Mattli, and Ngaire Woods. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press pp. 151–188.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist Sys-
tem: Concepts for Comparative Analysis.” Comparative Studies in Society and History
16 (4): 387–415.
Walter, Andrew. 2008a. Governing finance: East Asia’s adoption of international stan-
dards. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Walter, Andrew. 2012. “Over-compliance with Basel Standards.” Presentation.
Walter, Stefanie. 2008b. “A New Approach for Determining Exchange-Rate Level Prefer-
ences.” International Organization 62 (3): 405–438.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959. Man, the State, and War. New York, NY: Columbia University
Press.
Ward, Michael D., John S. Ahlquist, and Arturas Rozenas. 2013. “Gravity’s Rainbow:
Dynamic Networks Models of International Commerce.” Network Science 1 (1).
Wasserman, Stanley, and P. Pattison. 1996. “Logit Models and Logistic Regression for
Social Networks: An Introduction to Markov Graphs and p*.” Psychometrika 61 (3):
401–425.
Winecoff, W. Kindred. 2014. “Bank Regulation, Monetary Incentives, and Macroeconomic
Management in OECD Economies.” International Studies Quarterly forthcoming.
Woods, Ngaire. 2003. “The United States and the International Financial Institutions:
Power and Influence Within the World Bank and the IMF.” In U.S. Hegemony and Inter-
national Organizations, ed. Rosemary Foot, Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno.
Oxford University Press.
Young, Kevin. 2012. “Transnational Regulatory Capture? An Empirical Examination of
Transnational Lobbying over the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.” Review of
140
International Political Economy 19 (4): 663–688.
141
